H+ Russia asked for an estimate of the computer power needed to raise the dead.
Anyone hazard a science guess at this?
Bare in mind there is a lot of repetition and it's not as vast as it seems.
Cheers
eldras
H+ Russia Calculations needed to resurrect the dead?
(121 posts) (15 voices)-
Spud100
Memberjesus Eldras, nobodies ever gone broke by underestimating such an attempt. How could we even test this kind of thing to see if its true. Doesn't the Russian Transhumanists have Mensky on their Board of Directors? He's a physicist and can prolly answer that as well as Tipler.
My sense of it is that we need to emulate not only neurons, but how they are connected. Using the archaic 10^17 operations per second estimated from the 1990's and multiply this times 100 billion neurons gives us something like 10 Octillion operations per second. Now multiply this times the number of people you want restored, or re-emulated, or whatever, and perhaps 150 billion hominids times all that, perhaps staggered over 400 years, maybe? Mixing both the Napoleonic terminology and the ancient Greek, I will guess, I would venture that it would take as a base number to start...15000 trillion yottabytes, or 150 quadrillion Exabytes per second, over decades and centuries. This number may net yet be enough. Unlike Tipler, I am guessing that rather than just guess about people, we can spy on the past, Roman Emperors on the shiter, and all that, and reconstitute reality. That seems somewhat more doable, then chasing after spacetime and manipulating it, but who's to say?
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberMy sense of it is that we need to emulate not only neurons, but how they are connected.
You're way off base of what the whole problem here is. There's nothing difficult about simulating a brain compared to recovering one that has decayed and vanished into oblivion; That would require an error-free simulation of the entire universe, which is an amusing prospect to say the least.Posted 3 months ago # -
Thanks spud100
That would require an error-free simulation of the entire universe,
not so.A human based history grid could be assembled.
Every neuron has not just vanished, but vanished by absolutely deterministic laws that affect other things now in the present by chains of causation.
But even a simulation of the local universe..unless you think Mars would be useful for earth humans????...
is not so difficult a task with enough computing plus enough maths & stats.The DNA of pretty much all groups of hominids back 50,000 years can be described approximately.
eg
A family group has been reconstructed albeit from skeletal remains in Lichtenstein:
https://sites.google.com/site/quantumarchaeology4/
There are many markers held archaeologically, including bits of brains.
Apart from the history matrix, my idea would be calculation from the present by chains of cause & effect.
Retrodiction is knowing the laws of science then number crunching.
The Russians want to know the numbers!
There are massive advances in statistics like algorithmic probabilities which factorially reduce what has to be done
Size of enterprise puts most people off, but it just using the same systems as on smaller ones (see Sun Tzu!)
What %age of a man's brain is unique?
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberWhy would re-simulating the entire cosmos, be necessary to re-simulate a person?
Because the cosmos constructed the person. There is no other way to recover the information. Once the data is recovered the simulation could be halted.Every neuron has not just vanished, but vanished by absolutely deterministic laws that affect other things now in the present by chains of causation.
Right, so all we need are the exact positions of every subatomic particle in the universe and an inconceivably fast computer. Piece of cake.Posted 3 months ago # -
I think it can be done within 10^40 ops -
the how would be a sort for physical state records of the right simple recursively self-compiled network- Wolfram is focusing on trivalent nodes but I think it will be hexavalent nodes confined in two dimensions [minimal graph] which through it's geometry renders trivalent Planck AREAS representing qubit states through triangulation between every three hexavalent nodes- because this is the spacetime geometry of the event horizon of a black hole according to the Holographic Principle http://www.zeropoint.ca/Blackhole_sciam.bmp
Posted 3 months ago # -
Project PX
MemberI don't think it's possible to raise the dead anymore. I look at resurrection like this: take a CD, copy the information to your computer then burn it to another disk... it will have the same songs and sounds but it's not the original disk. We can copy people but it won't be the same consciousness.
Posted 3 months ago # -
@project px - the nature of music recodings actually makes a perfect example of why the Identity of Indiscernibles principle is true:
again- the nature of the song is the answer- when you dub a song recording to different media you DON'T end up with different copies- different mixes like 'twins' or 'copies' - you get the ORIGINAL song recording- the aspects that made that recording unique and unrepeatable from the complex variations of voice and instrument interaction are not copied but PROJECTED through the recording - one can think of the data recording process like a radio transmitter that captures signals in space and time and provides a signal path to nonlocal regions of space and time-
Posted 3 months ago # -
I don't think it's possible to raise the dead anymore. I look at resurrection like this: take a CD, copy the information to your computer then burn it to another disk... it will have the same songs and sounds but it's not the original disk. We can copy people but it won't be the same consciousness.
this is the argument from consciousness.
If you'd care to define it it's answerable from science.
If you cant define it is illogical to debate it.
But you are being copied and replaced every second.set i'd be interested if you have a method for amount of data needed eg working from a human archaeology grid.
I also think it;s much lower that it seems because things are repeated and inevitable.
Posted 3 months ago # -
TheSeekerOfKnowledge
MemberBeing in the same quantum state does not seem necessary for being the same person. We change our states all the time and remain the same people - at least as far as we can tell! (On a molecular and atomic level you are not quite the same person you were a minute ago) Does Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle prevent us from replicating a person precisely enough for the person to think him or her was the same as the original? Who knows (it's intriguing) - the quantum no-cloning theorem prohibits us from making a perfect replica of a person.
The move of the meme uploading persons or here, identities from science fantasy to science should be accompanied at least by some attempt to explain the fundamental problems that suggest it isn’t theoretically possible. This is important I believe when writing for a general audience that may believe uncritically assertions as opposed to facts or hypotheses so nearly conceptually and perhaps experimentally buttressed that they are clearly on the verge of acceptance as scientific theories (not theories in the unfortunate non technical usage of the term).
First, the concept of” copy” should be explained in view of at least two or three major problems. First, explain why the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle does not preclude making an identical copy of a given brain’s precise structures and content down to the presumed level of specificity required to be sufficient to reproduce any acceptable degree of functioning mental activity that reasonably qualifies as a conscious mind…let alone an identical mind to the original.
Second, explain how it is theoretically possible to avoid the no-cloning theorem, a familiar part of many modern quantum text books. Essentially, the (proven) theorem shows that it isn’t possible to copy an unknown quantum state. Any attempt not only destroys the quantum state, it does not produce a copy. There is a theoretical possibility to produce something similar to the original state, but not identical. This is a severe problem if you believe there are any quantum states at all involved in whatever processes and structures in the brain necessary to the unknown generation of consciousness and mind. To rule out quantum states in processes for instance at the synapses and their functions in concert with the neuro transmitters within the associated vesicles and the electron flows would appear problematic. Given the vast number of quantum states likely to be present within the complex web of the brain’s biochemistry and electrical functioning, the multiplication of errors in each of those cast number of quantum states, were even a near cloning of each quantum state possible would result in a “scan” that would be enormously different than the now destroyed original.
Another problem that is ignored and a previous reply here may have touched upon is the concept of embodiment and its relation to mind or more precisely, one’s concept of self…or “identity”. Consciousness and mental states are mediated by more than the brain alone, as various experiments have demonstrated in recent years.
Lastly, the assertion that split brain persons are two different identities yet share “the same” memories and other characteristics, and that could be placed in two different bodies, is fraught with unexamined assumptions. Not least problematic is the question of the same memories. We are speaking of two hypothetically different selves, although experimentally it is differing knowledge and perception that have been shown to be available regarding the same event in the lab. Accepting for discussion that this means there are two separate selves or identities, they clearly have different memories of the lab events, and by extension presumably of other events beyond the lab. Therefore, they clearly would not share the same memories!
Reasonably, what we intend when toying with the idea of making copies of ourselves is that we would be creating another consciousness, another mind that is termed “identical” to our current, original self – however we may define that. However, despite much brain research and millennia of philosophizing, no one really knows how (embodied) brains generate or are endowed with consciousness, and how these terms such as mind actually relate to the brain and what is actually transpiringIt also seems to me that we have to distinguish between “self” and “identity”. I agree that “self” is an illusion, in the sense that I define it as an experience that some organisms such as humans can have that fuses sense impressions, memories, and a narrative about their relation to the outside world into an illusion of an agent separate from all others and from the environment in which it lives. “Identity” is a tag we place on each agent we see (and trivially on ourselves) that attempts to define the borders between those agents and between the agents and their environments.
But the identity of a human being is very slippery thing. Clearly we need to include the nervous system as part of identity; we wouldn’t have cognition, sense impressions, memory, or interaction with the world without it. And we should probably include the endocrine system; emotions are a part of us. But what about the immune system, which affects the other systems, almost certainly in some ways we don’t understand yet? And what of the commensal (and largely symbiotic) bacterial colonies we each carry? Do they contribute to identity?
These questions apply to the notion of mind-copying. How faithful a copy is one that doesn’t include one or more of those systems? And there are other questions of fidelity that arise when you ask what contributes to our identities as individuals. For instance, at what time scale do we need to consider an identity to be coherent? If it takes 100 milliseconds to record everything important about a person, is that record internally consistent? How about 100 seconds, or 100,000? There’s some evidence that our senses and cognition are smeared across a time window of several hundred milliseconds, but nervous potentials change on a time scale of low milliseconds or microseconds. Or in the other hand, endocrine secretions change levels on a time scale of hundreds of milliseconds to seconds.
The answers to these questions will have an effect on whether copying of an identity is possible at all, and whether it can be sufficiently faithful that it might actually be useful for something
Posted 3 months ago # -
Spud100
MemberAre we talking past each other? I am wondering of quantum states can be mistaken, in the discussion here, for Brain States? which involves a snapshot of neurons, neural activity, the voluntary and autonomic nervous system. Now, I would like to open the chat here, for the notion of holographic physics and the possibility that all information, all things quantum and otherwise, get automatically copied to the Planck Cell/Unit level? Perhaps, I am too much like the Japanese saying, that "To a hammer, everything in the world looks like a nail." But to me, its the basic unit of physics, it comprises spacetime, it fits the holographic principle-string theory-brane theory etc.
The idea would be to use some read-write function, to extract coherent data from this scale of the cosmos. Maybe the energy to do this would be too gigantic to accomplish this? Or, that everything is jumbled-up and incoherent forever? Perhaps the Planck cells are not where the information gets written? But I toy with this idea that we can, in a sense, data mine the Past Light Cone, in the Minkowski sense of the term.
I can offer up a science paper from Len Susskind at Stanford, that touches on this hypothesis. The paper is physics but in is connected to Information Science.
http://arxiv.org/abs/0710.1129I would offer, that if we invoke God (why need I do that?) this might be the way God would do it...or not!
Posted 3 months ago # -
the brain is not something that needs to be copied well to PERFECTLY TRANSFER the original mind- you need only deal with the low res brain states themselves - the statistical aggregations of action potential cluster patterns - and this will be EASY to test with BCI - by shunting localized brain activity for emulation activity and then simply SUBJECTIVELY compare them - the fact that hypnosis and exploratory probing of the brain causes PROFOUND effects in the mind's perception of reality and self strongly suggests that it will only require the crudest emulations to convince someone that the digital sensation is authentic- much of the early brain emulation could actually exploit our hypnotic suggestibility to program us to be accepting of very crude and superficial emulated sensations as the real thing- like a hypnotized subject who is made to believe that a red wagon is actually a Lamborghini- I truly think that much of the philosophical debate will disappear as technology brings uploading into the realm of empirical research and we simply experience the possibilities
Posted 3 months ago # -
Redakteur
MemberSeveral of you have made valuable contributions to this thread, so I'm marking it to find and come back to it later.
In the meantime, one (multi-part) question: How much computing "power" would be necessary to simulate a single, "typical" human neuron, in vitro? And once that is accomplished, how difficult would it be to take that simulation program and adapt it for variations of that original neuron? And how many different basic neuron "types" are there? I am assuming that there is only a single basic "type" of brain neuron (I'm discounting the glia, etc.), though with varying numbers of axons, synapses, and the like.
Or to put it another way: Disregarding the practical problem of miniaturizing and implanting, e.g., a silicon chip into the human brain in place of a natural living neuron, and establishing rejection-free interfaces to other neurons: Could one - in theory - design, construct, and program such a chip? And how "complex" would it be?
Please forgive me for posing such naîve questions, on which I'm sure neuro-scientists and A.I. specialists have been working for ages. Spud100? TheSeekerOfKnowledge? I'm looking for a back-of-the-envelope calculation here.
I'm not considering the difficulty of reconstituting a "lost" neuron, e.g., of a dead person. Let's assume that someone's brain has been scanned in as much detail as humanly possible, and that one could even "harvest" a living neuron from a volunteer.
Regards,
Posted 3 months ago # -
Kolosus
MemberCitation:
Psilocybin (the active component of magic mushrooms) dampens the activity of key brain regions.
" We thought when we started that psilocybin would activate different parts of the brain. But we haven't found any activation anywhere. All we have found are reductions in blood flow. The areas affected were those parts of the brain that tell us who we are, where we are and what we are."It means reality and consciousness itself could be fake.
If we calculate the universe, it may appear quite different.Posted 3 months ago # -
Right, so all we need are the exact positions of every subatomic particle in the universe and an inconceivably fast computer. Piece of cake.
No the scale is from the ion to the complete body.
Subatomics are below the atom. Some actions may be needed from that scale but most of them wonrt be that.SetAI has stated about 10/\42 ops would be needed & I cant argue with that.
What is certain is that we are increasing processing power on trajectories: 10/\42 ops
would be here in about 2100 by Moore's Law, however the singularity is predicted in 2045, and post human intelligence by 2020-30Professor Nick Bostrom at Oxford has dealt with this in his famous paper: The Simulation Argument:
"(for) a realistic simulation of human history...we can use ~10^33 - 10^36 operations as a rough estimate. As we gain more experience with virtual reality, we will get a better grasp of the computational requirements (100 billion humans50 years/human30 million secs/year[10^14, 10^17] operations in each human brain per second [10^33, 10^36] operations."
"a rough approximation of the computational power of a planetary-mass computer is 10^42 operations per second, and that assumes only already known nanotechnological designs, which are probably far from optimal. A single such a computer could simulate the entire mental history of humankind (call this an ancestor-simulation) by using less than one millionth of its processing power for one second." (ibid)
Posted 3 months ago # -
Red
How many basic different neuron types are there?
There are 2 basic types divided into classes and then some. 72+
wiki:
Neurons exist in a number of different shapes and sizes and can be classified by their morphology and function. The anatomist Camillo Golgi grouped neurons into two types; type I with long axons used to move signals over long distances and type II with short axons, which can often be confused with dendrites. Type I cells can be further divided by where the cell body or soma is located. The basic morphology of type I neurons, represented by spinal motor neurons, consists of a cell body called the soma and a long thin axon covered by the myelin sheath. Around the cell body is a branching dendritic tree that receives signals from other neurons. The end of the axon has branching terminals (axon terminal) that release neurotransmitters into a gap called the synaptic cleft between the terminals and the dendrites of the next neuron.Furthermore, some unique neuronal types can be identified according to their location in the nervous system and distinct shape. Some examples are:
Basket cells, interneurons that form a dense plexus of terminals around the soma of target cells, found in the cortex and cerebellum.
Betz cells, large motor neurons.
Medium spiny neurons, most neurons in the corpus striatum.
Purkinje cells, huge neurons in the cerebellum, a type of Golgi I multipolar neuron.
Pyramidal cells, neurons with triangular soma, a type of Golgi I.
Renshaw cells, neurons with both ends linked to alpha motor neurons.
Granule cells, a type of Golgi II neuron.
Anterior horn cells, motoneurons located in the spinal cord.Afferent neurons convey information from tissues and organs into the central nervous system and are sometimes also called sensory neurons.
Efferent neurons transmit signals from the central nervous system to the effector cells and are sometimes called motor neurons.
Interneurons connect neurons within specific regions of the central nervous system.Afferent and efferent also refer generally to neurons that, respectively, bring information to or send information from the brain region.
Posted 3 months ago # -
TheSeekerOfKnowledge
MemberA common assumption in the philosophy of mind is that of substrate-independence. The idea is that mental states can supervene on any of a broad class of physical substrates. Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. It is not an essential property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon-based biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon-based processors inside a computer could in principle do the trick as well. Arguments for this thesis have been given in the literature, and although it is not entirely uncontroversial, we shall here take it as a given.
The argument we shall present does not, however, depend on any very strong version of functionalism or computationalism. For example, we need not assume that the thesis of substrate-independence is necessarily true (either analytically or metaphysically) – just that, in fact, a computer running a suitable program would be conscious. Moreover, we need not assume that in order to create a mind on a computer it would be sufficient to program it in such a way that it behaves like a human in all situations, including passing the Turing test etc. We need only the weaker assumption that it would suffice for the generation of subjective experiences that the computational processes of a human brain are structurally replicated in suitably fine-grained detail, such as on the level of individual synapses. This attenuated version of substrate-independence is quite widely accepted. Neurotransmitters, nerve growth factors, and other chemicals that are smaller than a synapse clearly play a role in human cognition and learning. The substrate-independence thesis is not that the effects of these chemicals are small or irrelevant, but rather that they affect subjective experience only via their direct or indirect influence on computational activities. For example, if there can be no difference in subjective experience without there also being a difference in synaptic discharges, then the requisite detail of simulation is at the synaptic level (or higher).
At our current stage of technological development, we have neither sufficiently powerful hardware nor the requisite software to create conscious minds in computers. But persuasive arguments have been given to the effect that if technological progress continues unabated then these shortcomings will eventually be overcome. Some authors argue that this stage may be only a few decades away. Yet present purposes require no assumptions about the time-scale. The simulation argument works equally well for those who think that it will take hundreds of thousands of years to reach a “posthuman” stage of civilization, where humankind has acquired most of the technological capabilities that one can currently show to be consistent with physical laws and with material and energy constraints.
Such a mature stage of technological development will make it possible to convert planets and other astronomical resources into enormously powerful computers. It is currently hard to be confident in any upper bound on the computing power that may be available to posthuman civilizations. As we are still lacking a “theory of everything”, we cannot rule out the possibility that novel physical phenomena, not allowed for in current physical theories, may be utilized to transcend those constraints that in our current understanding impose theoretical limits on the information processing attainable in a given lump of matter. We can with much greater confidence establish lower bounds on posthuman computation, by assuming only mechanisms that are already understood. For example, Eric Drexler has outlined a design for a system the size of a sugar cube (excluding cooling and power supply) that would perform 10^21 instructions per second. Another author gives a rough estimate of 10^42 operations per second for a computer with a mass on order of a large planet. (If we could create quantum computers, or learn to build computers out of nuclear matter or plasma, we could push closer to the theoretical limits. Seth Lloyd calculates an upper bound for a 1 kg computer of 5*10^50 logical operations per second carried out on ~10^31 bits. However, it suffices for our purposes to use the more conservative estimate that presupposes only currently known design-principles.)
The amount of computing power needed to emulate a human mind can likewise be roughly estimated. One estimate, based on how computationally expensive it is to replicate the functionality of a piece of nervous tissue that we have already understood and whose functionality has been replicated in silico, contrast enhancement in the retina, yields a figure of ~10^14 operations per second for the entire human brain. An alternative estimate, based the number of synapses in the brain and their firing frequency, gives a figure of ~10^16-10^17 operations per second. Conceivably, even more could be required if we want to simulate in detail the internal workings of synapses and dendritic trees. However, it is likely that the human central nervous system has a high degree of redundancy on the mircoscale to compensate for the unreliability and noisiness of its neuronal components. One would therefore expect a substantial efficiency gain when using more reliable and versatile non-biological processors.
Memory seems to be a no more stringent constraint than processing power. Moreover, since the maximum human sensory bandwidth is ~10^8 bits per second, simulating all sensory events incurs a negligible cost compared to simulating the cortical activity. We can therefore use the processing power required to simulate the central nervous system as an estimate of the total computational cost of simulating a human mind.If the environment is included in the simulation, this will require additional computing power – how much depends on the scope and granularity of the simulation. Simulating the entire universe down to the quantum level is obviously infeasible, unless radically new physics is discovered. But in order to get a realistic simulation of human experience, much less is needed – only whatever is required to ensure that the simulated humans, interacting in normal human ways with their simulated environment, don’t notice any irregularities. The microscopic structure of the inside of the Earth can be safely omitted. Distant astronomical objects can have highly compressed representations: verisimilitude need extend to the narrow band of properties that we can observe from our planet or solar system spacecraft. On the surface of Earth, macroscopic objects in inhabited areas may need to be continuously simulated, but microscopic phenomena could likely be filled in ad hoc. What you see through an electron microscope needs to look unsuspicious, but you usually have no way of confirming its coherence with unobserved parts of the microscopic world. Exceptions arise when we deliberately design systems to harness unobserved microscopic phenomena that operate in accordance with known principles to get results that we are able to independently verify. The paradigmatic case of this is a computer. The simulation may therefore need to include a continuous representation of computers down to the level of individual logic elements. This presents no problem, since our current computing power is negligible by posthuman standards.
Moreover, a posthuman simulator would have enough computing power to keep track of the detailed belief-states in all human brains at all times. Therefore, when it saw that a human was about to make an observation of the microscopic world, it could fill in sufficient detail in the simulation in the appropriate domain on an as-needed basis. Should any error occur, the director could easily edit the states of any brains that have become aware of an anomaly before it spoils the simulation? Alternatively, the director could skip back a few seconds and rerun the simulation in a way that avoids the problem.
It thus seems plausible that the main computational cost in creating simulations that are indistinguishable from physical reality for human minds in the simulation resides in simulating organic brains down to the neuronal or sub-neuronal level. While it is not possible to get a very exact estimate of the cost of a realistic simulation of human history, we can use ~10^33 - 10^36 operations as a rough estimate. As we gain more experience with virtual reality, we will get a better grasp of the computational requirements for making such worlds appear realistic to their visitors. But in any case, even if our estimate is off by several orders of magnitude, this does not matter much for our argument. We noted that a rough approximation of the computational power of a planetary-mass computer is 10^42 operations per second, and that assumes only already known nanotechnological designs, which are probably far from optimal. A single such a computer could simulate the entire mental history of humankind (call this an ancestor-simulation) by using less than one millionth of its processing power for one second. A posthuman civilization may eventually build an astronomical number of such computers. We can conclude that the computing power available to a posthuman civilization is sufficient to run a huge number of ancestor-simulations even it allocates only a minute fraction of its resources to that purpose. We can draw this conclusion even while leaving a substantial margin of error in all our estimateshttp://www.simulation-argument.com/simulation.html
Substrate-independence (silicon vs. carbon)
Let’s look at the situation with carbon based life as we know it. There are complicated molecules for storing genetic information (DNA), mechanisms to translate this information into structural molecules, enzymes and hormones (proteins) and biochemical pathways to store produce and use chemical energy - carbohydrates and fats. While silicon chemistry is similar to carbon there just isn’t the same wide variety of compounds available that would be able to do all these jobs. Large molecular weight silicon compounds exist, but are nowhere as structurally rich as DNA or protein. Mostly they are just silicon and hydrogen without nitrogen phosphorous or oxygen. So it’s difficult to see how silicon life could store and use the necessary genetic information.
Carbon life is very compatible with water as a solvent . A solvent allows the movement by Brownian motion of all the biochemical compounds within the living cell - a viable silicon life form would also need mobility, however water is out and there doesn’t seem to be any other alternative solvent. Carbon life with water as a solvent is able to handle most simple carbon compounds without getting wrecked - i.e. poisoned. Carbohydrate metabolism has pathways to utilize a great many of the small molecules containing carbon - e.g. acetate, malate succinate, ethanol, glycerol, acetone. There are relatively few poisons that life often encounters - most of us die of old age rather than being poisoned. Silicon life looks likely to have many more problems in this department - oxygen might be an insurmountable problem because SiO2 is a solid. Water might be a poison as well.I still believe in the possibility of silicon life, but I think that it might well be electronic rather than chemical
Brain cell and replacing them with a chip
Not all neurons would be expected to be involved in consciousness (cognitive processes). There are neurons that have other functions, such as regulating hormone release, or control of other autonomic functions (heart rate, breathing, intestinal motility, temperature regulation, etc) that have no requirement of consciousness. Also, since neurons don't have just one input and one output, a single neuron might be involved in both cognitive and non-cognitive processes...perhaps as a "relay hub" of sorts, so you might not be able to categorize such a neuron according to the dichotomy you start out with...it could be both.
Another issue I have with the idea of replacing a neuron with a computer chip is what sort of output would you have? How would you connect it to the other neurons? Neurons don't communicate via electrical signals, they communicate via chemical signals (neurotransmitters). Those neurotransmitters can be either stimulatory or inhibitory on efferent neurons, depending on the neurotransmitter. The neurotransmitter released can also be different depending on the signals received by the afferent neuron. Neurons don't just communicate via on/off switches either. You could get more or less neurotransmitter released, and depending on the receptors on the efferent neuron, that may or may not increase the signal received (in other words, if the receptors are few and already saturated, increasing neurotransmitter release may not matter, but if receptors are abundant, there may be more sensitivity to different concentrations of neurotransmitter release).
I also think there's another point that is relevant regarding neuron processes : In order to allow a neuron to be replaced with a chip, the chip must obviously have sensors to detect signals, be they electrical signals, ions, glucose used for energy, or whatever. Neurons transmit and receive ions (calcium ions?) through synapse but that is not the only affect. They are also affected very strongly by temperature. If the neuron's temperature rises or falls by about 10 degrees, it will cease to function. Similarly, pressure on a neuron might elicit a response such as during a stroke. The electrical waves that pass throughout the brain would also need some type of sensor. For the chip to replace a neuron, one would require numerous sensors as well as transmitters for transmitting pressure, ions to other neurons, heating devices to transmit heat to other neurons, etc… So suggesting one replace a neuron with a chip is overly simplified. A chip cannot interface with neurons directly. The point of all this is to show just how different these two things are, they are as different as calculating rain and actually being wet
Posted 3 months ago # -
PJT- as Tipler recently said- philosophers would not even debate the copy vs original issue if they had been properly trained in science- the Principle of Indistinguishability or the Identity of Indiscernables has been VERIFIED by clever experiments for over a century- NO scientist would make the error of thinking that you could even have a 'copy'- it is the original projected to new coordinates - this is why Tipler completely dismisses any such issues when dealing with the resurrection in the Omega Point- those reconstructions are US- not 'copies'
we have had far too many posts and threads debating an issue which has been SOLVED for over a century! I myself have wasted a lot of time presenting empirical/theoretical/philosophical arguments for transference because even I didn't know that the POI had been formally extended to all physical systems and not just individual particles- but now that we do we need to stop any further debates- it's like debating whether the earth is flat or round- we KNOW now so there can be no debate- in order to posit a copy requires you to show how a century of QM experiment was flawed and you have to make an experimental prediction that shows QM to be wrong- if that weren't impossible enough you would ALSO have to embrace duality and violate conservation laws- essentially you are forced to abandon ALL science to take on the copy view- it's over
Tipler ends the copy vs original argument for good: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YEHHWI8MNAw#t=55m41s
any set of physical systems in the same state is the same system
Posted 3 months ago # -
sensoniq
Memberany set of physical systems in the same state is the same system
I think the problem is many people are still inherently dualists -- even if they have consciously evolved from that position -- they simply cannot grasp the logistics of consciousness being represented by "any set of physical systems" -- they assume it is somehow, someway, above this...
The dualist stance is seemingly reinforced by positing "I am me, you are not me, so I must be unique," and then extrapolating this statement to a post-QA future where multiple "copies" (please forgive the use of that term for now!) of you might be resurrected at the exact same moment...Clearly they cannot all be "you"? Yes, they can!!! They are not copies -- they are all multiple instances of you -- each one of the perhaps thousands of instances of you would wake up to QA immortality thinking the exact same thing: "I am me!"
Set, as you have stated it has already been shown that this is the case -- that any set of physical systems in the same state is the same system -- and this would necessarily include individual consciousness. So I would suggest that the onus is on any naysayers to prove the opposite -- they need to demonstrate how, exactly, two absolutely identical resurrected beings would not in fact be simple multiple instances of the same person.
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberThe following was devised as a tool to better understand the popular idea that simply copying a mind's pattern as sufficient for an awareness/presence transference (from one body into an another). The original conversation threads can be found here:
http://www.kurzweilai.net/forums/topic/any-copyresurrection-method-is-by-definition-the-continuation-of-consciousness/page/3
http://www.kurzweilai.net/forums/topic/uploading-perspective-test-v08Situation1: An original mind and a copy of that mind exists simultaneously.
Question 1: Is the original mind and/or the copy aware of each other?
Question 2: Does your answer to question 1 change whether or not the two minds have already diverged vs are actively exhibiting the same pattern?
Question 3: If the two minds are not aware of each other, does that imply the original and the copy are different in some way?
Question 4: If the answer to 3 is NO, is that so because awareness is an illusion?
Question 5: If the answer to 3 is YES, is this difference unimportant?
Question 6: If the answer to 5 is YES, how can this be proven?--------------------S1-Q1------S1–Q2-----S1–Q3-----S1–Q4-----S1–Q5-----S1–Q6
Virgilic------------No----------No----------Yes---------N/A---------Yes---------Yes, See responses
/:set\AI------------Mostly no-Mostly no--No-----------No----------N/A---------N/A
Extropia-----------Yes--------No----------Yes----------No----------No----------Yes, See responses
PDCÖ LXVIII-----No---------No----------No-----------No----------N/A---------N/A
Purpose-----------No---------No----------Yes----------No----------N/A---------N/A, See responsesSituation2: An original mind pattern is recorded and then destroyed. From the recorded information a copy is made.
Question 1: Does the act of destroying the original mind in any way influence the copy?
Question 2: If the answer to 1 is YES, how can this be proven?--------------------S2-Q1------S2–Q2
Virgilic------------No----------incomplete
/:set\AI------------depends---Yes, See responses
Extropia-----------Yes---------Yes, See responses
PDCÖ LXVIII-----No----------N/A
Purpose-----------No----------N/ASituation3: You are hooked up to a computer which causes you to exactly and only experience what another person is experiencing.
Question1: Are you aware in this situation?
Question2: Is the other person aware?
Question3: Are you both aware?
Question4: If the other person hooks himself up to a similar machine and becomes aware of someone else, how many awarenessses are there now?
Question5: If the answer to 4 is 1, does the number of awarenesses in our universe increase by 1 if one of the people is unhooked from the machine?--------------------S3-Q1------S3–Q2------S3–Q3------S3–Q4------S3–Q5
Virgilic------------Yes---------Yes----------Yes---------3-------------N/A
/:set\AI------------No----------No-----------Yes---------1-------------No
Extropia-----------No----------Yes----------No----------1-------------Yes
PDCÖ LXVIII-----No----------Yes---------No-----------1------------Yes
Purpose-----------Yes---------Yes---------Yes---------3-------------N/AS1-Q6 responses
Virgilic: The proof is that identity is irrelevant to awareness. One is aware between 40 - 80 times per second of whatever the attention neurons process. Every 40 - 80 times per second there's a cycle of going in and out of consciousness but since we are conscious only when we are conscious (obviously) we loose the rest of the time and paste together the conscious moments in a seemingly continuous stream of consciousness.
Extropia: I do not think it could be any more or less important than both being aware of each other. The point is, their minds are qualitatively the same so in either case it would make no sense to use this sameness as a justification to call them different.
Purpose: Between 40 and 80 times per second we become aware of mental activity. That is not the same thing as saying awareness itself pops in and out of existence 40 to 80 times per second. For example, if I cycle the image on your monitor 40-to-80 times a second, the screen itself does not pop in and out of existence. Instead I propose that awareness is a field that is disturbed by our mind's pattern (identity/self) at a rate of 40-80 times per second. Individually they both the pattern and awareness exists in of themselves as actual entities. The main difference between them is that the awareness field isn't so much an ensemble of interacting things, as much as it can be thought of as a continuous fluid with localized disturbance impressionsS2-Q2 responses
/:set\AI: The developing science of Neuroquantology will establish and explain the Morphic Field and deal with the planet's electromagnetic field as a single multicellular quantum entangled mind where individual brains/nervous systems are analogous to neocortical columns
Extropia: Imagine that you had a sibling that you do not actually have. Like, if you have no brother imagine you had grown up with a little or elder brother. Or two sisters if you have one brother and a sister. Or no siblings if you have one or more. Can you imagine this different family unit not making any difference whatsoever to your personal development? I bet not. So how can the existence/destruction of your other make no difference?Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MembersetAI said: any set of physical systems in the same state is the same system
sensoniq said: I think the problem is many people are still inherently dualists -- even if they have consciously evolved from that position -- they simply cannot grasp the logistics of consciousness being represented by "any set of physical systems" -- they assume it is somehow, someway, above this...
No physical system is "in the same state" as any other system, period. In addition recent findings that consciousness/awareness/presence runs on a substrate of electromagnetic fields whom are coupled to neurons makes most/all of the traditional neural state models/arguments irrelevant from a philosophical perspective.
Posted 3 months ago # -
Purpose-that doesn't help since you are only refering to other physical systems in observed reality- but systems MUST be in the same state in exhaustive emulative SIMULATION where you sort through ALL POSSIBLE states- we have not seen or measured the output of such an emulation yet- we only know it's RULES which tell us about the POI
I feel the need to directly apologize to you for not being fully aware of the situation with POI/IOI in physics- I am not often weak in technical knowlege but this CENTRALY IMPORTANT issue slipped by me due to my own smugness wrt the history of science- I knew of the POI for particles and even invoked it as an argument- but even though I own and have read Tipler's Physics of Immortality - I failed to really take notice of the passage on page 207 where he briefly explains the Identity of Indistinguishables and leaves a reference to some literature [Hofstader and Dennett 1981] which I skipped and haven't seen- it wasn't until the Telxlr8 talk when I reread the section that I NOTICED it- if I had noticed it 8 years ago I could have refered to it instead of engaging in the discussion and avoided us all a lot of bother!
you see Purpose- I genuinely value your views and wanted to explore the copy issue as you did- I thought it was more nuanced and deseved deeper discussion like your questionare- but that was an error in my part - there is a very strong history of experiment which makes the discussion moot-
in fact one of your other passions [and mine] : Quantum Biology- REQUIRES the acceptence of POI - which means that a copy ontology directly contradicts quantum biology / quantum mind / quantum ANYTHING - the very property called Entanglement is the strong proof of the POI since you can show that any changes to a system will AFFECT all the 'copies' with 'spooky action at a distance'- two entangled objects will BOTH react when ONE is stimulated-
I think we have had some great insights from the debate- but now that I have done my homework I feel embarassed that I missed the POI before- and as I said I feel guilty of 'stringing you along' which only reinforced your views on copies- if I had presented this finding long ago perhaps you and others would be past it by now- that is why I sort of feel your views are my fault-
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberI feel the need to directly apologize to you for not being fully aware of the situation with POI/IOI in physics-
No need to apologize, no one is responsible for what I may or may not understand. Any ignorance on my part is 100% my fault =). With that said I am not familiar "Physics of Immortality". Please provide an online reference so that I can educate myself on this seemingly paramount discovery that you feel would alter my world view so profoundly.
Posted 3 months ago # -
as I said Tipler mentions it on pg 207-8 in Physics of Immortality - he actually says more about it in the video link I provided- the idea - as so many important ideas- came from Leibniz- here is the wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles
what Tipler says is not that profound to me- it's that the principle has formally been appled to OBJECTS instead of just PARTICLES which does it - and the evidence that most philosophers are ignorant of this-
edit: it is important to point out that the copy/transference discussions were not completely a 'waste' because- as I said- the POI/IOI only applies to TRUE duplications of states in simulations- and since most forms of uploading DO NOT entail copying precise quatum states- but rather duplicating function- it means that POI/IOI likewise does not apply to those arguments- there is a case for an UPLOAD that is not the original- this is where I apply ideas about memory and social identity as well as molecular turnover to argue for transference- [but it DOES suggest that uploading via simulation might be the best way to acheive true transference]
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
Membercame from Leibniz- here is the wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles
Sure, but Leibniz was simply expounding on the the Law of Identity and its natural implications.
what Tipler says is not that profound to me- it's that the principle has formally been appled to OBJECTS instead of just PARTICLES which does it - and the evidence that most philosophers are ignorant of this-
Here is where I think things are getting confused.
In this case one must distinguish between types of particles in order to make coherent statements as to their discern-ability. For examples even if we only consider Elementary Particles (aka fundamental particles), we find that applying the "identity of indiscernible" runs into a road-block. Take identical fermions as an example (i.e. the particles that have mass and form matter/atoms) although according to the standard model they should be individually identical we find that they must obey the Pauli exclusion principle which states: "The Pauli exclusion principle is the quantum mechanical principle that no two identical fermions (particles with half-integer spin) may occupy the same quantum state simultaneously. A more rigorous statement is that the total wave function for two identical fermions is anti-symmetric with respect to exchange of the particles."
If however we consider Gauge boson (force carriers) we run into a different problem. Namely that fields are continuous and behave as a single entity, not as a particle or an object at all. To make matters even more interesting it is generally assumed all of the Gauge boson's combine into a unified, singular, field.
In short I do not at all see how one can claim that the Identity of Indiscernibles supports the view that copies constitute identical/same entities. At least if one understands that no two Fermions may occupy the same state anywhere where the universal wave function holds true and that these Fermions may only interact via a continuous unified field and never directly.
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberI'm amazed how the multitude of you are able to engage in such a deadbeat discussion all the while failing to realize it has no relevance to the functional nature of a human brain. When a conversation about human cognitive phenomena degenerates into a conflict regarding the nature of bosons perhaps it's time to step back and realize you're barking up the wrong tree.
If destructive teleporters existed in nature with abundance and humans evolved to make extensive use of them you wouldn't be having this conversation. For all the mental faculties nature has given us with which we can reason about the world it sure managed to distort our perception of ourselves as mere physical objects.
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberI'm amazed how the multitude of you are able to engage in such a deadbeat discussion all the while failing to realize it has no relevance to the functional nature of a human brain. When a conversation about human cognitive phenomena degenerates into a conflict regarding the nature of bosons perhaps it's time to step back and realize you're barking up the wrong tree.
I am amazed that someone as smart as you would be confused into thinking we are discussing either the functional nature of the human brain or human cognition in any form. setAI and I are debating whether or not presence is synonymous with objecthood or patternhood.
If destructive teleporters existed in nature with abundance and humans evolved to make extensive use of them you wouldn't be having this conversation.
Sure we would.
Posted 3 months ago # -
Purpose are you talking of superposition of states before decoherence? Although things are capable of being identical in structure...there are classes of things in reality and in maths, the moment their histories split they take on differences. Those may be space time alone or not, I cant resolve that, but substrate independence requires one achieves aggregate identity from classes of things.
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberPurpose are you talking of superposition of states before decoherence?
Decoherence does not eliminate superposition or entanglements, decoherence only explains the "appearance" of state reduction. The sum-total superposition of states and their entanglement relationships still exists.
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberI am amazed that someone as smart as you would be confused into thinking we are discussing either the functional nature of the human brain or human cognition. setAI and I are debating whether or not presence is synonymous with objecthood or patternhood.
You're debating the former with the mistaken belief that the latter can be established as a relevant basis on which to make conclusions.The brain's mental construct of "self", "presence" or whatever you wish to call it lies entirely in the domain of cognition, not that of subatomic particles.
Whether two rocks which are fundamentally equivalent can be considered "the same" has absolutely no bearing on the nature of human identity, irrespective of whichever conclusion you may come to.
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberYou're debating the former with the mistaken belief that the latter can be established as a relevant basis on which to make conclusions.
The brain's mental construct of "self", "presence" or whatever you wish to call it lies entirely in the domain of cognition, not that of subatomic particles.Self/identity and presence are not synonymous. Presence is the reason why I am aware of myself/my-identity and not yourself/your-identity.
Whether two rocks which are fundamentally equivalent can be considered "the same" has absolutely no bearing on the nature of human identity, irrespective of whichever conclusion you may come to.
Agreed.
*edit* Or to be more clear why the original is not present/aware of its copies, no matter how similar they may be prior to divergence.
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberPresence is the reason why I am aware of myself/my-identity and not yourself/your-identity.
If that is the case then presence is an entirely unnecessary and redundant concept. The reason you are aware of yourself is simply because that's what brains are designed to do, not because you have "presence". Your brain is your presence, just replace "presence" with "brain" and leave it at that; There's no reason to introduce these obfuscations. This is how a conversation degrades into "does a presence exist outside of a brain?" and "do electrons have presence?" until eventually you have Einstein facepalming at the inanity of your debate.It seems to me the reason many people seem to make no discernible progress here whatsoever is because they are inclined to introduce ill-defined concepts to the extent that one person has to make vague assumptions about what the other may be trying to say.
Posted 3 months ago # -
we must rigourously examine the thing on all levels despite our assumptions and certitude about what we are and how we can be uploaded/resurrected- as much as I want to simply accept Patternist Transference it must be thouroughly vetted-
considering this is one of the very few places where uploading/resurrection is being publically discussed - but we are only two or three decades away from it- it is quite possible that what is discussed here and what radiates in the Singularitarian/Transhumanist meme-space may have a profound influence on what human values survive the Singularity- that may sound bloated- but think about it- who else is really digging deeply into this subject?
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberIf that is the case then presence is an entirely unnecessary and redundant concept. The reason you are aware of yourself is simply because that's what brains are designed to do, not because you have "presence". Your brain is your presence, just replace "presence" with "brain" and leave it at that; There's no reason to introduce these obfuscations.
If you have two atomically identical brains, two presences exists not one. No different from the situation where you and I are two and not one. Your view appears to be, as it is true with many around here, that something magical happens as a brain pattern morphs from its current state to one that is "sufficiently similar" to another brain, in effect the presence of the later occupies the former, which is absurd.
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
Memberwho else is really digging deeply into this subject?
Whatever it is that needs digging into has already been resolved. Whoever is confused about the issues involved can read something like the Hayworth article. At that point either they succeed or fail to understand. Particle/Wave duality arguments are not going to help anyone who is already confused be LESS confused.If you want to dig deeply into the subject you can discuss the practical issues of ultra-scale data acquisition, simulations, tools and methods, social constraints, etc. You know, all those things that have a tangible influence on the nature of the problem.
This entire quantum circle jerk that never makes any progress whatsoever would have been lovely had the entire forum not consistent almost exclusively of it and been completely devoid of any technological/scientific insights through which a future conversation can advance and build on top of the established conclusions of the prior. It's like the real-world manifestation of the Christian limbo.
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberThis is how a conversation degrades into "does a presence exist outside of a brain?" and "do electrons have presence?" until eventually you have Einstein facepalming at the inanity of your debate.
Get real. The word presence is not only easy to understand it is common terminology in the tech industry. How on earth can you whine about someone using a word that means "to be present for".
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberIf you have two atomically identical brains, two presences exists not one.
Well, if we simplify the word "presence" to "brain" as I have previously established then above sentence reduces to:If you have two atomically identical brains, two brains exists not one.
Which is obviously correct.Your view appears to be, as it is true with many around here, that something magical happens as a brain pattern morphs from its current state to one that is "sufficiently similar" to another brain, in effect the presence of the later occupies the former, which is absurd.
I don't know what your misunderstanding is about my "view", but I assure you I consider what you just said at least as absurd as you do.How on earth can you whine about someone using a word that means "to be present for".
Because as I mentioned, when used in this context you introduce a dichotomy where "presence" may be potentially logically separable from "brain". There is no such ill defined concept as "being present for your brain".Posted 3 months ago # -
If you have two atomically identical brains, two presences exists not one
actually I don't think that this is true because there is an assumption that you are talking about two brains being somehow identical in the same local spacetime- but the view-point discussions showed how this assumption doesn't work because much of the mind is recording and thus dependent on the environment- and two otherwise identical brains in the same space but different locations within it MUST have different envioronmental states-
this means that a TRUE copy of an observer is a FULL copy of all the environmental factors as well- in other words the two or more copies WOULD and MUST share the same state/POV in order to BE the same- you are dealing with full parallel realities- universes- virtual and physical - not just copies of brains in a shared reality- any deviation in the future would leave you with an MWI view of multiple versions that are all equally authentic but with different destinies- subjectively the same as the you that turned left instead of right- and forcing you to deal with identity at the higher configuration space level of all your possible fates- but if they are in the same state they should be fully entangled and 'synced' so that both share the same future at every turn of chance- thus you really only have ONE brain in one reality
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberWell, if we simplify the word "presence" to "brain" as I have previously established then above sentence reduces to:
Presence: To be present for x.
Brain: An organ of soft nervous tissue contained in the skull of vertebrates, functioning as the coordinating center of sensation and intellectPosted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberBecause as I mentioned, when used in this context you introduce a dichotomy where "presence" may be potentially logically separable from "brain". There is no such ill defined concept as "being present for your brain".
Lol, that is after all my point. Presence cannot be separated from the object that produces the phenomena. There is no reason to assume that creating a mind child and then offing yourself will causes you to be "present for" the mind child's future. Which leads to my second point. If the universe is in fact as vast as recent evidence suggests then there are already "brains" that are far closer to your current brain than we can ever hope to make.
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberPurpose said: If you have two atomically identical brains, two presences exists not one
setAI said: actually I don't think that this is true because there is an assumption that you are talking about two brains being somehow identical in the same local spacetime- but the view-point discussions showed how this assumption doesn't work because much of the mind is recording and thus dependent on the environment- and two otherwise identical brains in the same space but different locations within it MUST have different envioronmental states-
Sorry, I didn't mean "you" in the possessive sense. I just meant "two atomically identical brains = two presences". I agree that brain+environment is critical.
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberPresence cannot be separated from the object that produces the phenomena.
Since clearly we can agree that presence is a result of the object that produces the phenomena I'd prefer to avoid referring to presence entirely and just refer to the object and the phenomena, otherwise we will never get anywhere.There is no reason to assume that creating a mind child and then offing yourself will causes you to be "present for" the mind child's future.
We can formalize a few things here. One thing we can say is that all brains are deltas of each-other. The delta values would be relative rather than absolute, and thus not refer to anything in particular.If we have two brains which are identical, by definition we would say brain0 is brain1 + delta0 and brain1 is brain0 + delta0. And because in this case delta is 0 we can simplify to say that brain0 = brain1.
Now if we take two brains that are arbitrarily different, we can reason to say that no brains are infinitely different and so the delta value is always < Infinity and always >= 0.
Also, because brains change over time, we must necessarily reason that brain0(t+h) = brain0(t) + delta. Meaning that over time h brain0 is not equal but necessarily some delta of it's prior self. Clearly we can therefore not established a static "self" or "identity" to a brain in a physical sense as it is not a static system; any such constructs are abstract manifestations of legal and social systems, etc.
Now if you're going to create "mind child" which is brain1, then brain1 = brain0 + delta. Now because we have gratefully ditched the nonsensical idea of "presence" then what questions are we left to ask? The only immediate question of interest is the size of our delta. How much does our brain1 differ from brain0 and how much do we care?
If we mange for the delta of your "mind child" to be 0 then as previously established brain1 = brain0. If you then "off" brain0 you still have brain1 and no information has been lost, we merely eliminated a redundancy. As a result "yourself" would be unchanged.
Because we know that delta is non-zero over time then brain0(t+h) for small values of h implies small values for delta. If we consider the changes that occur in our brain over a nanosecond to be negligible so far as it concerns our being in any sense of interest then small values of delta can be said to be negligible.
If our "mind child" brain1 != brain0 and as a result brain1 = brain0 + delta. If delta is small as described above then we infer that brain1 is negligibly different brain0 and as a result of this even though a change has occurred we don't consider this change meaningful. We can therefore conclude that for all intents and purposes the two brains are essentially equal and still redundant. As a result "yourself" would be practically unchanged and of no consequence over the prior equivalency.
We can also see that because the delta of two brain pairs varies, there are brains out there that are more like yours and less. If you "off" yourself and try to find your smallest delta, it is conceivable that you will come upon a delta of "negligible" value.
Furthermore, if the smallest delta that exists is of substantial value, this would lead to suggest a significant difference. However because as we have seen brain0(t+h) = brain0(t) + delta where delta is proportional to the size of h, it leads to suggest that time itself produced a significant difference which would ultimately exceed that of your nearest delta in space.
You can then realize that ultimately, perhaps between the ages of 15 and 60 in brain0(t+h) for large values of h, a large delta is produced over time such that eventually there will be a delta in space which is smaller. As a result, "offing" yourself at the age of 15 and waiting 45 years would result in the existence of a delta value that falls below that of the one which you would have been over that period of time.
The above observation would suggest that it is not reasonable, if the goal is to achieve a minimum delta, to find the delta of brain0(t+h) as MORE acceptable than that of brain1. It is entirely appropriate to conclude that "offing" oneself to produce a small delta has negligible long term implication for oneself; which is the case of uploading, especially if the delta is sufficiently small such that by reading all this your temporal delta has already exceeded that value.
Beyond this, it is easy to see that non-negligible deltas are what make us alive. If brain0(t+h) = brain0(t) then we would all fail to exist as conscious beings. It is counter-productive, if one wishes to live, to expect oneself remain the same.
It is also enlightening to see that we are all deltas of each-other rather than absolutely distinct individuals. Death is nothing more than the termination of the most like-delta, which would have been terminated anyways by the fact of h.
Does any of this begin to reason about the nature and fears that a person possesses about "a lack of being" and how illegitimate these fears can be shown to be?
A curious individual might at this point ask why upload if I have shown that it's not all that different from death? The answer is simple, because death is not all that different from falling asleep or even merely living long enough. It's all a gradient of the same phenomenon.
Posted 3 months ago # -
purpose
MemberWe can formalize a few things here. One thing we can say is that all brains are deltas of each-other. The delta values would be relative rather than absolute, and thus not refer to anything in particular.
Its not that simple. If you start with two atomically identical physical brains, you have brain0 and brain1. Now depending on the capabilities of the tool you use to measure these brains, you will produce a delta containing anywhere from 0 bytes to a number that is, well, large.
If we have two brains which are identical, by definition we would say brain0 is brain1 + delta0 and brain1 is brain0 + delta0. And because in this case delta is 0 we can simplify to say that brain0 = brain1.
If the actual Delta between Brain0 and Brain1 is <0 then Brain0 != Brain1 - physically speaking there will always be a <0 Delta.
Now if we take two brains that are arbitrarily different, we can reason to say that no brains are infinitely different and so the delta value is always < Infinity and always >= 0.
Object1 cannot be equal to Object2. The delta complexity is proportional to the resolution/inclusiveness of the method used to measure the objects.
Also, because brains change over time, we must necessarily reason that brain0(t+h) = brain0(t) + delta.
brain0(t+h) cannot equal brain1(t+h). Actual delta between brain0 and brain1 is dependent on and accounted for by external factors.
Meaning that over time h brain0 is not equal but necessarily some delta of it's prior self. Clearly we can therefore not established a static "self" or "identity" to a brain in a physical sense as it is not a static system; any such constructs are abstract manifestations of legal and social systems, etc.
The changes to one's self/identity is not the issue. Brain0 and Brain1 both evolve independent of each other over time, because they are in fact independent and unrelated. How different one is from the other is dependent on the measure. It is not the measure that determines the relationship between things/phenomena, it is nature (the system they inhabit) and the actual relation between objects (as managed by the system). You are assuming that brain0 + time is equivalent to the type of change that occurs in a Delta between Brain0 and Brain1. There is no reason to assume this.
Does any of this begin to reason about the nature and fears that a person possesses about "a lack of being" and how illegitimate these fears can be shown to be?A curious individual might at this point ask why upload if I have shown that it's not all that different from death? The answer is simple, because death is not all that different from falling asleep or even merely living long enough. It's all a gradient of the same phenomenon.
I was already familiar with the argument you presented.
Posted 3 months ago # -
nanostuff
MemberNow depending on the capabilities of the tool you use to measure these brains
Measurement error is of no relevance. If they are identical then the delta is 0 irrespective of what "tools" may show. Get a better tool.If the actual Delta <0 then Brain0 != Brain1
Delta is an absolute value, just like displacement magnitude. |delta| or Abs(delta).The delta complexity is proportional to the resolution/inclusiveness of the method used to measure the objects.
That's irrelevant. Only the relative differences are of issue not absolute size of the delta value which is why delta does not require a precise definition in this regard. Sort of like the notion of relative error in numerical analysis, which does not have or require any definition of measure methodology (inches, meters, gallons, etc)brain0(t+h) cannot equal brain1(t+h)
Of course it can, there's no plausible reason for you to suggest it cannot. Name the situation where brain0(t) == brain1(t), but even a hypothetical case where a brain0(t) != brain1(t) it is still possible that brain0(t+h) = brain1(t+h) where the two happen to converge after h. Even though this is unlikely it is not physically prohibited.Actual delta between brain0 and brain1 is dependent on and accounted for by external factors
External factors only influence the size of delta for non-zero h. They have no implication for difference measures at any point in time brain1(t) and brain0(t).Brain0 and Brain1 both evolve independent of each other over time, because they are in fact independent and unrelated
Don't say they're unrelated when they clearly are by the relationship I described. Of course there is no restriction for them to evolve independently as related as they may be.How different one is from the other is dependent on the measure
Choose any measure you wish. The arguments are equally valid for any measure of difference, which is why I chose them as such to make issues of measurement irrelevant.You are assuming that brain0 + time is equivalent to the type of change that occurs in a Delta between Brain0 and Brain1. There is no reason to assume this.
I never assumed this. The change need not be the same, and of course is not, I agree. However an infinitesimal delta between brain0 and brain0 + time and the same between brain0 and brain1 results in two brains that are approximately equal. The fact that the two would diverge over a significant period of time is obvious but of no consequence at any specific point in time of relevance.Posted 3 months ago #
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