[List All Topics] [Start Topic] [Search] [Show Thread Index] [Help]
[Not Logged In / Login / Register]
Sort: [Threaded | Date]
 |
|
|||
 |
what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
 |
|
what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die?
[Reply] |
||||
|
 |
|
 |
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
dayly high resolution brainscans |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
yep |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
what about if you need a new substrate? |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
bioprinting
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
with nanobots and all you could even have real time sinchronization of your real brain's structure with a model back home, so when you reboot you havent lost any moment.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
One question is what order of magnitude (if any) difference is there between the capacity of computation in the local mind-computer/brain and the capacity of a system to back up system states. If they are equal, you can have complete continuity of experience. Although, you might end up being absent from the world for a short period and/or suddenly end up at a different location.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
"The above analysis assumes that, generally, the mind-computer/brain resides in one discrete location. Actually, it would probably be rational to distribute the mind across space, perhaps time, and perhaps other dimensions. It would be difficult to even analyze how to analyze such design decisions"
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
"Expanding through time seems useless to me. It seems not even possible because I do not think that consciousness/awareness can exist through multiple concurrent timelines. I cannot conceive how this could be like subjectively."
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I expect this to be the system for uploading: incremental addition of artificial neurons that expand the mind into the machine.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
"I will not pass this chance to state once again that copying into a functional duplicate is useless (making live digital copies)"
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
making copies of myself does not help me in any way.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Your philosophy of mind explains your opinion perfectly. I just wonder one thing:
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Your philosophy of mind explains your opinion perfectly. I just wonder one thing:
Exapted It would not be a zombie, but it might be somebody else. No way of telling, even in principle. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
it would be me revived, not someone else.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
i do not underdstand the question. what zombie meat computer? you mean my defrosted and revived brain?
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
i lose continuity for several hours every 24 hours
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Well despite what I'm saying, I guess I would have some reluctance to upload myself until uploading had significant proven advantages, or I neared death. I don't think it is a trivial issue. I wonder, if you neared death, would you choose to upload your mind patterns to a robot or computer. I would, and I would want to be careful that I could *believe* in my own continuity. If I believed, then I don't think I or anyone else would ever notice the difference. In fact I think my brain is just a pattern that refers to this guy called "me". |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
In fact I think my brain is just a pattern that refers to this guy called "me". If there’s a copy they can’t both be “me”. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
If one is destroyed they don't have to be.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
"I guess you would have to agree that the mind is just a pattern in physical space, which can be duplicated and destroyed."
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I guess you would have to agree that the mind is just a pattern in physical space........" For some reason, it bothers me when people say this. I think it has to do with the "just" in front of "a pattern in physical space". Why not *just* reduce the sentence to: "there is no mind"? |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
You have a good point. A table is not "just atoms" or "just a pattern", it is a very specific kind of pattern with lots of a certain type of complexity, etc. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
You might object that we know they are different physical systems. But what if someone *secretly* destructively copied the patterns in my brain to a new 99.9999% identical body?
It doesn’t matter what you believe. The copy is not you even if he believes he’s you. You only have to think what happens if both exist at the same time. They are different people. If you destroy one it changes nothing for the other. In order to not be apprehensive about a mind transfer, I guess you would have to agree that the mind is just a pattern in physical space, which can be duplicated and destroyed. Agreed. It is a pattern but it is also something more, as one copy would be subjectively different from the other copy, even if they have identical experiences and remain physically identical. You need to pin down the cause of that subjective difference before you can be confident that uploading would work. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
It doesn’t matter what you believe. The copy is not you even if he believes he’s you. You only have to think what happens if both exist at the same time. They are different people.
But who cares if they are different in that way? No one could ever know the difference either before or after. For example if you *never* told someone he/she would be transferred to a new body. Agreed. It is a pattern but it is also something more, as one copy would be subjectively different from the other copy, even if they have identical experiences and remain physically identical. You need to pin down the cause of that subjective difference before you can be confident that uploading would work. I don't actually know what you mean by "subjectively different". They would both feel like themselves. Turn one of them "off" and you have one. If I decided to transfer my mind to a new body, afterwards would you claim that I was a different person? If so, I would say "no! I'm the same exapted". The only evidence against such an interpretation would be your belief about the matter. Or how about if everyone copied their minds to robots? Would they all be new people? But I would think they would act just the same as if they were old minds in new bodies. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
But who cares if they are different in that way? No one could ever know the difference either before or after. For example if you *never* told someone he/she would be transferred to a new body.
Exapted You’re right that nobody could tell the difference, but if one is destroyed, somebody dies and does not live on in the remaining copy. By subjectively different, I mean that each copy thinks of himself as ( and is in fact ) a different person from everybody else, including his copy. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
You’re right that nobody could tell the difference, but if one is destroyed, somebody dies and does not live on in the remaining copy. By subjectively different, I mean that each copy thinks of himself as ( and is in fact ) a different person from everybody else, including his copy. What is death? If I am going to be uploaded, I won't experience death. I will experience an operation. If that is death, then thats not a problem at all to me. If you are going to be uploaded, I assume that you will experience the psychological symptoms of death. I can see how that would be a problem. Also, your upload would probably believe he is a new person, because he would probably share your belief that uploading is death to the original. My upload wouldn't have that problem. In fact, I would say that, as an upload, *I* wouldn't have that problem. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Also, your upload would probably believe he is a new person, because he would probably share your belief that uploading is death to the original. My upload wouldn't have that problem. In fact, I would say that, as an upload, *I* wouldn't have that problem. Exapted The uploaded “I” or the uploaded “you” can believe anything they like but it doesn’t change reality. The reality is that a copy is a different person. If you upload gradually by replacing your neurons over time, then that might work, but any other scheme would just create a copy. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
The reality is that a copy is a different person. I define identity to be a set of criteria with regard to belief about identity with the caveat that the beliefs are not counterfactual. I hope that that is concrete enough for our purposes. If you could provide your definition of identity, we will identity the source of our differences of position with regard to uploading. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I hope that that is concrete enough for our purposes. If it is your purpose that your twin brother live happily ever after then that’s fine. If you could provide your definition of identity, we will identity the source of our differences of position with regard to uploading. My definition is that it would be me ( not my twin brother ) having the experiences after uploading. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
My definition is that it would be me ( not my twin brother ) having the experiences after uploading. Well that's a nominal definition. I can't actually understand your precise opinion because it is not fully coherent. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Well that's a nominal definition. I can't actually understand your precise opinion because it is not fully coherent. What don’t you understand ? A physically identical copy is your twin brother ( though completely identical, unlike normal biological twins ). He is not you. If the process is done by brain scanning then it is your twin brother who gets to be uploaded. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
What don’t you understand ? A physically identical copy is your twin brother ( though completely identical, unlike normal biological twins ). He is not you. If the process is done by brain scanning then it is your twin brother who gets to be uploaded. Not only is your definition a nominal one, it is a definition by fiat. Your atoms are going to be almost completely replaced sometime this year, so I guess you will cease to exist and be replaced by an impostor. C'mon, it's not that hard to see that your definition relates to continuity, brain identity, or something similar. Declaring that a physically identical copy is a twin brother dodges the question. I should mention that keeping both the original and the copy alive does introduce problems. You can see that in movies where both the original and the replica plead identity as the original. Ultimately it comes down to what your definition is for the identity of self. I could also introduce problems of another sort into a thought experiment about mind transfer. Suppose someone destructively scanned his brain and a replica was created. Would you deny the replica the right to the original's identity? Assume that the original never bothered with legal matters. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
C'mon, it's not that hard to see that your definition relates to continuity, brain identity, or something similar. Declaring that a physically identical copy is a twin brother dodges the question. Nothing to do with continuity. Logic strongly suggests that the copy is a twin brother and not you. If you imagine making a copy of yourself while you remain alive then you have to admit that the copy is somebody else. If it’s somebody else while you’re alive it will be exactly the same thing if you’re dead, whether you die before or after the copy is made. Ultimately it comes down to what your definition is for the identity of self. My definition is that the self is the one who has experiences. Nothing to do with who others think you are or with legal matters. If the uploading is done by brain scanning then it is your twin brother who will be having future experiences, not you. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Nothing to do with continuity. Logic strongly suggests that the copy is a twin brother and not you. If you imagine making a copy of yourself while you remain alive then you have to admit that the copy is somebody else. If it’s somebody else while you’re alive it will be exactly the same thing if you’re dead, whether you die before or after the copy is made. Your definition hinges on the original being alive while the replica is alive. You are actually appealing to the colloquial definition of identity, that there can't be more than one. And then you assume that it works the same way if only one is alive. How about if your best friend created a replica right before dying of cancer? He/she would have all of the same memories as the original. Would you shun him/her from your life, would you become involved with him/her while maintaining that he/she had a completely different identity from the original, or would you treat him/her the same as the original? Assume the original is already dead. I will not consider the issue settled if you fall back on your intuitions about identity. I want to know how it would actually work. My definition is that the self is the one who has experiences. Nothing to do with who others think you are or with legal matters. If the uploading is done by brain scanning then it is your twin brother who will be having future experiences, not you. Have you wondered if the continuity of experience is just a property of memory? Is there some kind of field in the brain which cannot be transfered to a replica? The fact that we can create thought experiments where there is an original and an exact replica leads me to think that the perception of the continuity of experience is in fact a property of memory rather than any field which cannot be transfered. What is it about the continuity of experience that seems so important to identity? [1] The belief that your identity will persist in your body. (memory) [2] Temporal experience. (memory) [3] The belief that your identity is the same as it was before. (memory) You continue to dodge the issue by invoking the "twin brother" scenario. I realize that problems are introduced in such a scenario. That actually leads me to believe that our intuitions about identity are not very explanatory or consistent, rather than clinging to the intuition that self must be some kind of indivisible property that belongs to particular bodies. Let me expand on the three categories of memory that I think are important to the continuity of experience, with regard to mind transfer: [1] The belief that your identity will persist in your body. I believe that my identity will persist in another body. [2] Temporal experience. I have had major surgery before. I don't think a gap of consciousness means that I lose my identity. Mind transfer could be an operation under general anesthesia. At the end of the operation, my original body is discarded, so that the identity of my new body is consistent with the societal (intuitive social) definition of self. [3] My replica mind will believe it is me. All of the thoughts that I am typing here will exist there. There is no magical field in my brain that will not exist in the other body. It's not like my experience will just "stop" and another's will "begin", because a consistently defined 'self' doesn't operate that way according to any empirical evidence. Subjective experience can be objectively studied by standardizing descriptions of it by subjects. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
You are actually appealing to the colloquial definition of identity, that there can't be more than one. There can’t be more than one who has my experiences. If I get injured it is me who experiences the pain, a copy or anybody else would experience nothing. And then you assume that it works the same way if only one is alive. The copy is what it is. Whether the original is alive or not has no influence on what the copy is. How about if your best friend created a replica right before dying of cancer? He/she would have all of the same memories as the original. Would you shun him/her from your life, would you become involved with him/her while maintaining that he/she had a completely different identity from the original, or would you treat him/her the same as the original? Assume the original is already dead. I would treat him/her the same but none of this has anything to do with what friends or family think. It’s all to do with the inner life of the person concerned. I will not consider the issue settled if you fall back on your intuitions about identity. I want to know how it would actually work. It’s not intuitions, it’s logic. As above, if I’m injured, I experience pain and the copy experiences nothing, if the copy is injured, he experiences pain and I experience nothing. Therefore we are different individuals. My replica mind will believe it is me. All of the thoughts that I am typing here will exist there. There is no magical field in my brain that will not exist in the other body. It's not like my experience will just "stop" and another's will "begin", because a consistently defined 'self' doesn't operate that way according to any empirical evidence. Subjective experience can be objectively studied by standardizing descriptions of it by subjects. You can call it a magical field. I prefer to call it something yet unknown, but whose existence is indicated by logic. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I am with you on everything you said except this mystery stuff
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I really have absolutely no ideea what so ever where this "mystery difference between copy and original" comes from, in your opinion.
You obviously agree that when the original is destroyed somebody dies. However all information still exists in the copy, so what is lost when the original is destroyed ? |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
hurray! |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
read through this thread, you will enjoy it I hope:
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
""Are you a zombie?"
No, you don't believe that you are, because there is no "you", remember? Zombies are not capable of self-reference, so if "you" are a zombie, then stop referencing your "self" as one: you are not capable of it. Stop using personal pronouns. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Zombies are not capable of self-reference Why not? Zombies are people too. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
again, Pan, any system can self-refer, it does not have to have a soul
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
again, Pan, any system can self-refer, it does not have to have a soul
I didn't say anything about a soul (see my posts on how panpsychism overcomes the dichotomies of both vitalism and reductionist materialism) The entire zombie argument is the elimination of what is called "self", so NO, a zombie cannot be self-referential. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
"The entire zombie argument is the elimination of what is called "self""
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
A zombie is a fully unconscious person who probably also lacks other things such as drives, desires and beliefs. The challenge is to explain a creature that could behave like you or me but lacks all of those things. Some mind-body dualists believe that it is possible that an exact physical replica of a person could lack those things.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I was asking about what the "self" is that zombies lack.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I was asking about what the "self" is that zombies lack.
In my opinion, zombies are probably not possible. I don't recognize qualia or sentience as anything but descriptive words. To see it my way, imagine if someone told you that it would be possible for someone to replicate your brain, but the replica would lack any sense of "interestingness". It makes no sense because interestingness is not a separate entity to be lacked. I won't go into details, but cognitive science could explain interestingness, and why it is both inextricably linked to neurobiology. The only coherent way to describe a zombie, in my opinion, is to do it in terms of coherent concepts. Qualia and sentience are incoherent. Their definitions, in my view, would go something like this: "This kind of special quality that can't be described....". So I would define a zombie as someone who lacks consciousness and some of the psychological drives. Such a definition is coherent because we can coherently define consciousness and drives. But how would that work? The only zombie I can imagine would probably lack the behavior we associate with consciousness and drives. It is hard to imagine a zombie that doesn't have consciousness yet can still talk about itself. How would someone implement such a zombie? Chalmers only believes zombies are possible in some other universe. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
It depends on the condition of your mind-computer. If it is still intact, a program could be run to remove the traumatic pain from the experience of death. The person could be regenerated and it would be like waking up after a mild accident. Some people might opt to keep all of their experiences intact.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
no off switch |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I suppose the security of a mind-computer/brain could be generalized into an analysis such as the one in my above reply to Virgilic's comment. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
sync your iBrain on iTunes |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Copying, whether digital or or that wave thingy, is still a linear projection of yourself. Digital just breaks up the line into samples.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
'You' is not a unique entity but one of a class with no difference to your conscious self in near infinite series.
It may be hard for our sense of self to let go of the staring fact we are as ununique as an atom of oxygen and likely to be as definable as that by coming process technology. Here is the chapter, which is a masterpiece of modern philosophy: "CHAPTER VIII The Problem of Identity 129 In considering the chances of reviving, curing, rejuvenating, and improving a frozen man, we have to envisage the possibility of some very extensive repairs and alteration. This leads to a number of very perplexing puzzles. As an extreme case, imagine an elderly cancer victim who is not frozen until several hours after death, and then only by crude methods. Almost all the cells of his body have suffered severe damage and are thoroughly dead by present criteria, although some would grow in culture and we assume a small percentage of them have degenerated relatively little. But after enough centuries pass medical art at last is ready to deal with him, and for the sake of emphasis let us assume a grotesque mixture of techniques is used. When our resuscitee emerges from the hospital he may be a crazy quilt of patchwork. His internal organs - heart, lungs, liver, kidneys, stomach, and all the rest - may be grafts, implanted after being grown in the laboratory from someone else's donor cells. His arms and legs may be bloodless artifacts of fabric, metal and plastic, directed by his own will and complete with sense of touch but extended and flexed by tiny motors. His brain cells may be mostly new, regenerated from the few which could be saved, and some of his memories and personality traits may have had to be imprinted on or into the new cells by microtechniques 130 of chemistry and physics, after being ascertained from the written records. Striding eagerly into the new world, he feels like a new man. Is he? Who is this resuscitee? For that matter, who am I and who are you? Although most resuscitees will not represent such extreme cases-we hope most of us will be frozen by non damaging methods-nevertheless we cannot sidestep the issue. We are now face to face with one of the principal unsolved problems of philosophy and/or biology, which now becomes one of prime importance in an exceedingly practical way, namely that concerning the nature of "self." What characterizes an individual? What is the soul, or essence, or ego? This seemingly abstruse question will shortly be seen to have ramifications in almost every area of practical affairs; it will be the subject of countless newspaper editorials and Congressional investigations, and will reach the Supreme Court of the United States. We can bring the problem into better focus by putting it in the form of two questions. First, how can we distinguish one man from another? Second, how can we distinguish life from death? Later I shall offer some tentative partial answers. First we can illuminate the question, and perceive some of its difficulties and subtleties, by considering a series of experiments. Some of these experiments are imaginary, but perhaps not impossible in principle, while others have actually been performed. Experiment 1. We allow a man to grow older Legally, he retains his identity; and also subjectively, and also in the minds of his acquaintances (usually). Yet most of the material of his body is replaced and changed; his memories change, and some are lost; his outlook and personality change. 131 It is even possible that an old acquaintance, seeing him again after many years, might refuse to believe he is the same person. On first considering this experiment, we are apt to feel slightly disturbed, but to retain a vague conviction that "basically" the man is unchanged. We may feel that the physical and psychological continuity has some bearing on the question. Experiment 2. We watch a sudden, drastic change in a man's personality and physique, brought about by physical damage, or disease, or emotional shock, or some combination of these. Such has often occurred. Afterwards, there may be little resemblance to the previous man, mentally or physically. There may be "total" amnesia, although he may recover capability of speech. Of course he retains, e.g., the same fingerprints, and the same genes. But it would be absurd to say the main part of a man is his skin; and identical twins have the same genes, yet are separate individuals. Although the physical material of his body is the same stuff, he seems-and feels-like a different person. Now we are more seriously disturbed, because the main continuity is merely physical; there is a fairly sharp discontinuity in personality. One might say with some plausibility that a man was destroyed, and mother man was created, inheriting the tissues of his predecessor's body. Experiment 3. We observe an extreme case of "split personality." It is commonly believed that sometimes two (or even more) disparate personalities seem to occupy the same body, sometimes one exercising control and sometimes the other. Partly separate sets of memories may be involved. The two "persons" in the same body may dislike each other; they may be able to commu- 132 nicate only by writing notes when dominant, for the other to read when his turn comes. We may be inclined to dismiss this phenomenon by talking about psychosis or pathology. This tendency is reinforced by the fact that apparently one of the personalities is usually eventually submerged, or the two are integrated, leaving us with the impression that "really" there was only one person all along. Nevertheless, the personalities may for a time seem completely distinct by behavioral tests, and subjectively the difference is obviously real. This may leave us with a disturbing impression that possibly the essence of individuality lies after all in the personality, in the pattern of the brain's activity, and in its memory. Experiment 4. Applying biochemical or microsurgical techniques to a newly fertilized human ovum, we force it to divide and separate, thereby producing identical twins where the undisturbed cell would have developed as a single individual. (Similar experiments have been performed, with animals.) An ordinary individual should probably be said to originate at the moment of conception. At any rate, there does not seem to be any other suitable time-certainly not the time of birth, because a Caesarean operation would have produced a living individual as well; and choice of any other stage of development of the foetus would be quite arbitrary. Our brief, coarse, physical interference has resulted in two lives, two individuals, where before there was one. In a sense, we have created one life. Or perhaps we have destroyed one life, and created two, since neither individual is quite the same as the original one would have been. Although it does not by any means constitute proof, the fact that a mere, crude, mechanical or chemical manipulation can "create a soul" suggests that such portentous terms as "soul" 133 and "individuality" may represent nothing more than clumsy attempts to abstract from, or even inject into, a system certain "qualities" which have only a limited relation to physical reality. Experiment 5. By super-surgical techniques (which may not be far in the future) we lift the brains from the skulls of two men, and interchange them. This experiment might seem trivial to some. Most of us, after thinking it over, will agree it is the brain which is important, and not the arms, nor the legs, nor even the face. If Joe puts on a mask resembling Jim, he is still Joe; and even if the "mask" is of living flesh and extends to the whole body, our conclusion will probably be the same. The assemblage of Joe's brain in Jim's body will probably be identified as Joe. But at least two factors make this experiment non-trivial. First, if the experiment were actually performed and not merely discussed, the emotional impact on the parties concerned would be powerful. The wives would be severely shaken, as would the subjects. Furthermore, Joe-in-Jim's-body would rapidly change, since personality depends heavily on environment, and the body is an important part of the brain's environment. Also, we may be willing to admit that Joe's arms, legs, face, and intestines are not essential attributes of Joe-but what about his testicles? If Joe-in-Jim's-body lies with one of their wives, he can only beget Jim's child, since he is using Jim's gonads. The psychiatric and legal problems involved here are formidable indeed. Some people might be tempted to give up on Joe and Jim altogether, and start afresh with Harry and Henry. In one sense, this is an impractical evasion, since the memories, family rights and property rights cannot be dismissed. From another view, it may be a sensible admission that characterization of an individual is to some extent arbitrary. 134 Once again, the suggestion is that physical systems (i.e., real systems) must in the end be described by physical parameters (operationally) and that attempts to pin profound or abstract labels on them, or to categorize them in subjective terms, cannot be completely successful. Experiment 6. By super-surgical techniques (not yet available) we divide a man s brain in two, separating the left and right halves, and transplant one half into another skull (whose owner has been evicted). Similar, but less drastic, experiments have been performed. Working with split-brain monkeys, Dr. C. B. Trevarthen has reported that " . . . the surgically separated brain halves may learn side by side at the normal rate, as if they were quite independent." (121) This is most intriguing, even though the brains were not split all the way down to the brain stem, and even though monkeys are not men. There is also other evidence in the literature which we can summarize, with certain simplifications and exaggerations, as follows. Either half of a brain can take over an individual's functions independently. Normally, one half dominates, and loss of the other half is not too serious. But even if the dominant half is removed, or killed, the other half will take over, learning the needed skills. There is presently no conclusive evidence that so drastic an experiment as ours would necessarily succeed; but in principle, as far as I know, it might, and we are not at the moment concerned with technical difficulties. If it did succeed, we would have created a new individual. If the left half was dominant, we might label the original individual Lr; the same skull containing the left half alone after surgery we might call L, and the right half alone, in a different skull after the operation, is R. 135 L thinks of himself as being the same as Lr. R may also think of himself as Lr, recuperated after a sickness, but to the outside world he may seem to he a new and different, although similar, person. In any case, R is now an individual in his own right, and regards his life to be as precious as anyone else's. He will cling to life with the usual tenacity, and if he sees death approaching will probably not be consoled by the knowledge that L lives on. Even more interesting is the attitude of L, the formerly dominant half, now alone in the skull. Suppose that, before the operation, we had told Lr that the dominant half of his brain was diseased, and would have to be removed, but that the other half would take over, albeit with some personality changes and possibly some loss of memory. He would be worried and disturbed, certainly-but he would probably not regard this as a death sentence. In other words, Lr would be consoled well enough by the assurance that R would live on. Yet after the splitting, and transplanting operation, L would regard his own destruction as death, and it would not satisfy him that R lived on, in another body. This experiment seems to suggest again that, psychologically if not logically, the physical continuity is an important consideration. Experiment 7. A man is resuscitated after a short period of clinical death, with some loss of memory and some change in personality. This experiment has actually been performed many times. (97) Death was real by the usual clinical tests (no respiration, no heartbeat) but of course most of the cells remained alive, and most people would say that he had not "really" died, and that he was certainly the same person afterward. This experiment is important only as background for the following ones. 136 Experiment 8. A man dies, and lies unattended for a couple of days, passing through biological death and cellular death. But now a marvel occurs; a space ship arrives from a planet of the star Arcturus, carrying a super-surgeon of an elder race, who applies his arts and cures the man of death and decay, as well as his lesser ailments. (It is not, of course, suggested that any such elder race exists; the experiment is purely hypothetical, but as far as we know today it is not impossible in principle.) The implications are apt to shake us. If decay is to be regarded as just another disease, with a possibility of cure, then when may the body be considered truly dead? If "truly" dead be taken to mean "permanently" dead, then we may never know when we are in the presence of death, since the criterion is not what has already happened to the man, but what is going to hap pen to him in the (endless?) future. Experiment 9. A man dies, and decays, and his components are scattered. But after a long time a super-being somehow collects his atoms and reassembles them, and the man is recreated. Once more, the difficulty or even impossibility of the experiment is not important. We also disregard the question of the possibility of identifying individual elementary particles. Is it the "same" man, in spite of the sharp physical discontinuity in time? If memory, personality, and physical substance are all the same, perhaps most of us would think so, even though we are disturbed by the black gulf of death intervening. But if we so admit, we must open the door even wider. Experiment 10. We repeat the previous experiment, but with a less faithful reproduction, involving perhaps only some of the original atoms and only a moderately good copy. Is it still the same man? 137 Again, perhaps, we wonder if there is really any such thing as an individual in any clear cut and fundamental sense. Experiment 11. We repeat experiment 10, making a moderately good reconstruction of a man, but this time without trying to use salvaged material. Now, according to the generally accepted interpretation of quantum theory, there is in principle as well as in practice no way to "tag" individual particles, e.g. the atoms or molecules of a man's brain; equivalent particles are completely indistinguishable, and in general it does not even make sense to ask whether the atoms of the reconstructed body are the "same" atoms that were in the original body. Those unfamiliar with the theory, who find this notion hard to stomach, may consult any of the standard texts. If we accept this view, then a test of individuality becomes still more difficult, because the criteria of identity of material substance and continuity of material substance become difficult or impossible to apply. Experiment 12. We discover how to grow or to construct functional replicas of the parts of the brain - possibly biological in nature, possibly mechanical, but at any rate distinguishable from natural units by special tests, although not distinguishable in function. The units might be cells, or they might be larger or smaller components. Now we operate on our subject from time to time, in each operation substituting some artificial brain parts for the natural ones. The subject notices no change in him - self, yet when the experiment is finally over, we have in effect a "robot"! Does the "robot" have the same identity as the original man? Experiment 13. We perform the same experiment as 12, but more quickly. 138 In a single, long operation, we keep replacing natural brain components with artificial ones (and the rest of the body likewise) until all the original bodily material is in the garbage disposal, and a "robot" lies on the operating table, an artificial man whose memories and personality closely duplicate those of the original. Perhaps some would feel the "robot" was indeed the man, basing the identity in the continuity, on the fact that there was never a sharp dividing line in time where one could say man ended and robot began. Others, well steeped in democracy and willing to apply political principles to biology, might think the robot was not the man, and ceased to be the man when half the material was artificial. The subject himself, before the operation, would probably regard it as a death sentence. And yet this seems odd, since there is so little real difference between experiments 13 and 12; 13 merely speeds things up. Perhaps sufficient persuasion could convince the subject that the operation did not represent death; he might even be made to prefer a single operation to the nuisance of a series of operations. Experiment 14. We assume, as in the previous two experiments, that we can make synthetic body and brain components. We also assume that somehow we can make sufficiently accurate nondestructive analyses of individuals. We proceed to analyse a subject, and then build a replica or twin of him, complete with memories. Does the identity of our subject now belong equally to the "robot" twin? It might seem absurd to say so, but compare the previous experiment. There is scarcely any difference, especially since in 13 the subject was under anaesthesia during the operation; 13 was virtually equivalent to destroying the subject, then 139 building a robot twin. The only real difference between 13 and 14 is that in 14 both the original and the duplicate survive. Experiments 15, 16, and 17. We repeat experiments 12, 13, and 14 respectively, but instead of using artificial parts we use ordinary biological material, perhaps obtained by culturing the subject's own cells and conditioning the resultant units appropriately. Does this make any difference? In logic, one would think perhaps not, but blood is thicker than water. Some people might make a different decision on 15 and 16 than on 12 and 13. Experiment 18. We assume the truth of an assertion sometimes heard, viz., that in certain types of surgery a patient under certain types of anaesthesia suffers pain, although he does not awaken and afterwards does not remember the pain. The experiment consists in performing such an operation. Most of us do not fear such operations, because we remember no pain in previous experiences, and because authoritative persons assure us we need not worry. Even a warning that the pain under anaesthesia is real is unlikely to disturb us much, if we are not of very nervous temperament. Still less do we fear ordinary deep anaesthesia, in which there seems to be no pain on any level, even though for the conscious mind this gulf is like that of death. Yet a child, or a person of morbid imagination, might be intensely frightened by these prospects. Thus again we note a possible discrepancy between the logical and the psychological. Experiment 19. A Moslem warrior is persuaded to give his life joyfully in a "holy war," convinced that the moment his throat is cut he will awaken in Paradise to be entertained by houris. We draw the obvious but useful conclusion that, from the 140 standpoint of present serenity, it is merely the prospect of immortality that is important. Experiment 20. We pull out all the stops, and assume we can make a synthetic chemical electronic mechanical brain which can, among other things, duplicate all the functions of a particular human brain, and possesses the same personality and memory as the human brain. We also assume that there is complete but controlled interconnection between the human brain and the machine brain: that is, we can, at will, remove any segments or functions of the human brain from the joint circuit and replace them by machine components, or vice versa. In a schematic sense, then, we envisage each of the two brains, the biological one and the mechanical one, as an electronic circuit spread out on a huge "bread board" with complete accessibility. From the two sets of components, by plugging in suitable leads, we can patch together a single functioning unit, the bypassed elements simply lying dormant. To make the picture simpler and more dramatic, let us also assume the connections require only something like radio communication, and not a physically cumbersome coupling. We might begin the experiment with the man fully conscious and independent, and the machine brain disconnected and fully dormant. But now we gradually begin disconnecting nerve cells or larger units in the man's brain, simultaneously switching in the corresponding units of the machine. The subject notices no change - yet when the process is completed, we "really" have a machine brain controlling a "zombie" human body! The machine also has its own sensory organs and effectors. If we now cut off the man's sensory nerves and motor leads and simultaneously activate those of the machine, the first subjective change will occur, namely, an eerie transportation of the senses from one body to another, from the man's to the machine's. 141 This might be enjoyable: perhaps the machine's sense organs are more versatile than the man's, with vision in the infra-red and other improvements, and the common personality might feel wonderful and even prefer to "live" in the machine. At this stage, remember, the man is entirely dormant, brain and body, and the outside observer may be inclined to think he is looking at an unconscious man and a conscious machine, the machine suffering from the curious delusion that it is a man controlling a machine. Next, we reactivate the components of the man's brain, either gradually or suddenly, simultaneously cutting off those of the machine, but leaving the machine's sensors plugged in and the sensors of the human body disconnected. The subject notices no change, but we now have a human brain using mechanical senses, by remote control. (We disregard such details as the ability of the human optical centre to cope with infra-red vision, and the duplication of the new memories.) Finally, we switch the human effectors and sensors back in, leaving the man once more in his natural state and the machine quiescent. If we perform this sort of exchange many times, the subject may become accustomed to it, and may even prefer to "inhabit" the machine. He may even view with equanimity the prospect of remaining permanently "in" the machine and having his original body destroyed. This may not prove anything, but it suggests once more that individuality is an illusion. Discussion and Conclusion. In discussing these hypothetical experiments we have touched on various possible criteria of individuality-identity of material substance, continuity of material substance, identity of personality and memory, continuity of personality and memory-and seen that none of these is 142 wholly satisfactory. At any rate, none of these, nor any combination, is both necessary and sufficient to prove identity. One cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that we have missed the nub of the matter, which may lie in some so far intangible essence or soul. However, such a notion seems inconsistent with the ease with which man can instigate, modify, and perhaps actually create life, and with several of our experiments. The simplest conclusion is that there is really no such thing as individuality in any profound sense. The difficulty arises from our efforts first to abstract generalities from the physical world, and then to regard the abstractions, rather than the world, as the basic reality. A rough analogy will help drive home the point: The classification "man" is useful, but not sharply definable. Is a freak a man? Is an aborted foetus a man? Is a pre-Neanderthal or other "missing link" a man? Is a corpse a man if some of the cells are still alive? And so on. A label is handy, but objects may be tagged arbitrarily. In the physical world there is no definite collection of objects which can be called "men," but only shifting assemblages of atoms organized in various ways, some of which we may choose to lump together for convenience. Let us then cut the Gordian knot by recognizing that identity, like morality, is man-made and relative, rather than natural and absolute. Identity, like beauty, is partly in the eye of the beholder. It is only partly existent, and partly invented. Instead of having identity, we have degrees of identity, measured by some criteria suitable to the purpose. The result is wonderful: we have lost our souls, but gained heaven, in a certain sense. Perhaps few of us, even if intellectually convinced that identity is an illusion and death therefore unimportant, may be able to translate this into emotional acceptance, or will want to. But we can now persuade ourselves that death need never be regarded as absolutely final-since it is always possible, at some distance in space, time, and matter, 143 for reasonably close duplication or resuscitation to occur-that is, for physical reincarnation, with memory or without. This possibility can dull the edge of desperation for those unable to obtain first class freezer accommodations for themselves or their families. " http://www.cryonics.org/contents1.html |
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
Just saw the movie "Moon" starring Sam Rockwell as as the sole (for awhile) worker on a moon-based outpost.
|
||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||
|
Re: what is the not-lamest-way to backup / reboot yourself if you die? |
[Top] [Show Index] [Reply to this post] |
|
|
I second that. I saw it in the cinema and it was really good. Cool effects using models I think. |
||||
|
|
|
|
|