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Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Ok, I’ll jump in again, but in this new thread so as not to bog down the other distantly related original topic.
Although sensory perception is triggered by "vibration", that does not prove that consciousness (in dreams, meditation or awareness of consciousness, or just inner attention) could not exist without vibration. You can’t prove a negative. But there is nothing in this universe that we can find that does not vibrate at some level. The brain is absolutely full of vibratory, oscillatory processes at all levels of observable reality. There is no reason to assume any lack of vibration whatsoever. I am curious as to why vibration is something that to you must be excluded from this non-fundamental level, blue? I think the problem is that you are making the assumption that the root level can be observed and reached through division or something. In my view this is not the case. The root level is attainable only through logic. It does not exist at some level of size or in some specific type of existence, but in all sizes and all types of existence. In Spinoza, for instance, substance comes prior to modification not in any temporal or spatial sequence whatsoever, but only through logical analysis. In the field of time there is no such thing as un-modified substance, because you can’t have a continuity of immanent causation without modification on all levels. So when we discuss consciousness wrt vibration, we are not talking about the rootless root, but consciousness as it is in the field of time, and this necessarily involves modification. You can become conscious of the fact that you see colors. Can you do this without a brain? The brain is full of motion and vibration. To cease this pattern at an objectively observable level (though fundamentally impossible) is to eliminate human consciousness. Although you may disagree, I do think conscious experience of seeing colors is not physical (at least not in the contemporary sense), Given your commonly used definition of “physical… in the contemporary sense” that is a trivial statement and amounts to saying that the brain is not mathematical. And I FULLY agree and have done so since we first began discussing the issue. …and so I also think that in the awareness of visual consciousness, in the awareness of seeing colors, there is consciousness/awareness without sensory organs: it is consciousness of consciousness, not consciousness of sensory perception. Okie dokie, but do you know that the brain cannot survive if it does not receive sensory input? Human consciousness is a fully symbiogenetic process between the subjective and the objective. You can’t have one without the other. This is a scientifically proven fact. Consciousness and awareness cannot exist without sensation. Since consciousness can't be the arithmetic sum of non-conscious process Who is claiming such an absurdity? Remember that this is the age of the fractal (non-linearity, complexity and emergence (synergy)) not the age of the machine (i.e. the 1700’s). These implicit processes are FULLY non-arithemetic and non-linear and you can’t encapsulate them through the explicit linearity of the stream of linguistic consciousness that is the root of objectivity. The best one can do given the linear constraints of the objective descriptive protocol is to intuit the emergence of consciousness using the modern models of cognitive science and complexity theory. Without the use of these heuristic bridges, you may as well be back in the 18th century when trying to intuit the nature of HUMAN consciousness (not the essence at the rootless root). … the "rootless root" cannot be non-conscious. I thought we had already agreed to this point, but remember that it was you who said that it is not human type consciousness that we are talking about, so the word has little transferable meaning at this fundamental level. Remember that I had said that subject and object do not reduce one to the other. The dichotomy is fundamentally a polarity. The root is the essence of everything, not JUST consciousness, so any word would suffice. You are simply still reacting against the 18th century mechanistic world-view by swinging in the opposite direction. This is your unbalance and the reason that you try to reduce the objective to the subjective and thus eliminate form at the root. The problem is that you keep confusing the absolute root with the relative level of modification as seen through the subject/object polarity. It might be meta-conscious or who knows what, but not non-conscious. So it can be called consciousness, I think, simply in the sense that it is not non-conscious. The root must be aware, I think. Aware of what? At the root level there is nothing else in existence. The Hindu’s realized this long ago so they mythologized that God began to hide himself in the forms, to multiply by division and modification so as to generate otherness and inter-awareness. So what is essence?
a black-and-white answer based on your limited definitions. There is a continuum that you exclude by your dualistic over-simplification. Sub: Form is not a quantitative concept. It can be quantitatively represented, yes, but that doesn’t mean it is such.
? Who said it wasn’t “quantitatively describable”? In fact that is precisely what I DID say. The point is that many non-quantitative things are nevertheless describable in quantitative terms. The distinction is deceptively simple. Mathematics is a necessarily limited modeling tool for things that are NOT necessarily mathematical. That is the sole reason that it is such a useful description tool. I bought Alan Watts "What is Zen?" Cool, I’ve never read anything by Watts. I just listen to his brilliant lectures that I found on my favorite mp3 sharing utility. (@@@_***) (BTW, a long time ago I read "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance" by Robert Pirsig, and at that time I really liked it, but I don't directly remember very much of it.) Never read it. I have never been able to get into Zen until these Watts lectures because Watts seems to take a more philosophical and realist approach than a wishy washy religious approach that is often quite popular. So far I think I should make two comments: He seems to equate emptiness/nothingness with empty space, But remember that his “emptiness/nothingness” is not *absolute* nothingness. This much is perfectly clear from his lectures. He says nothingness is the essential polar opposite of somethingness, but these are terms of the polarity of perception and context, not fundamental unified existence. and to equate the absence of "any" form and motion (both of which are related to space) with a "total blank" (in his criticism of a specific notion of nirvikalpa-samadhi as the absence of all form). That doesn't sound right to me. I don’t know anything about that and would have to know the context to make sense of it. The confusion likely has to do with the absolute vs. relative levels, such as the distinction above. Dualities only apply to the relative level, not the absolute; that is why they are fundamentally polarities, not dualities. It would mean that in his view, there is only form, motion, and space. Clearly a mis-reading, I assure you. Also he seems to equate "thought" with explicit "verbal thought",… That is what is called “defining ones terms.” When he says ‘thought’ think ‘verbal thought’. It is not so tough to keep these things clear. Watts certainly knows that there are all sorts of mental activities other than the verbal variety and that is indeed his point. I hope your difficulties in remapping your semantic space is not going to hinder your understanding of this book. That would be a pity. … and to assume that the absence of such inner verbalization is equal to the absence of thought. His ‘thought’ is not YOUR ‘thought.’ Try to make the shift. You are not yet speaking the same language. However there are many other forms of thought than those using language symbols, and it is my impression that many/most eastern philosophies/religions do have a much more fundamental notion of thought. Nevertheless, it is not easy (at least for most of us) to stop inner verbalizing for more than a few seconds. Indeed, Watts is right-on with the esoteric tradition once you learn his language. It is quite easy, blue, once you know what to look for. Good luck. [Reply] |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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You can’t prove a negative. But there is nothing in this universe that we can find that does not vibrate at some level. The brain is absolutely full of vibratory, oscillatory processes at all levels of observable reality. There is no reason to assume any lack of vibration whatsoever.
Which "non-fundamental level" are you referring to? We were discussing the question whether "form" is "really essential", in response to your statement that "substance" and "form" are symbiotic. Since I understand that for you "substance" is the most fundamental level, I took this to mean that in reality there is nothing without form. I am questioning this assumption of unconditional symbiosis using the plausibility argument that it is easily conceivable that in conscious experience, we see blue (sky) all around, so that there is a conscious experience without form, yet still of a quality. If you now argue that everything we find in the universe is vibrating, then you are countering my argument by extrapolating a statement from physics to consciousness. But if you argue or assume that any statement about the physical universe also applies to consciousness, then the two would be exactly the same, and you are back to plain materialism, without a story about conscious experience of color. Consciousness cannot be just a mirror effect, the objective mirroring itself in the subjective. It must have a substantial, essential quality. I think the problem is that you are making the assumption that the root level can be observed and reached through division or something. In my view this is not the case. The root level is attainable only through logic. It does not exist at some level of size or in some specific type of existence, but in all sizes and all types of existence. In Spinoza, for instance, substance comes prior to modification not in any temporal or spatial sequence whatsoever, but only through logical analysis. In the field of time there is no such thing as un-modified substance, because you can’t have a continuity of immanent causation without modification on all levels.
Form is not just modification in the field of time, form is more specifically quantitatively describable modification in space. Everything we know about the physical universe is such quantitatively describable modification in space, but that does not apply to everything we see in consciousness. In consciousness, there is usually both form (which I call "conscious-size") and non-quantifiable qualities, such as the specific "look" of a color. Now I am saying that the latter is conceivable without, independent of, the former. Can you do this without a brain? The brain is full of motion and vibration. To cease this pattern at an objectively observable level (though fundamentally impossible) is to eliminate human consciousness. Given your commonly used definition of “physical… in the contemporary sense” that is a trivial statement and amounts to saying that the brain is not mathematical. And I FULLY agree and have done so since we first began discussing the issue. Perhaps we are not quite understanding each other. Let me try to clarify: Nobody thinks the brain is mathematical, but everything we know about the brain (and the physical universe) is quantifiable information and quantifiable conclusions. The physical/scientific model of the brain is quantitative. Now when I say that the conscious experience of seeing colors is not physical (at least not in the contemporary sense), then I mean that we "see" "more" in conscious experience than we can capture in a quantitative model (certainly as of today). There are two ways of arguing that, as far as I know: one is the distinction quantifiable vs. non-quantifiable aspects of color experience, the other is the distinction of realizing-a-fact vs. having-abstract-information about consciousness. Now what is it that you fully agree with, and what do you conclude from that? Okie dokie, but do you know that the brain cannot survive if it does not receive sensory input? Human consciousness is a fully symbiogenetic process between the subjective and the objective. You can’t have one without the other. This is a scientifically proven fact. Consciousness and awareness cannot exist without sensation. How is that a scientific proven fact? Even if it is so most of the time, it does not have to be a metaphysical necessity. Even if it applies to the kind of consciousness we know through daily life, it does not have to apply to all consciousness. Perhaps it does not apply in deep sleep, we just can't remember. Or perhaps that there are non-human conscious/aware realities, how should we be able to exclude this possibility? Who is claiming such an absurdity? Remember that this is the age of the fractal (non-linearity, complexity and emergence (synergy)) not the age of the machine (i.e. the 1700’s). These implicit processes are FULLY non-arithemetic and non-linear and you can’t encapsulate them through the explicit linearity of the stream of linguistic consciousness that is the root of objectivity. The best one can do given the linear constraints of the objective descriptive protocol is to intuit the emergence of consciousness using the modern models of cognitive science and complexity theory. Without the use of these heuristic bridges, you may as well be back in the 18th century when trying to intuit the nature of HUMAN consciousness (not the essence at the rootless root). New-Age materialism is still materialism. Fractals, non-linear dynamics (which for example are often mentioned in regard to the weather system) and so on don't change that, except they make an mathematical description on the lowest level impractical, or perhaps even impossible, but only as a limitation of mathematics as a tool, not as a fundamental change in terms of what is happening. As long as you believe in the contemporary laws of physics (in a preliminary and very general sense) as in principle a correct model of the universe, and that all physical events are caused by other physical events (causally-closed), then all higher-level processes (chemical, biological etc) would have to be the arithmetic sum (the actual "+" operation) of a complex combination of low-level physical events. If, on the other hand, you don't believe that, then the implications would go far beyond "fractals" and non-linear dynamics and what for example Fritjof Capra writes about. [...] This is your unbalance and the reason that you try to reduce the objective to the subjective and thus eliminate form at the root. The problem is that you keep confusing the absolute root with the relative level of modification as seen through the subject/object polarity. I have already made clear that consciousness in that sense would not be limited to being subjective. Furthermore, I don't eliminate form at he root by calling it consciousness, I do so because form refers to quantitative properties, but consciousness shows that there are also non-quantitative properties, and I don't see any reason to assume that the latter cannot be without the former, as I have argued above. Aware of what? At the root level there is nothing else in existence. The Hindu’s realized this long ago so they mythologized that God began to hide himself in the forms, to multiply by division and modification so as to generate otherness and inter-awareness. Aware of non-quantitative qualities (perhaps, I don't have any authorized information about that ;-)). a black-and-white answer based on your limited definitions. There is a continuum that you exclude by your dualistic over-simplification. Computers, in so far as they act strictly according to boolean (or analog-mathematical) logic, are on the outer (actually non-existant) extreme of that continuum. ? Who said it wasn’t “quantitatively describable”? In fact that is precisely what I DID say. When I said form is a quantitative concept, I meant "form" as a concept. We never really talk _about_ reality, we always talk about concepts. The point is that many non-quantitative things are nevertheless describable in quantitative terms. The distinction is deceptively simple. Mathematics is a necessarily limited modeling tool for things that are NOT necessarily mathematical. That is the sole reason that it is such a useful description tool. No, the point is that everything we know about physical reality is quantitative, and also some things we know about what we see in conscious experience, but there are also things we see in conscious experience which we cannot describe quantitatively. Therefore the physical model is inadequate for conscious experience. The reason is that these non-quantifiable properties are specific causal factors (they make us talk about them, for example), whereas in known physical reality there are (so far) no non-quantifiable properties which would appear as causal factors. (See http://www.occean.org "Information, Representation and Qualia") But remember that his “emptiness/nothingness” is not *absolute* nothingness. This much is perfectly clear from his lectures. He says nothingness is the essential polar opposite of somethingness, but these are terms of the polarity of perception and context, not fundamental unified existence. His expose seems to end with nothingness as an end-point (like absolute zero temperature), instead of seeing it as a door. (Which reminds me of what was written about Hegel here some time ago.) He doesn't really put a visible toe outside of materialism. I'm not quite sure what he means with the following quote, though: "To see that forms come and go in space as the leaves come and go on the trees, as the stars come and go in the sky." Or: "Space and form arise mutually - as do being and non-being." Arise...out of what? Or who? I hope you know what you are getting into... ;-) His 'thought' is not YOUR 'thought.' Exactly my point. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Which "non-fundamental level" are you referring to? The level of human consciousness and the perception of, say, the color of the sky. We were discussing the question whether "form" is "really essential", in response to your statement that "substance" and "form" are symbiotic. Yes, my point is that in the field of time there is no such thing as unmodified substance. It has never been observed and in fact in principle it can’t be observed. The senses work on contrast. In the absence of modification there is no contrast. Consciousness (the human variety), however, is an emergent abstraction arising from the sensory differentiations. It only appears homogenous due to the limits of abstractions. Cognitive science shows that in fact the homogeneity of consciousness is an illusion. Since you don’t know cognitive science you believe in the absolute homogeneity of the representation. Since I understand that for you "substance" is the most fundamental level, I took this to mean that in reality there is nothing without form. “In reality” means in the field of time. In Spinoza, substance is logically prior to its modifications, but in the field of time there is no unmodified substance. I am questioning this assumption of unconditional symbiosis using the plausibility argument that it is easily conceivable that in conscious experience, we see blue (sky) all around, so that there is a conscious experience without form, yet still of a quality. That’s fine, but an appeal to a perspectival illusion will not get you to the fundamental level. Far from it. If you now argue that everything we find in the universe is vibrating, then you are countering my argument by extrapolating a statement from physics to consciousness. That is not a statement, it is an observation. You are assuming with zero evidence that un-modified substance can exist in the field of time. You can’t even appeal to consciousness to back that claim up because consciousness is composed of differentiation, and the minute that consciousness differentiation ceases there is no consciousness. But if you argue or assume that any statement about the physical universe also applies to consciousness, then the two would be exactly the same, and you are back to plain materialism, without a story about conscious experience of color. Not at all. I am saying that both subjectivity and objectivity are points of view. Subjectivity is the direct emergent experience of being a modification of substance and objectivity is the abstract collective activity of generalizing this externally directed experience into “facts” and statements in physics. Therein lies its limitations. Consciousness cannot be just a mirror effect, the objective mirroring itself in the subjective. It must have a substantial, essential quality. Exactly. I am agreeing with you here. There is a continuity between substance and human consciousness. There is no absolute line to be drawn between them. Form is not just modification in the field of time, form is more specifically quantitatively describable modification in space. Lol, I thought that much was obvious. If substance is the root level how could this be otherwise. My point was that just because we can observe modification and build quantitative approximations of it does not make it fundamentally quantitative. In Everything we know about the physical universe is such quantitatively describable modification in space, but that does not apply to everything we see in consciousness. So you have found a difference between subjectivity and objectivity. There is no real capability, as of yet, to apply standards and yard-sticks to what is entirely subjective. Both subjectivity and objectivity are necessary for the emergence of the other and none of which are fundamental to substance (except in Spinoza’s extrapolation through his attributes, which is a slightly different categorization). In consciousness, there is usually both form (which I call "conscious-size") and non-quantifiable qualities, such as the specific "look" of a color. Now I am saying that the latter is conceivable without, independent of, the former. To someone who doesn’t know any better, yes, anything is conceivable. Perhaps we are not quite understanding each other. Let me try to clarify: Nobody thinks the brain is mathematical, but everything we know about the brain (and the physical universe) is quantifiable information and quantifiable conclusions. The physical/scientific model of the brain is quantitative. Now when I say that the conscious experience of seeing colors is not physical (at least not in the contemporary sense), then I mean that we "see" "more" in conscious experience than we can capture in a quantitative model (certainly as of today). Again you are pointing out the fundamental difference between subjectivity and objectivity. I agree with you on this point, but my point is that BOTH subjectivity and objectivity are inversely directed and symbiotic points of view. There is no need to reduce one to the other and such an attempt is the wrong way to go about it. Since, however, there is a direct polar symbiosis between the two, what you do to one you do to the other. Thus if you modify the brain you modify the consciousness. This parallelism is due to the fact that both points of view refer to the same modification of the single substance which is only perceived through the protocols of subject and object. There are two ways of arguing that, as far as I know: one is the distinction quantifiable vs. non-quantifiable aspects of color experience, the other is the distinction of realizing-a-fact vs. having-abstract-information about consciousness.
I am not claiming to be able to erase, what is called in philosophy of mind, the “explanatory gap”, but I am explaining why such a gap is absolutely necessary as a function of the polarity of subject and object. sub: Okie dokie, but do you know that the brain cannot survive if it does not receive sensory input? Human consciousness is a fully symbiogenetic process between the subjective and the objective. You can’t have one without the other. This is a scientifically proven fact. Consciousness and awareness cannot exist without sensation.
I am sorry for your lack of research on the subject, but it is scientifically proven that brain cells die if they do not receive stimulus which is composed of modulated inputs. If the brain-cells die then there can be no consciousness and the mnemonic primitives of qualia cannot emerge. This has been demonstrated not only with individual brain cells, but with whole organisms. If you feed them a perfectly adequate diet intravenously, but restrict their sensory input, the animals die. Subject and object are entirely symbiogenetic. One cannot exist without the other. Even if it is so most of the time, it does not have to be a metaphysical necessity. It is an actuality about human consciousness. That is my only point here, but I suspect that it applies to all representational forms of consciousness. Even if it applies to the kind of consciousness we know through daily life, it does not have to apply to all consciousness. Perhaps it does not apply in deep sleep, we just can't remember. Where do you think all of your dreams come from? This too is a proven fact that in dreams our memories are stimulated and recombined to form new experiences. Without these memories we could not dream. In fact these memories and their unconscious components are the very essence of qualia. Or perhaps that there are non-human conscious/aware realities, how should we be able to exclude this possibility? As I said before, you can’t prove a negative, but this doesn’t prove it as a positive either. You have to justify your claim for anyone to take it seriously and so far all of the available evidence, even the subjective evidence, is stacked against you. New-Age materialism is still materialism. Lol. This is *modern* materialism and yes it is still materialism and thus not a complete replica of reality. Fractals, non-linear dynamics (which for example are often mentioned in regard to the weather system) and so on don't change that, except they make an mathematical description on the lowest level impractical, or perhaps even impossible, but only as a limitation of mathematics as a tool, not as a fundamental change in terms of what is happening. Try to keep in mind that I am NOT saying that materialism is the fundamental viewpoint. This would be saying that all subjectivity reduces to objectivity. This I have denied several times. Can you keep it in mind so we don’t keep going in circles about it? What I am saying is that viewpoints are NOT fundamental to reality. They emerge from it as two necessary poles from modification itself. The within and the without. As long as you believe in the contemporary laws of physics (in a preliminary and very general sense) as in principle a correct model of the universe… I don’t and I don’t know how many times I have to tell you this in order for it to sink in. …and that all physical events are caused by other physical events (causally-closed), then all higher-level processes (chemical, biological etc) would have to be the arithmetic sum (the actual "+" operation) of a complex combination of low-level physical events. Apparently our previous discussions of the difference between immanent and transitive causation did not hold in your mind. What you are describing is transitive causation and as such it is only how the world APPEARS to the objective viewpoint. In reality all transitive causation is a function of immanent causation of existence itself which cannot be reduced to linearity whatsoever. If, on the other hand, you don't believe that, then the implications would go far beyond "fractals" and non-linear dynamics and what for example Fritjof Capra writes about. Indeed. Fractals are merely a mathematical tool for heuristically bridging the explanatory gap in non-explicit objective terms. There is no reason to assume that the map of objectivity is the territory, however. It is just an approximation of reality. I have already made clear that consciousness in that sense would not be limited to being subjective. Right, so it is consciousness in name only. Furthermore, I don't eliminate form at (t)he root by calling it consciousness, I do so because form refers to quantitative properties…
, but consciousness shows that there are also non-quantitative properties, and I don't see any reason to assume that the latter cannot be without the former, as I have argued above. Your argument is based on an appeal to ignorance. This is similar to Chalmer’s “Conceivability Thesis” which appeals to his ignorance of cognitive science to postulate the logical possibility of zombies. Quite a weak form of argument indeed. Since you don’t know what human consciousness is, you can conceive of it existing in any way you want. Your argument hinges on a freedom from reality and as such it can be easily dismissed. The objectively observable reality shows otherwise, but it will never completely get rid of the explanatory gap that your argument continues to exploit. Aware of non-quantitative qualities… Oh? Such as form? (perhaps, I don't have any authorized information about that ;-)). Right, you don’t have any information at all about it. It is just a hunch based in ignorance of the facts. Computers, in so far as they act strictly according to boolean (or analog-mathematical) logic, are on the outer (actually non-existant) extreme of that continuum. Indeed. Glad to know you can see that. When I said form is a quantitative concept, I meant "form" as a concept. We never really talk _about_ reality, we always talk about concepts. That’s a cop out. If all concepts referred to more concepts then we could have no understanding of reality whatsoever. The fact is that most concepts refer to reality as perceived through the senses or as perceived through subjective means. Furthermore, form as a concept is generally qualitative rather than quantitative. We can see form and discuss it entirely devoid of mathematics whatsoever and this is the primary means. How many people do you know that describe forms to you exclusively in terms of numbers. The idea is quite absurd. We say things like round, squashed, squiggly, pointy, jagged, etc. These are ENTIRELY qualitative concepts even though we can assign mathematical functions to quantitatively model them. No, the point is that everything we know about physical reality is quantitative… Are you insane? Are you a robot? Do you have a computer in your head that interprets your digital numerical senses? Get a clue, blue. We see things in terms of quality and only then can we quantify those descriptions AFTER THE FACT into physics or whatever. Or conversely we could just do a painting of the same thing or just verbally describe it to remain purely qualitative. This is the heart of the impasse. You continue to confuse the mathematical descriptions of physical reality for the observations of that reality and even for the reality itself. … and also some things we know about what we see in conscious experience, but there are also things we see in conscious experience which we cannot describe quantitatively. Big deal. Quantification is a limited descriptive protocol. Who is arguing otherwise except for you wrt physical reality? Therefore the physical model is inadequate for conscious experience. Yes, all models are fundamentally limited. We are in loose agreement here. The reason is that these non-quantifiable properties are specific causal factors (they make us talk about them, for example), whereas in known physical reality there are (so far) no non-quantifiable properties which would appear as causal factors. Define a “causal factor” in non-objective terms. His expose seems to end with nothingness as an end-point (like absolute zero temperature), instead of seeing it as a door. His ‘nothingness’ is identical to Spinoza’s substance. (Which reminds me of what was written about Hegel here some time ago.) He doesn't really put a visible toe outside of materialism. Your brief exposure to Watts has left you confused, but again it seems that you are forcing a materialist interpretation. I interpret Watts quite differently, however. I'm not quite sure what he means with the following quote, though: "To see that forms come and go in space as the leaves come and go on the trees, as the stars come and go in the sky."
He says that forms are a function of space and vice versa, thus space as nothingness is not the absence of existence, but just one of its poles of manifestation in the field of perspective. Arise...out of what? Or who? I hope you know what you are getting into... ;-) substance … I know quite well what I am already far into, thanks. I hope you can get past your forced materialist interpretations, but since you couldn’t do it for Spinoza, I have little hope for you. His 'thought' is not YOUR 'thought.'
You *precisely* missed my point. I am saying that though you use the same words you mean quite different things by them therefore your interpretation of his meaning will be wrong. But I knew this would happen. Thus if you continue to force materialism into your interpretation of Watts I am not going to waste my time with a reply. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Cognitive science shows that in fact the homogeneity of consciousness is an illusion. Case in point: Say you look at a flat blue wall. Your mind sees only one homogenous and continuous color, but in reality there is a blind spot in each of your eyes where in a black spot could be hidden but your eyes fool you to thinking that the blue continues unbroken. Furthermore, we know that the blue is composed of modified stuff, particles of paint or whatever. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Are you insane? Sorry, this must have been too much for you. How can you respond to a simple statement with such polemics? I don't think you are addressing the arguments and distinctions I make, and instead are mixing them up to the point where I can't recognize them myself anymore, trying instead to impose Spinoza's categories as a dogma. Or to put it differently: I don't know who you are talking to, but it doesn't seem to be me. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Sorry, this must have been too much for you. How can you respond to a simple statement with such polemics? It is simply insane to suggest that all objectivity is quantitative and to keep failing to recognize that I am not taking that position. You keep acting as if I was taking this position, in order NOT to understand my points. Well you succeeded again in blocking a correct interpretation by forcing it into your fantasy-land quantitative physical wonderland. Mine couldn't be further from it, but apparently you don't believe me when I say it. So now you don't understand the interface because you can't see the surface of the adjacent cell except through your specialized distorted materialist feelers. I don't think you are addressing the arguments and distinctions I make, and instead are mixing them up to the point where I can't recognize them myself anymore, trying instead to impose Spinoza's categories as a dogma. You don't recognize them anymore because they never were what you thought they were. Remember you couldn't find the meaning in Spinoza. To you he made no sense and was a self-contradictory materialist. Anyone who knows anything about Spinoza KNOWS he is not a plain (absolute)materialist, but he supports both descriptive protocols and this is where the exegetic split is conveniently located. I pointed out how to remap your concepts to make non-(absolute)materialist sense of it but you couldn't. Now you are doing the same to Watts. If you could understand both Spinoza and Zen then you would see that they map exactly the same esoterritory. A great many philosophers have recognized this fact. Or to put it differently: I don't know who you are talking to, but it doesn't seem to be me. You simply don't understand my points and how they apply to yours. If you did you would come up with some sort of analysis and make your own counter-points. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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It is simply insane to suggest that all objectivity is quantitative and to keep failing to recognize that I am not taking that position. That would not at all be insane, but that you keep using this word might be so. ;-) The simple point you are missing is that I am not only discussing your position, but a whole spectrum of positions from materialis through New-Age materialsm and Epiphenomenalism, also dual-aspect theories, and sometimes even dualism. The plain reason is that most of us keep mixing them up and flip-flop from one to the other, and last but not least the argument I am making would be incomplete if it didn't go the whole way through. that is, it must go right through all these positions to be meaningful at all. Tough job, I tell you. So let me finish this discussion with something I wrote on my homepage a little more than a year ago: "And I consider the crucial difference to be that between conscious-size and conscious-how, not the one between measurable-size and conscious-size. In a sense, both measurable-size and conscious-size are formal abstractions resulting from analyzing differences and changes." |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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The simple point you are missing is that I am not only discussing your position, but a whole spectrum of positions from materialis through New-Age materialsm and Epiphenomenalism, also dual-aspect theories, and sometimes even dualism. Ironically, the likelihood that we agree whenever you diverge from arguing against my position is great indeed. Those positions that you argue against are not mine, so what is the point of acting as if they were? Let’s just recognize our quite large foundation of agreement rather than ignoring it and pretending that we don’t agree in order to keep fighting the windmills of materialism. The simple fact is that I am not a materialist and your whole argument is focused against a narrow form of materialism that deals simply with the descriptive protocols of mathematical physics. Neither of us believes in the model that you attack. The plain reason is that most of us keep mixing them up and flip-flop from one to the other, and last but not least the argument I am making would be incomplete if it didn't go the whole way through. So just because no one else can keep it straight this justifies your problem as well? If you are going to argue against me while ascribing the whole mixed bag of materialist and idealist and dualist positions to me (or whatever you are doing) then at least make that known at the outset and try to announce which position you are using me to argue against so someone can follow the discussion. that is, it must go right through all these positions to be meaningful at all. Tough job, I tell you. Tackling all these various viewpoints is an important thing, but don’t assume that I am holding these views and then argue against me as if I were. So let me finish this discussion with something I wrote on my homepage a little more than a year ago:
Nice. So we agree here that there is indeed a “crucial difference.” I don’t, however, see the value in your categories because I don’t think objectivity is fundamentally quantitative. Minor detail, but I hope it helps your model deal with positions like mine. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Ironically, the likelihood that we agree whenever you diverge from arguing against my position is great indeed. Those positions that you argue against are not mine, so what is the point of acting as if they were? Let’s just recognize our quite large foundation of agreement rather than ignoring it and pretending that we don’t agree in order to keep fighting the windmills of materialism.
This discussion is not about your personal position, it is about a "topic" and I happen to discuss it in a more general way than just "your position". |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Blue:No, the point is that everything we know about physical reality is quantitative…
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Analog to Digital, Quantizing is. Zen, this is. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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lol. that's a good one |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Analog to Digital, Quantizing is. Zen, this is. Analog, Digital, all Quantitative is, the first place in. Science, this is. ;-) |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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analog is quantitative? Care to back up this statement with anything but rhetoric and empty opinion? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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analog is quantitative? Care to back up this statement with anything but rhetoric and empty opinion? You question whether analog is quantitative? Have you ever seen how voltage was measured before we had digital instruments? This is basic science. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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That is the quantification of the analog. Just because it CAN be quantified, does not make it intrinsically so. Can't you grasp this difference? The signal is meaningless and entirely non-numerical until it is used to represent numbers. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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That is the quantification of the analog. Just because it CAN be quantified, does not make it intrinsically so. Can't you grasp this difference? The signal is meaningless and entirely non-numerical until it is used to represent numbers. If you think analog is not quantitative, this explains a lot. You could not have understood much of what I was saying the last months. When you measure voltage with one of the instruments that were common before, let's say, 1980, then you are making an analog measurement. This measurement is quantitative. "Quantitative" is not the same as "numerical". Digital computers have floating point numbers of limited precision, but "quantitative" is not bound by specific representations of limited precision. It simply means that something is measured on a scale, in tems of, so to say, "more" and "less". What is quantitative about the word "squiggly"? Off the top of your head can you give me a formula that represents it? Yet no doubt you understand what it means. This is qualitative meaning. The way they LOOK regardless of whether we assign numbers to their parts. So you think that "quantitative" is identical with "numeric", but this is not so. "Quantitative" includes "analog" and also spatial structure. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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If you think analog is not quantitative, this explains a lot. You could not have understood much of what I was saying the last months. I understood exactly what you were saying that is why I tried to point out the differences which you are just barely grasping. But we have had this very same discussion for years. When you measure voltage with one of the instruments that were common before, let's say, 1980, then you are making an analog measurement. I am not talking about measurement. Get it through your head, blue. We are discussing reality and the objective senses. Do you quantitatively measure everything you see? This is just nonsense if you can't see this distinction. This measurement is quantitative. Yes, obviously measurements are quantitative. Why are you arguing yet anothet pointless point? "Quantitative" is not the same as "numerical". Digital computers have floating point numbers of limited precision, but "quantitative" is not bound by specific representations of limited precision. It simply means that something is measured on a scale, in tems of, so to say, "more" and "less". You are defining your own terms in highly idiosyncratic ways. The term should be "quantifiable" rather than quantitative because the essence of these things is NOT numerical nor quantitative, i.e. it has nothing to do with number or quantity. So you think that "quantitative" is identical with "numeric", but this is not so. Did I say they are identical? Nope. I am beginning to see your idiosyncratic definition. The difference is simple, quantitative also includes and refers to the salient parts represented by the numbers, i.e. numerically. But there are no absolute distinctions to be made. The quantity (i.e. a number assigned to a real property) is purely imaginary. "Quantitative" includes "analog" and also spatial structure. That is not the common usage of the term. 1. A specified or indefinite number or amount. 2. A considerable amount or number: 3. An exact amount or number. 4. The measurable, countable, or comparable property or aspect of a thing. 5. Mathematics. Something that serves as the object of an operation. Analog signals can have absolutely NOTHING to do with number, eg, the audio signals on a magnetic tape or a vinyl record. But all of objectivity can be *quantified*, thus it is quantifiable though not quantitative until quantified and always at a specified level of abstraction in the representation of the mind. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I am not talking about measurement. Get it through your head, blue. We are discussing reality and the objective senses. Do you quantitatively measure everything you see? This is just nonsense if you can't see this distinction. That is not the common usage of the term.
An "amount" is not a number. An "amount" is something in physical reality. So "quantitative" refers to physical reality, in fact to everything we _know_ about physical reality. This is just one of your fundamental misunderstandings. You keep being insulting based on your own basic misunderstandings. And I will keep exposing that. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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An "amount" is not a number. An "amount" is something in physical reality. A quantitative amount *is* a number. Otherwise it is a qualitative amount. Like, well this one looks bigger or it feels heavier. So "quantitative" refers to physical reality, in fact to everything we _know_ about physical reality. That is imprecise and it is this imprecision that you are capitalizing upon. Do you really deny that we can know things about reality that are qualitative and not quantitative? If so then this is where we are going to have to agree to disagree. This is just one of your fundamental misunderstandings. Not so at all. I simply understand that common meanings are imprecise and lead to problems which you are stuck in. Reality is not composed of number, but it can be measured and described by it. That is my point. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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A quantitative amount *is* a number. Otherwise it is a qualitative amount. Like, well this one looks bigger or it feels heavier. That is imprecise and it is this imprecision that you are capitalizing upon.
Not so at all. I simply understand that common meanings are imprecise and lead to problems which you are stuck in.
Let me try to give an example. Voltage is an amount. It can be measured on a scale of "more" and "less". The term "quantification" is often used to describe the process of identifying measurable amounts relating to a phenomenon and measuring them. The result of the measurement is a quantity. Voltage is called a quantitative property of physical reality because it is an amount that can be measured with a quantity as the result. All properties which we know about in physics are quantitative. An example for something which is not an amount would be "triangle". The property of being a "triangle" is not something that can be measured as an amount. But to determine whether something has the shape of a triangle can be based on quantitative measurements, so in an extended sense one can speak of "shape" as a (more complex) quantitative property. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Let me try to give an example. Voltage is an amount. It can be measured on a scale of "more" and "less". The term "quantification" is often used to describe the process of identifying measurable amounts relating to a phenomenon and measuring them. The result of the measurement is a quantity. Agreed, but keep in mind that quantification is an a posteriori mental process. As such it necessitates purely qualitative sensation and differentiation between objects and their physical referents such as yard-sticks. Voltage is called a quantitative property of physical reality because it is an amount that can be measured with a quantity as the result. All properties which we know about in physics are quantitative. An example for something which is not an amount would be "triangle". The property of being a "triangle" is not something that can be measured as an amount. There you go. It is not quantitative. But to determine whether something has the shape of a triangle can be based on quantitative measurements Yes, it CAN be based in quantitative measurements, but surely you understand that such an identitification can be acheived without any quantification whatsoever, right? ... so in an extended sense one can speak of "shape" as a (more complex) quantitative property. Sure, it *can* be conceived that way, but it is not intrinsic to the experience of "triangleness" itself, i.e. we can identify triangles as toddlers without knowing any math whatsoever. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Sure, it *can* be conceived that way, but it is not intrinsic to the experience of "triangleness" itself, i.e. we can identify triangles as toddlers without knowing any math whatsoever. Sure, but even a toddler does so based on quantitative sensations (unless soemthing surprising is going on). The toddler just doesn't know that they are called "quantitative". So I repeat my statement: "Everything we know about physical reality is quantitative." |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Sure, but even a toddler does so based on quantitative sensations (unless soemthing surprising is going on). The toddler just doesn't know that they are called "quantitative". So I repeat my statement: "Everything we know about physical reality is quantitative." So do you deny really the subjectivity and non-numerical quality of perception? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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So do you deny really the subjectivity and non-numerical quality of perception? ...if so then you are saying in effect that the color blue *is* quantitative insofar as it is objectively (externally) perceived, because it can be quantified in exactly the same way you gave for triangularity. Do you deny this conclusion from your own premises? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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So do you deny really the subjectivity and non-numerical quality of perception? ...if so then you are saying in effect that the color blue *is* quantitative insofar as it is objectively (externally) perceived, because it can be quantified in exactly the same way you gave for triangularity. Do you deny this conclusion from your own premises? You have extended your own previous question, but it is still not quite clear to me what you are asking. I distinguish sensory perception (brain processes) and conscious experience of perception (the 3D image we see consciously). However, I am not trying to imply that they are separate, only that we know about them in different ways, with different qualities. More later, also please clarify your question if possible. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I distinguish sensory perception (brain processes) and conscious experience of perception (the 3D image we see consciously). It is slightly inaccurate and misleading to say that we see in 3 dimensions. If you are going to quantitatively simplify and generalize the senses (and why stop before we get to blue?) then it is perhaps more accurate to say that we see in two dimensions for each planar retina and feel the depth based on learned correlations (feelings) between the two images. This is more of a learned feeling (mnemonic primitive) than a quantitative computation. So essentially it is a quantification and an over-generalization to say that we see in dimensions at all. It is far more complicated than that and far less linear and numerical. Vision, like the other senses are qualitative at root, even if they are ‘quantitative’ in your sense of the term as modified and thus merely quantifiable at root. also please clarify your question if possible. Do you deny that in sensation (the basis of objectivity) there is a qualitative aspect that is more fundamental than your restricted quantitative aspect (which means simply quantifiability). After-all it is the qualitative aspect that is indeed what is quantified, abstracted and simplified into generalized parameters, dimensions and "facts." We see the object unconsciously before we see it consciously and only then do we qualitatively or quantitatively determine any amounts or numbers. If you deny this then you are in effect saying that the perception of color is ‘quantitative’ (quantifiable) which implies to most people that blue is indeed numerical. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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It is slightly inaccurate and misleading to say that we see in 3 dimensions. If you are going to quantitatively simplify and generalize the senses (and why stop before we get to blue?) then it is perhaps more accurate to say that we see in two dimensions for each planar retina and feel the depth based on learned correlations (feelings) between the two images. This is more of a learned feeling (mnemonic primitive) than a quantitative computation. So essentially it is a quantification and an over-generalization to say that we see in dimensions at all. It is far more complicated than that and far less linear and numerical. Vision, like the other senses are qualitative at root, even if they are ‘quantitative’ in your sense of the term as modified and thus merely quantifiable at root. I'm not sure I get your point. We see horizontal and vertical extension, and "depth". "Depth" is indicative of distance from the eyes, we can roughly estimate the distance an object has from us and this corresponds to the conscious experience of "depth". This is good enough for me to talk about "3D". I'm not so much interested (in the context of this discussion) about the scientific details, since I don't quite see how they would be significant in this context. Do you deny that in sensation (the basis of objectivity) there is a qualitative aspect that is more fundamental than your restricted quantitative aspect (which means simply quantifiability). After-all it is the qualitative aspect that is indeed what is quantified, abstracted and simplified into generalized parameters, dimensions and "facts." We see the object unconsciously before we see it consciously and only then do we qualitatively or quantitatively determine any amounts or numbers.
Sorry to say I still need clarification on this. Perhaps it helps if I say that I don't understand "quality" to be opposed to "quantitative". There different quantitative qualities and also non-quantitative qualities. Quantitative qualities are for example size, voltage, frequency, amplitude. Non-quantitative qualities are the famous "qualia". I don know any other _basic_ non-quantitative qualities than qualia. Perhaps this helps you to re-phrase your question in way that I might understand. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Do you deny that in sensation (the basis of objectivity) there is a qualitative aspect that is more fundamental[...] On the risk of missing your point (which you would need to clarify), let me say this: The physical model of sensory perception rests on physical measurements of electromagnetic, electrochemical, and similar processes. All these are defined through quantitative qualities such as frequencey voltage, etc. Only in conscious experience there is what I call the "look" of blue, or what is generally called "qualia". This not quantifiable, otherwise it would be possible for two persons to exachange a quantitative decription (which is of course not the reality) and be certain that these two person see "blue" in _exactly_ the same way. Just like it is possible for two persons to exchange the number "10" in order to be completely sure that they have the same number of fingers. It is also not possible to quantify the difference between color and sound, even though it might be possible (in the future) to quantify a physical description of the respective neural processes. So the physical model of neural processes is quantitative, whereas it is not possible to have such a model for conscious experience. Although it is quite possible that physical processes in general also have non-quantitative qualities (in fact I would assume so), such qualities are not known to us and do not appear to have any effect on us (although one could for example think about whether quantum effects have anything to do with that). Such qualities would be beyond what we commonly call "physical reality". I've written more on this at http://www.occean.org in "Proving the Unprovable", but I am not sure whetehr you would consider this to come closer to your question. From your earlier post: but only if you will grant me that underlying all quantification of observability is qualitative perception, i.e. the perception of colors, textures forms shapes etc, using no numbers whatsoever. In "my" language, and I don't know yet how to translate this to "your" language, the physical model of sensory perception speaks only about quantitative qualities. In our conscious experience, there are both quantitative qualities and non-quantitative qualities. The quantitative qualities are those which I call "conscious-size": sizes, extensions, distances, shapes, and the amount of color, for example the amount of blue. The non-quantitative qualities are those which I call "conscious-how": the specific "look" of blue, what "blue" looks like. Usually none of these exists in "numbers", but some are "amounts" and some are not. Again, I don't know if you would consider this an answer to your question, or if you will say that you already heard me explain all this (which I did, but perhaps the misunderstanding of what "quantitative" means kept it from being communicated). |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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On the risk of missing your point (which you would need to clarify), let me say this:
Right, but we are discussing more than the physical model of anything here. We are discussing the whole of objectivity itself. This means all externally directed sensation. This sensation is then the foundation to all quantitative and qualitative forms of description. Only in conscious experience there is what I call the "look" of blue, or what is generally called "qualia". This not quantifiable, otherwise it would be possible for two persons to exachange a quantitative decription (which is of course not the reality) and be certain that these two person see "blue" in _exactly_ the same way. Just like it is possible for two persons to exchange the number "10" in order to be completely sure that they have the same number of fingers. It is also not possible to quantify the difference between color and sound, even though it might be possible (in the future) to quantify a physical description of the respective neural processes. I wonder if by now you are starting to realize that we agree on this part? So the physical model of neural processes is quantitative, whereas it is not possible to have such a model for conscious experience. That is a non-sequitur. Just because the experience itself of qualia is not capturable by a physical model does not mean that a model of why they arise is not possible. In a physical model of lightning does the scientist get to know what it is like to *be* lightning? Physical models are not about recreating the intrinsic experience of the object in question. They cannot bridge the explanatory gap through anything but a heuristic bridge to recall the intrinsic experience of a similar mode. Although it is quite possible that physical processes in general also have non-quantitative qualities (in fact I would assume so), such qualities are not known to us and do not appear to have any effect on us (although one could for example think about whether quantum effects have anything to do with that). Such qualities would be beyond what we commonly call "physical reality". That’s only true in your sense of the term “quantitative”, but not in mine. I've written more on this at http://www.occean.org in "Proving the Unprovable", but I am not sure whetehr you would consider this to come closer to your question. Right. I’ve seen it, but I think, like our conversations, it misses the point. From your earlier post:
Notice that I am not talking about any physical model whatsoever, but simply the experience of sensation in general. The ‘qualia,’ which, whether you know it or not, extends to all sensation. In our conscious experience, there are both quantitative qualities and non-quantitative qualities. And of course in your terms they are either one or the other, right? So the question becomes how is the experience of texture any more quantitative and less qualitative than that of color? The quantitative qualities are those which I call "conscious-size": sizes, extensions, distances, shapes, and the amount of color, for example the amount of blue. The non-quantitative qualities are those which I call "conscious-how": the specific "look" of blue, what "blue" looks like. Ok, but the look ALWAYS underlies recognition of the quantitative distinctions. Usually none of these exists in "numbers", but some are "amounts" and some are not. “Usually”? How about ALWAYS. In the mind, even numbers are qualitative. That is why they are so fuzzy and imprecise. Again, I don't know if you would consider this an answer to your question, or if you will say that you already heard me explain all this (which I did, but perhaps the misunderstanding of what "quantitative" means kept it from being communicated). It is an answer, but I don’t know how much closer it gets to our argument. Can you now put it back into the argument to see what it proves and what it doesn’t? Maybe we should list all the points of agreement first. I’ll list em’ and you decide whether or not you agree with them or make qualifications or whatever. 1: We agree that there is a fundamental “explanatory gap” between the objective and subjective and as of yet science cannot bridge the gap and may not ever FULLY be able to in its explicit linguistic and thus linear descriptions. 2: We agree that, at root neither objectivity (externally directed experience) nor subjectivity (internally directed experience) are numerical and that both are essentially qualitative whether additionally quantitative (quantifiable) or not. 3: We agree that physics is not physical reality and that physical reality is only objectively observable reality and does not encapsulate the intrinsic experience of subjectivity. 4: We agree that subjectivity and objectivity do not reduce one to the other, but instead exist as symbiotic poles of observability or consciousness itself. 5: well that’s a good start for now. If you can think of others then list them. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Right, but we are discussing more than the physical model of anything here. We are discussing the whole of objectivity itself. This means all externally directed sensation. This sensation is then the foundation to all quantitative and qualitative forms of description. Aha, the whole of it. To be clear: what do you mean with sensation: subjective conscious experience, or sensory perception in terms of brain processes? Our understanding of the latter is of course (at least mostly) based on (or rather: part of) the physical model. Sensation in my experience usually refers to the physical/cognitive-biological process in terms of neural reactions etc.. This seems like a big step to make, so we should make sure we are talking about the same. I wonder if by now you are starting to realize that we agree on this part? So you agree that qualia are additional properties of reality that have no equivalent in our common understanding of the physical reality of brain processes? That is a non-sequitur. Just because the experience itself of qualia is not capturable by a physical model does not mean that a model of why they arise is not possible. In a physical model of lightning does the scientist get to know what it is like to *be* lightning? Physical models are not about recreating the intrinsic experience of the object in question. They cannot bridge the explanatory gap through anything but a heuristic bridge to recall the intrinsic experience of a similar mode. I wasn't talking about a model of "why they arise", but of conscious experience as such. One could try to have a model of the quantifiable aspects, yet one of my major points is that they are not causally independent of the non-quantitative aspects. Perhaps you agree in this sense. With physical models however, this does not seem to be a problem (unless perhaps quantum effects are such a situation). That’s only true in your sense of the term “quantitative”, but not in mine. Which is "your" sense of "quantitative"? Numerical? How would that be related? ight. I’ve seen it, but I think, like our conversations, it misses the point. I assume you are about to bring out what this point is. Notice that I am not talking about any physical model whatsoever, but simply the experience of sensation in general. The ‘qualia,’ which, whether you know it or not, extends to all sensation. Qualia extends to all sensation which is conscious to at least some degree. The term doesn't seem to apply to sensation which is not conscious at all (in so far as you would still call it sensation). And of course in your terms they are either one or the other, right?
Some aspects of conscious experience are quantitative and some not. The texture in the sense of a pattern has quantitative charateristics: the distances and angles and selection of colors appearing in conscious experience. This can be described in a "JPG file" or "tiff" file or with vector graphics. The look of each color cannot. Then texture may "cause" a sense of beauty, a like or dislike, which in turn may have again quantitative aspects and non-quantitative aspects. Ok, but the look ALWAYS underlies recognition of the quantitative distinctions. Yes, if they are based on conscious experience. A computer may make quantitative distinctions, in which case there is no reason to assume that there is such a thing as a "look". There may also be quantitative distinctions in the brain which we are not conscious of (subjectively). (Except if, for example, we _assume_ that all reality goes with non-subjective or distributed non-personal consciousness, in which case it probably would not be a "look" in the human sense. But then we would have to make clear that we are not anymore talking about "physical" reality in the common sense, and that this is an _assumption_ which would apply to bananas just (or at least) as well as to computers or tape-recorders.) “Usually”? How about ALWAYS. In the mind, even numbers are qualitative. That is why they are so fuzzy and imprecise. Numbers in the mind are abstractions in thought, which can be "triggered" for example by seeing a visual representation of a number. Whether you consider this abstraction in thought to be a part of conscious experience or of consciousness is probably a matter of definition. However, we are, or can be, aware of the abstractions we are making and also experience them consciously. It is an answer, but I don’t know how much closer it gets to our argument. Can you now put it back into the argument to see what it proves and what it doesn’t? I'll make a step in that direction when I come to point "4:"... Maybe we should list all the points of agreement first. I’ll list em’ and you decide whether or not you agree with them or make qualifications or whatever. Of course there have been many more (which I didn't keep a list of), it is interesting to see some of them listed. 1: We agree that there is a fundamental “explanatory gap” between the objective and subjective and as of yet science cannot bridge the gap and may not ever FULLY be able to in its explicit linguistic and thus linear descriptions. Yes, and the gap may be larger than we think. 2: We agree that, at root neither objectivity (externally directed experience) nor subjectivity (internally directed experience) are numerical and that both are essentially qualitative whether additionally quantitative (quantifiable) or not. Yes, nothing real is at root numeric/symbolic. The question I have here, as above (where you used the word sensation), is whether you are talking about conscious experience, or experience in third-person terms, or both. The "physical model" is based on comparisons of external objects, that is, we compare a yard-stick to the size of an object. This "operation" can be performed both by a computer or consciously, but in the end our sense of reality is based on those things which we experience consciously. 3: We agree that physics is not physical reality and that physical reality is only objectively observable reality and does not encapsulate the intrinsic experience of subjectivity. Yes, but I would be cautious in the first part. Our idea of physical reality is usually based on what we know from physics, and when we (or you) mean something else, it is necessary to be clear about that, and what the differences are. So far it would not be clear to me to what else, specifically, you would be referring to in a specific context. 4: We agree that subjectivity and objectivity do not reduce one to the other, but instead exist as symbiotic poles of observability or consciousness itself. We agree that subjective consciousness cannot be reduced to objective physics. However, it might possible to "explain" subjective consciousness in terms of objective (or perhaps better "non-personal") consciousness. This would not be a "reduction" but an "enrichment". It seems also possible that there is only multiple-interconnected-subjectivity and no "objectivity" other than that. I think there are "symbiotic poles" between what I call "measurable-size" and "conscious-size", but not between "conscious-how" and anything known, anything not based on assumptions. And this goes in the direction of why I think that "conscious-how" is more essential, a "deeper" reality, than "measurable-size" and "conscious-size". This is not a distinction between objective and subjective, but a distinction within consciousness. I see no reason, for example, to assume that conscous-how is "vibrating", referring to what we said earlier. Actually, to assume that "conscious-how" vibrates in itself (that is, other than with a modification of "conscious-size") would mean that our experience of "blue" would be vibrating, that is, we would experience the same neural activity in varying conscious color experiences. That we would not have just one way of seeing "blue", but many slightly different ones. Most "materialists" (not you) would find this more than implausible, I think. What I wrote two paragraphs above does not exclude the possibility that "measurable-size" has a root, or rather a branch, that goes deeper, as well. It might, but what can we say about that other than that we cannot exclude it as a possibility, and that it doesn't have any known effect on us? (Except, perhaps, the quantum effects.) Science does not give us much of a clue in that direction, except that questions such as "Why the universe?" and "Why the quantum?" (or not) remain to be answered. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Aha, the whole of it. To be clear: what do you mean with sensation: subjective conscious experience, or sensory perception in terms of brain processes? I mean that polar unity of sensation beyond the duality of description you keep presenting. This however is the interface between the subject and object and it ‘blurs’ your rigid dualistic distinction, so you will naturally be inclined to turn up the contrast as you are doing here. This polar unity is the qualia interface (mnemonic primitives) which is the basis for BOTH subjectivity and objectivity. The objective description “in terms of brain processes” is but a subset of generalized abstractions within an even more restricted domain, all of which is based on the qualia of sensation as the root of the empirical. Our understanding of the latter [brain processes] is of course (at least mostly) based on (or rather: part of) the physical model. Sensation in my experience usually refers to the physical/cognitive-biological process in terms of neural reactions etc.. I an mot talking of the intellectual objective understanding of what perception is, but what it actually is in terms of experience, i.e. the experience itself. It is this experience which is again the root of observability. This seems like a big step to make, so we should make sure we are talking about the same. Indeed, maybe this time it will become clear. So you agree that qualia are additional properties of reality that have no equivalent in our common understanding of the physical reality of brain processes? I do indeed because subjectivity and objectivity are NOT the same thing. In fact they are polar opposites. But I also believe that the explanatory gap is a natural consequence of the polarity itself and the polar non-identity. I wasn't talking about a model of "why they arise", but of conscious experience as such. “As such?” Can you explain what that means? So you are hoping for an objectification of subjectivity without reduction to parts? This wouldn’t be objective whatsoever because objectivity deals strictly with parts and wholes and their structures. Take that away and you have an empty symbol which is what we already have. No doubt you are assuming a priori that consciousness is indivisible and composed of no parts. (then we certainly differ on this matter) One could try to have a model of the quantifiable aspects, yet one of my major points is that they are not causally independent of the non-quantitative aspects. I don’t get it. Can you point out the causal connection more clearly? Perhaps you agree in this sense. With physical models however, this does not seem to be a problem (unless perhaps quantum effects are such a situation). We’ll find out I guess. S: That’s only true in your sense of the term “quantitative”, but not in mine.
To me ‘quantitative’ strongly implies 'composed of number'. This is a natural reaction due to whatever formative causes so, as a habit, the connotation is hard to break. I assume you are about to bring out what this point is. I merely think your division between quantitative and non-quantitative (size vs. how) is a bit superficial and doesn’t address the root of the duality. It deals strictly in the realm of the epistemic and not the ontic. The point I am bringing about will be published in due course and may be visible in some respects in our discussion. Qualia extends to all sensation which is conscious to at least some degree. The term doesn't seem to apply to sensation which is not conscious at all (in so far as you would still call it sensation). Right, let’s stick with the qualia of sensation, which is what it is like to observe both external and internal states. The qualitative interface between subject and object. This is the ‘medium’ (or abstractly a ‘surface’) of conscious creativity and the root of all representation in science and art. Some aspects of conscious experience are quantitative and some not. The texture in the sense of a pattern has quantitative charateristics: the distances and angles and selection of colors appearing in conscious experience. I feel our conversation will go more smoothly if we could use ‘quantifiable’ rather than ‘quantitative’ since that is what we have established it really means. Either way that is how I will continue to interpret it, but if we eliminate this necessary translation then we will eliminate a possible source of interpretive error. Just a suggestion. Anyway, the experience is what I am referring to whether or not it is a posteriori quantifiable. conversion
Ok, so it seems that ‘quantifiable’ is an aspect or property in addition to qualia. Some qualia have salient features that one can attach value, number or amount, to and others do not. Keep in mind the retinal blind-spot, however, which demonstrates that we may simply not be aware of the modifications of the senses (such as a missing patch near the center of the visual field). Thus the modifications go undetected and we assume that there is an underlying continuity simply due to ignorance of the causes. S: Ok, but the look ALWAYS underlies recognition of the quantitative distinctions.
We agree essentially about this point, but I would word it differently as “if they emerge into conscious experience” rather than "if they are based on." A computer may make quantitative distinctions, in which case there is no reason to assume that there is such a thing as a "look". Right, and most people believe perhaps justifiably that no such thing yet exists in a non-biological computer. Numbers in the mind are abstractions in thought, which can be "triggered" for example by seeing a visual representation of a number. Whether you consider this abstraction in thought to be a part of conscious experience or of consciousness is probably a matter of definition. Agreed and well put. However, we are, or can be, aware of the abstractions we are making and also experience them consciously. Agreed, but I refrain from making such a clear homuncular distinction between the two. To me, consciousness simply includes a symbolic self-recursive self-monitoring function and sometimes we become aware of parts of consciousness itself. The superficiality of the function can be seen when it enters the ‘infinite loop’ of being conscious of being conscious of being conscious etc. where what actually ends up in consciousness is an empty shell game not the original contents which were the triggering kernel of the cascade. Usually, however, when going about daily business we are not self-conscious at all and just exist and experience somewhat directly. Of course there have been many more (which I didn't keep a list of), it is interesting to see some of them listed. indeed S: 1: We agree that there is a fundamental “explanatory gap” between the objective and subjective and as of yet science cannot bridge the gap and may not ever FULLY be able to in its explicit linguistic and thus linear descriptions.
Generally I agree. Both materialists and idealists are ignorant of its necessary polar nature and existence and thus they ignore it almost completely. But the gap has presented a solid ground for detractors on both sides of the interface. It persists because it exists. The implicit cannot be encapsulated by the explicit. S: 2: We agree that, at root neither objectivity (externally directed experience) nor subjectivity (internally directed experience) are numerical and that both are essentially qualitative whether additionally quantitative (quantifiable) or not.
Experience in third person terms is not experience. It is projection. I am talking about *real* experience; Nagel’s “what it is like.” The "physical model" is based on comparisons of external objects, that is, we compare a yard-stick to the size of an object. This "operation" can be performed both by a computer or consciously, but in the end our sense of reality is based on those things which we experience consciously. I am not talking about computers and WE do it consciously. S: 3: We agree that physics is not physical reality and that physical reality is only objectively observable reality and does not encapsulate the intrinsic experience of subjectivity.
The definition was itself a clarification. To further clarify: I am not talking about ideas or scientific generalizations, but again experience. S: 4: We agree that subjectivity and objectivity do not reduce one to the other, but instead exist as symbiotic poles of observability or consciousness itself.
In my view that is a deeply confused prospect, though it seemed that you parenthetically caught a glimpse of that ;-) The objective is an epistemic function and thus is not the ontic. This confusion is at the root of materialism and I am surprised that you would make the same connection. This would not be a "reduction" but an "enrichment". To me that is simply what science already is, an enrichment. Reality doesn’t reduce to science, but an externally observable aspect of reality is merely approximately explained by it, to whatever degree possible. It seems also possible that there is only multiple-interconnected-subjectivity and no "objectivity" other than that. So you are saying that you think it is possible that we do not experience or modify in reaction to an external world? Is this the ‘brain in the vat’ conjecture? If so, then the skeptic in me would have to assign an extremely low, but non-zero probability to that possibility. I think there are "symbiotic poles" between what I call "measurable-size" and "conscious-size", but not between "conscious-how" and anything known, anything not based on assumptions. I can see how they map, but to me they seem rather loose fitting and a bit lopsided in the ‘quantitative’ direction. And this goes in the direction of why I think that "conscious-how" is more essential, a "deeper" reality, than "measurable-size" and "conscious-size". I agree in a certain sense, because conscious experience is immediate while objectivity is mediated. This is the essence of the relativity of simultaneity because it takes time to mediate or propagate sensory modifications from object to subject. This is perhaps part of the disconnect you are sensing. And this is why subjectivity is the root of objectivity, but just the same objectivity is the root of subjectivity (skepticism not withstanding). This is not a distinction between objective and subjective, but a distinction within consciousness. I see no reason, for example, to assume that conscous-how is "vibrating", referring to what we said earlier. Perhaps just as you would have no reason to assume a priori that a perfectly calm lake would be composed of atoms. The sub-levels are invisible because human consciousness is emergent from what you call non-personal consciousness or what I call specifically modified substance. Consciousness certainly has it’s own limits as the retinal blind spot reveals. Actually, to assume that "conscious-how" vibrates in itself (that is, other than with a modification of "conscious-size") would mean that our experience of "blue" would be vibrating, that is, we would experience the same neural activity in varying conscious color experiences. Ok so 'how' rests at a certain level of abstraction, beneath which it does not penetrate and thus cannot ‘see’. (resist the homuncular projection) That we would not have just one way of seeing "blue", but many slightly different ones. I believe that is the case, similar to the fact that we have very many slightly differing personalities, only the differences may be more slight wrt color. Most "materialists" (not you) would find this more than implausible, I think. Perhaps, but I wouldn’t know. What I wrote two paragraphs above does not exclude the possibility that "measurable-size" has a root, or rather a branch, that goes deeper, as well. It might, but what can we say about that other than that we cannot exclude it as a possibility, and that it doesn't have any known effect on us? (Except, perhaps, the quantum effects.) Science does not give us much of a clue in that direction, except that questions such as "Why the universe?" and "Why the quantum?" (or not) remain to be answered. Thus the necessity for metaphysics. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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When you say subjectivity is the root of objectivity, then that refers to objectivity as we perceive it through quantifying sensation. In this sensation we do not recognize (outside of ourselves) consciousness. When you say objectivity is the root of subjectivity, then that must be an objectivity which includes the quality of consciousness as an essential quality. So the two objectivities are not the same, it is only a metaphysical assumption that they might be the same ontologically, there are other possibilities. The important point, however, is that they are for sure not the same epistemologically. It would be a fundamental error to propagate what we know about the objective to be a root of the conscious. It can't be. What we know as "the objective" is not the root of consciousness, far from it. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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When you say subjectivity is the root of objectivity, then that refers to objectivity as we perceive it through quantifying sensation. Ahhh digging deep at the interface for a crack to pry open? I knew the blurring distinctions would make you uneasy and you would try and crank up the contrast. It is this absolute duality that your position requires in order to force the objective to be reduced to the subjective. Typically cartesian. Ok, to answer your question. It depends on what you mean with “quantifying sensation.” I don’t normally think of the sensations as quantifying anything. Furthermore, what I am talking about (and keep reiterating over and over and over and...) is the experience of sensation. Not just the fact that we perceive patterns and modifications which we can assign numbers to. Do you deny the role of qualia in perception? In this sensation we do not recognize (outside of ourselves) consciousness. Of course. The consciousness is not inside of ourselves either. It is the interface itself. It is what we commonly call the “self”...though I prefer a much broader aperture. When you say objectivity is the root of subjectivity, then that must be an objectivity which includes the quality of consciousness as an essential quality. Precisely. You can’t observe the world without experiencing it. What I really mean is that subjectivity cannot form without external sensory perception. This is objectivity. Subjectivity arises in the same process as does objectivity. They are symbiogenetic. The interface of qualia (mnemonic primitives) is essential for both subjectivity and objectivity. So the two objectivities are not the same Right, you are thinking of objectivity as the abstract and generalized product of the calibration of the perceptions (objectivity) of many individuals, namely science, or physics. I am talking about the objectivity of the single individual which is the root of all collective objectivity, but more specifically I am pointing to the common interface in qualia between both subjectivity and objectivity. Both of them are fundamentally an experience. One is external and the other is internal, but as representations, BOTH are epistemic functions. … it is only a metaphysical assumption that they might be the same ontologically, there are other possibilities. No, they are the same experientially. I am not saying that there is a real surface of qualia in the brain. It is clearly distributed. But the same qualia that is engaged when I dream of the color blue is also engaged when I see it outside of me. Qualia is the interface of subject and object. The important point, however, is that they are for sure not the same epistemologically. It would be a fundamental error to propagate what we know about the objective to be a root of the conscious. But that is not what I am saying. I said nothing about “what we know about the objective.” I am talking about what if FEELS LIKE to experience the sensation of external things. Clearly you don’t suppose that this experience is non-essential for objectivity, right? It can't be. What we know as "the objective" is not the root of consciousness, far from it. Exactly, we agree on this point and I am surprised yet again that you keep assuming otherwise. The root is beyond both the subjective and the objective. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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The last first:
Exactly, we agree on this point and I am surprised yet again that you keep assuming otherwise. I don't keep assuming otherwise. I just assume that not everyone agrees with this as much as you, which is one of the reasons I keep pointing this out, another one being, as I explained, that it is an integral point of my argument to emphasize certain distinctions. Please, I don't want to keep justifying myself for that. Ahhh digging deep at the interface for a crack to pry open? I knew the blurring distinctions would make you uneasy and you would try and crank up the contrast. It is this absolute duality that your position requires in order to force the objective to be reduced to the subjective. Typically cartesian. No, there is no absolute duality. Ok, to answer your question. It depends on what you mean with “quantifying sensation.” I don’t normally think of the sensations as quantifying anything. Furthermore, what I am talking about (and keep reiterating over and over and over and...) is the experience of sensation. Not just the fact that we perceive patterns and modifications which we can assign numbers to. Do you deny the role of qualia in perception? How about "in-terms-of-more-and-less" instead of "quantifying". I think we have to get this clear. All sensory perception, whether you look at it scientifically or consciously, or both, results in information which has a "more-or-less" character. Something is larger or smaller, brighter or darker, more-blue or less-blue, more-green or less-green. Qualia are not information, but how the information is represented in our consciousness. Of course. The consciousness is not inside of ourselves either. It is the interface itself. It is what we commonly call the “self”...though I prefer a much broader aperture. Right, you are thinking of objectivity as the abstract and generalized product of the calibration of the perceptions (objectivity) of many individuals, namely science, or physics. I am talking about the objectivity of the single individual which is the root of all collective objectivity, but more specifically I am pointing to the common interface in qualia between both subjectivity and objectivity. Both of them are fundamentally an experience. One is external and the other is internal, but as representations, BOTH are epistemic functions. No, they are the same experientially. I am not saying that there is a real surface of qualia in the brain. It is clearly distributed. But the same qualia that is engaged when I dream of the color blue is also engaged when I see it outside of me. Qualia is the interface of subject and object. But that is not what I am saying. I said nothing about “what we know about the objective.” I am talking about what if FEELS LIKE to experience the sensation of external things. Clearly you don’t suppose that this experience is non-essential for objectivity, right? It seems you are talking about the concepts we have of the outside (the "world") and the inside (the "I"). Both are concepts, abstractions in our mind which we form through historical experience. Yes, these concepts are formed in mutual dependency, the word "symbiogenetic" fits well. The conceptual mind doesn't have an interface between the concepts it is holding. Qualia are the way in which we are conscious of something, whether it is concepts or perception, qualia are so to say orthogonal to these distinctions. The root is beyond both the subjective and the objective. In so far as the above is what you mean with "the objective" and "the subjective", the root of both is the conceptual mind and its interpretation of the historical experiences it makes, embedded in psychological processes. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I don't keep assuming otherwise. I just assume that not everyone agrees with this as much as you, which is one of the reasons I keep pointing this out, another one being, as I explained, that it is an integral point of my argument to emphasize certain distinctions. Please, I don't want to keep justifying myself for that. As soon as you stop automatically using me as a proxy to argue against your favorite opponent, then you won’t need to justify why it seems as if you are attributing absolute materialist positions to me. Alternatively, you could state something like, “well a materialist would say…” rather than just acting like *I* would or did say it. Think about it. No, there is no absolute duality. Right, not after you have reduced objectivity to subjectivity. But both materialists and idealists do the same thing. They present an absolute dualism in order to force one side into unreality thereby reducing it to the other. You are an inverse materialist. This is a reactionary stance. How about "in-terms-of-more-and-less" instead of "quantifying". I think we have to get this clear. All sensory perception, whether you look at it scientifically or consciously, or both, results in information which has a "more-or-less" character. In EXACTLY the same individual way as internal sensation is quantifiable. The blue inside my dreaming mind has just as much of an amount as the blue I experience with my eyes open. But again, I am not talking about the quantifiability. How many more times will I have to say this? I am talking about the sheer experience of the sensation itself. Something is larger or smaller, brighter or darker, more-blue or less-blue, more-green or less-green. Qualia are not information, but how the information is represented in our consciousness. EXACTLY, so when I say ‘qualia’ why can’t you just know that this is what I am talking about? Instead you have to force it into your quantifiability distinction which works both ways, BTW, the only difference being the additional collective aspect of objectivity. It seems you are talking about the concepts we have of the outside (the "world") and the inside (the "I"). Both are concepts, abstractions in our mind which we form through historical experience. NO. Can’t you understand what I am saying? Hell, it is not that tough, blue. I am talking about the experience underlying BOTH subjectivity AND objectivity. I am not talking about concepts at all, unless you think of qualia as a concept as well. Yes, these concepts are formed in mutual dependency, the word "symbiogenetic" fits well. oh, ok. Nice tangent. The conceptual mind doesn't have an interface between the concepts it is holding. You have confused it way beyond what I thought you capable of. Qualia are the way in which we are conscious of something, whether it is concepts or perception, qualia are so to say orthogonal to these distinctions. I know what qualia are, they are the EXPERIENCE of the sensation rather than any concept formed of them. I am talking about qualia, not concepts. Answer me this question. Do you think it FEELS like anything to see the blue sky? Do you also think it FEELS like anything to vividly imagine a blue sky in a dream? What do they have in common? FEELING!!!!! (@_@) qualia! What two things have in common *is* their interface. S: The root is beyond both the subjective and the objective.
That’s not my root. Not even close. All our conversations about Spinoza are lost on you. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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As soon as you stop automatically using me as a proxy to argue against your favorite opponent, then you won’t need to justify why it seems as if you are attributing absolute materialist positions to me. Alternatively, you could state something like, “well a materialist would say…” rather than just acting like *I* would or did say it. Think about it. This discussion is not about you or my favorite opponent, it is about a topic. And putting forward a consistent view on this topic requires addressing materialistic positions. If you agree with what I say then you agree with what I say, no need to get upset. Who says I assume you are disagreeing with everything I say? Right, not after you have reduced objectivity to subjectivity. But both materialists and idealists do the same thing. They present an absolute dualism in order to force one side into unreality thereby reducing it to the other. You are an inverse materialist. This is a reactionary stance. I simply don't assume a specific form of unity or symmetry based on metaphysical assumptions. Instead I look at what we can know and/or realize as a fact. These points are open ended and reflect that we have, so to say, only pieces of the puzzle. That doesn't mean that I assume the absolute to be a puzzle with missing pieces. It just means that I am not interested in making speculations. In EXACTLY the same individual way as internal sensation is quantifiable. The blue inside my dreaming mind has just as much of an amount as the blue I experience with my eyes open. But again, I am not talking about the quantifiability. How many more times will I have to say this? I am talking about the sheer experience of the sensation itself. You may agree with this, but I need to clarify it: Only "what" we see is quantifiable, not "how" we see it. "How" we see, "blue" and "green", are distinct, but between "blue" and "green" it is not a difference in terms of more-or-less of something. Where as the differences between "what" we see (whether external or internal) are differences of more-or-less, larger or smaller, more-blue or less-blue. Again, you may already agree. EXACTLY, so when I say ‘qualia’ why can’t you just know that this is what I am talking about? Instead you have to force it into your quantifiability distinction which works both ways, BTW, the only difference being the additional collective aspect of objectivity. NO. Can’t you understand what I am saying? Hell, it is not that tough, blue. I am talking about the experience underlying BOTH subjectivity AND objectivity. I am not talking about concepts at all, unless you think of qualia as a concept as well. oh, ok. Nice tangent. You have confused it way beyond what I thought you capable of. I know what qualia are, they are the EXPERIENCE of the sensation rather than any concept formed of them. I am talking about qualia, not concepts. You speak as if external sensation/experience is the same as "the objective". However, any sensation/qualia-experience is called "subjective", regardless of whether the content of experience (that which is seen) is external or internal. The basis of "the objective" is comparison, that is, we establish a connection between multiple events or properties, logically or causally or mathematically, and we assume that this connection exists independently of whether we experience these events/properties or not. These multiple events are part of "what" we see, not "how" we see. "What" we see are the objects we recognize in the 3D image we see, "how" we see are the colors used by this image, which of course need to be distinct, otherwise everything is the same color and we see "nothing". We speak of the "objective" when speak of "what" we see independently of the "seeing", the split of "observation" into the "observed" and the "observer", which is usually the "I" and the "world". Do you think it FEELS like anything to see the blue sky? Do you also think it FEELS like anything to vividly imagine a blue sky in a dream? What do they have in common? FEELING!!!!! (@_@) qualia! What two things have in common *is* their interface. An interface is something that connects two things and is _between_ these two things. Commonality is not an "interface". If anything in this regard, commonality means that two things are not separate and so don't need an "interface". That’s not my root. Not even close. All our conversations about Spinoza are lost on you. It is not your "rootless root", but it is the root of the "I" and "world" concepts. Again, this discussion is not about you or Spinoza, it is about understanding a topic. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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This discussion is not about you or my favorite opponent, it is about a topic. No, the discussion is *with* me. The point is that you keep putting forth a view point as if it were mine and I keep telling you that if you do that then make it clear that you are not assuming that it is mine. It is simple, just be explicit about it or it will continue to seem that you are attributing wrong views to me. And putting forward a consistent view on this topic requires addressing materialistic positions. Then put them forth AS SUCH, not as if they were my views. Just label them or something so it is clear that you know the difference. If you agree with what I say then you agree with what I say, no need to get upset. Who says I assume you are disagreeing with everything I say? I guess you said that. I didn’t. I simply don't assume a specific form of unity or symmetry based on metaphysical assumptions. Instead I look at what we can know and/or realize as a fact. These points are open ended and reflect that we have, so to say, only pieces of the puzzle. That doesn't mean that I assume the absolute to be a puzzle with missing pieces. It just means that I am not interested in making speculations. Lol, ok. As you continue to speculate about consciousness existing at the root. You may agree with this, but I need to clarify it: Only "what" we see is quantifiable, not "how" we see it. "How" we see, "blue" and "green", are distinct, but between "blue" and "green" it is not a difference in terms of more-or-less of something. Where as the differences between "what" we see (whether external or internal) are differences of more-or-less, larger or smaller, more-blue or less-blue. Again, you may already agree. Yep, I agreed long ago. You speak as if external sensation/experience is the same as "the objective". There are many senses in the meaning of ‘objective.’ I am pointing (and keep pointing) to its root in qualia, but you have to keep quibbling about it. However, any sensation/qualia-experience is called "subjective", regardless of whether the content of experience (that which is seen) is external or internal. There you go. The objective is rooted in the subjective. My point exactly. The basis of "the objective" is comparison How can you compare anything without experiencing it first? … that is, we establish a connection between multiple events or properties, logically or causally or mathematically, and we assume that this connection exists independently of whether we experience these events/properties or not. But we do the same thing internally in subjectivity. Do we not have internal complexity, objects, patterns, relationships in the subjective? Do we not make internal connections between them? These multiple events are part of "what" we see, not "how" we see. Again, you are driving a wedge into a dead horse. You can’t have a “what you see” without a “how you see.” That is my point. "What" we see are the objects we recognize in the 3D image we see, "how" we see are the colors used by this image, which of course need to be distinct, otherwise everything is the same color and we see "nothing". Just get to the point. This stuff is so obvious and I have made it clear that I am accepting this distinction. We speak of the "objective" when speak of "what" we see independently of the "seeing", the split of "observation" into the "observed" and the "observer", which is usually the "I" and the "world". Yes, but I am not talking about what we speak of, blue. Again I am talking about the qualia that allows us to speak of anything we see whatsoever. It is not your "rootless root", but it is the root of the "I" and "world" concepts. Again, this discussion is not about you or Spinoza, it is about understanding a topic. The topics are contained in our respective minds and I am not interested in being your proxy for a materialist. I was under the assumption that we were trying to understand one another, i.e. to communicate. If that is not your goal then just come out and say it. If it is your goal then take my word for what it is instead of forcing it to be something else. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Just get to the point. We were talking about whether we need or should assume that consciousness is "vibrating". "Vibrating" is a repeated variation from "less" to "more" and back, a variation of an amount, from high amplitude through zero to negatove amplitude. So my point is that it applies to qualities of consciousness which are "more-or-less" (I call them "conscious-size"), but not, or at least in no known way, to qualities which are non-quantitative/non-quantifiable/not "more-or-less". These I call "conscious-how". The same for nothingness in the sense of zero-level: Only amounts can be zero. The rest may be obvious. Or not. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Just because you can't see the modifications beneath consciousness does not mean they don't exist. In fact consciousness is at the very least diurnally cyclical. It waxes and wanes on many different and complex frequencies just like any other natural phenomenon. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I heard you are reading Alan Watts / Zen. It might be interesting to come back to this at a later point. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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eh? What are you talking about? I am not reading Alan Watts, I am listening to his talks and have been so for quite a while. Furthermore I have known the basics of buddhism for many years now so I don't think a little time will make much difference.
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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What I *am* reading, among other things, is Leibniz's "Monadology." It is quite fascinating and I think you would enjoy it, blue, because it is generally thought of as sort of an idealist slant on Spinoza, though it fits perfectly (even in a tight one-to-one correspondence in very many places) with my forthcoming neutral monist (nucleation of observability) interpretation of Spinoza.
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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because it is generally thought of as sort of an idealist slant on Spinoza As expressed in the quote from my homepage above, it is not the distinction materialistic vs. idealistic which interests me, but the distinction conscious-size vs. conscious-how, which is a discrimination within consciousness, and the recognition of conscious-how as an _additional_ causal factor within the quantitative. This two steps (the discrimination and the recognition as an additional causal factor) I consider to be perhaps logically distinct but in actuality the same. I would be surprised if I found personal interest in a philosophy which doesn't deliver on both of these steps. So in case Leibniz does, I might be interested to take a look. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I mentioned it only because you seem to be pushing for an idealist model and no doubt this is furthered through the distinctions you have mentioned above.
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I mentioned it only because you seem to be pushing for an idealist model and no doubt this is furthered through the distinctions you have mentioned above. No, that is a misunderstanding. There are of course more valid distinctions then the ones I mentioned to be of crucial interest to me. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Furthermore both Spinoza and Leibniz would agree with you as well, but I don't think you have worked out just how consciousness fits in the causal scheme of things. Spinoza does not recognize the non-quantitative to be an _additional_ causal factor _within_ the quantitative. In so far as his distinction "extension" vs "thought" can be considered in this reagrd (which I think it can't, really), the principles of causation are still different. In his view, the causation between modes of extension can be conceived independently of modes of thought. Which is not at all what I am talking about, and while I am not going to start a discussion about this, let me merely state that I am very clear on this. Thanks for the discussion. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Spinoza does not recognize the non-quantitative to be an _additional_ causal factor _within_ the quantitative. You are quite incorrect about that, blue. Immanent causation is entirely non-quantitative. You are simply hoping for some homogenous formless consciousness to explain consciousness with. Well how is that going to explain anything? How can form arise from non-form? How does the formless consciousness interact *with* the forms? Seems we are back to Descartes’ pineal vortex, but at least he had a fleshed out system. You just demand an outcome and could care less whether your axioms and categories make sense enough for to be worked out in full. In fact I bet that working it out in full is precisely what you don’t want. That would spoil your mystery. In so far as his distinction "extension" vs "thought" can be considered in this reagrd (which I think it can't, really), the principles of causation are still different. In his view, the causation between modes of extension can be conceived independently of modes of thought. Can be conceived, yes, but thought and extension are not REALLY separate whatsoever. At the epistemic level, they are simply two different ways in which we can conceive of modes and at the ontic level they are simply the within and the without. It is your admitted failure to make sense out of Spinoza that still precludes you from understanding this. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Immanent causation is entirely non-quantitative. I'll put a marker on this statement... ;-) Can be conceived, yes, but thought and extension are not REALLY separate whatsoever. At the epistemic level, they are simply two different ways in which we can conceive of modes and at the ontic level they are simply the within and the without. Exactly. And that is why according to Spinoza one does not have an causal effect on the other: Because in his system they are two aspects (if that is good word, if not, don't mind) of one and the same mode of substance. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I'll put a marker on this statement... ;-) Exactly. And that is why according to Spinoza one does not have an causal effect on the other: Because in his system they are two aspects (if that is good word, if not, don't mind) of one and the same mode of substance. That is why it is misleading to suppose that the mind should effect the brain or vice versa, because they are one and the same thing. There is a perfect causal connection and that is in their inseperability. The mind is every bit a part of the causal chain as is the brain. It is both a cause and an effect like every other natural phenomenon. Your agenda is to make it a supernatural “additional” cause, but you don’t even know that the formless cannot possess either energy or causation. Two words that you don’t seem to understand. Furthermore you forget that consciousness is every bit as “quantitative” as anything else, the only difference is that it is not visible by other minds. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Great. Since we already agreed that quantitative in your sense means quantifiable, then my statement stands. The immanent is beyond all perception and mensuration. It can’t be quantified. Quantitative in my sense is not exactly the same as quantifiable, but I accept if you say what you meant was "quantifiable" (also you mentioned that earlier). The difference I see is that "quantifiable" speaks of a ("a-posteriori") possibility, whereas "quantitative" speaks of something that is already the case. I think that the "more-or-less" (amount) character of many properties is due to their nature, independent of whether this property is being "quantified" by someone. For example the size of an object is more-or-less, larger-or-smaller (in my sense this means "quantitative"), unless one says that, similar to quantum theory, an object might not have a "size" independent of measurement. Or is there another word you could suggest for "more-or-less-character", other than "quantitative", which denotes an a-priori property? Independently, you are saying the "immanent" is not "quantifiable". So would you see the terms "immanent" and "conscious-how" as related? That is why it is misleading to suppose that the mind should effect the brain or vice versa, because they are one and the same thing. There is a perfect causal connection and that is in their inseperability. The mind is every bit a part of the causal chain as is the brain. It is both a cause and an effect like every other natural phenomenon. This is exactly how I understood yours (and Spinoza's) point of view. Your agenda is to make it a supernatural “additional” cause, but you don’t even know that the formless cannot possess either energy or causation. I'm not claiming to have an argument that says conscious-how is a causal factor in addition to the "brain", but that it is a causal factor in addition to that which we know in terms of quantitative physics _about_ the brain. Furthermore you forget that consciousness is every bit as “quantitative” as anything else, the only difference is that it is not visible by other minds. Since you have agreed that conscious-how is (unlike conscious-size) non-quantifiable, this means that you assume the brain to have corresponding non-quantifiable properties (or not?). Since you agree that conscious-how is a causal factor, I would conclude that the non-quantifiable properties of the brain are, in your view, causal factors just the same. Then where and how do you think would these non-quantifiable causal factors come into effect? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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The difference I see is that "quantifiable" speaks of a ("a-posteriori") possibility, whereas "quantitative" speaks of something that is already the case. Right, but it is misleading because it suggests mathematics and numbers. I think that the "more-or-less" (amount) character of many properties is due to their nature, independent of whether this property is being "quantified" by someone. Agreed. For example the size of an object is more-or-less, larger-or-smaller (in my sense this means "quantitative"), unless one says that, similar to quantum theory, an object might not have a "size" independent of measurement. Or is there another word you could suggest for "more-or-less-character", other than "quantitative", which denotes an a-priori property? ...inhomogeneous...modified...differentiated... Independently, you are saying the "immanent" is not "quantifiable". So would you see the terms "immanent" and "conscious-how" as related? Yes, certainly. The conscious-how is the emergent experience of the immanent as opposed to the extrinsic experience of the transitive which is a main aspect of objectivity, though both converge at the same interface of immanent experience. I'm not claiming to have an argument that says conscious-how is a causal factor in addition to the "brain", but that it is a causal factor in addition to that which we know in terms of quantitative physics _about_ the brain. Ok, that clears things up. So you are saying that there is an aspect to the brain which is unaccounted for by cognitive science which contributes to the nature of human consciousness? I would say that there is nearly an infinite amount of immanent causation that is necessarily unaccounted for by science. It seems that perhaps we are in agreement here as well. Since you have agreed that conscious-how is (unlike conscious-size) non-quantifiable, this means that you assume the brain to have corresponding non-quantifiable properties (or not?). Yes, everything has non-quantifiable properties and qualities because everything is ultimately caused by immanent causation beyond the reach of objectivity and subjectivity. But even consciousness comes in amounts, whether objectively or subjectively quantifiable or not. Ask yourself if an ant is as conscious as you think you are. Do you think it has as much feeling associated with its experiences of sensation? Also notice how consciousness waxes and wanes throughout the day. My experience is of great variability in consciousness, but I don't know about yours. And in fact this variability is directly quantifiable by brain-scanning machines. Since you agree that conscious-how is a causal factor, I would conclude that the non-quantifiable properties of the brain are, in your view, causal factors just the same. Indeed, they are the real causal factors. This is immanent causation, as opposed to transitive. Then where and how do you think would these non-quantifiable causal factors come into effect? There is no place that they don’t come into effect. I am sure that I did not quite answer your question, but it is too broad to answer at this point. Can you narrow the scope? Which processes ar¿˜¶Ë talking about here? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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...inhomogeneous...modified...differentiated... Can't something be differentiated without being quantitative/quantifiable ? For example blue looks different than green in a way that is not an amount/quantitative/quantifiable. Ok, that clears things up. So you are saying that there is an aspect to the brain which is unaccounted for by cognitive science which contributes to the nature of human consciousness? I would say that there is nearly an infinite amount of immanent causation that is necessarily unaccounted for by science. It seems that perhaps we are in agreement here as well. Good. (Of course, this applies only in so far as cognitive science/ science in general defines itself in terms of concepts and ways of thinking which are rooted in the context/paradigm of quantitative events/properties.) Yes, everything has non-quantifiable properties and qualities because everything is ultimately caused by immanent causation beyond the reach of objectivity and subjectivity. But even consciousness comes in amounts, whether objectively or subjectively quantifiable or not. Ask yourself if an ant is as conscious as you think you are. Do you think it has as much feeling associated with its experiences of sensation? Also notice how consciousness waxes and wanes throughout the day. My experience is of great variability in consciousness, but I don't know about yours. And in fact this variability is directly quantifiable by brain-scanning machines. As I think you agree, some things in consciousness are amounts, some are not. The amount of blue is an amount, the look of blue is not. The look of blue does not seem to change, but maybe it does somewhat without us noticing it. In dreams, the intensity of visual images can change strongly, whereas when awake the intensity of the visual image is surprisingly constant. We can be very distracted or very aware of the present, and so on. Not all variations/differences are are differences in amounts, such as the difference between blue and green. We may see a corresponding difference in a brain scan, yet it is not the same difference. (The brain scan, of course, shows only amounts.) Since we can understand and then say that it is not the same difference, it becomes a causal factor in addition to the difference detectable by the brain scan. As long as we simply react to what we see, the brain scan might reflect all causal factors. However, the moment we reflect on visual consciousness itself, on how we see, the brain scan will not reflect all causal factors. (As I think you already agree, just clarifying and deepening these points.) There is no place that they don’t come into effect. I am sure that I did not quite answer your question, but it is too broad to answer at this point. Can you narrow the scope? Which processes ar¿˜¶Ë talking about here? Yes, from the perspective of quantifiable measurements, how do you think will one see non-amounts come into effect? How do non-amounts change what we would otherwise expect to happen, how will it practically make a difference? If non-amounts are causal factors, how or where do you think will they change what happens from what would happen if only amounts were causal factors (which is the current view of physics)? You wrote "There is no place that they don’t come into effect.", so how is the situation different than it would be if this were not the case, for example different to what happens in terms of boolean logic in a computer, where every logical (quantitative) state depends only on other logical (quantitative) states (as long as the computer works the way it is supposed to work). Does this clarify the question? I'm not sure yet how far we agree on this question, and in how far we see that which we agree on here in the same context. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Can't something be differentiated without being quantitative/quantifiable ? For example blue looks different than green in a way that is not an amount/quantitative/quantifiable. But of course we could attach numbers to the degrees of differentiation, say, as actual degrees on a color wheel, for example. If we can see the differentiation, we can quantify as well as qualify it. As I think you agree, some things in consciousness are amounts, some are not. An amount is an arbitrary category. Every property of nature comes in relative degrees or amounts (or whatever pigeonholing word you wish to use) which can be quantified or qualified. The amount of blue is an amount, the look of blue is not. More arbitrary categories and distinctions. The look of blue inherently includes an amount or a relative degree of differentiation. You can’t separate the two in anything but artificial categories. It is the amount of blue that determines the look. The look of blue does not seem to change, but maybe it does somewhat without us noticing it. The look is ENTIRELY dependent on the amounts and relations of the wavelengths that combine and enter our eyes, therefore it is indeed constantly changing and that is why we can differentiate between thousands (? at least) of different colors. You can never escape the modifications and degrees underlying everything observable. In dreams, the intensity of visual images can change strongly, whereas when awake the intensity of the visual image is surprisingly constant. Ok, but I am not sure where you are going with that one. It seems to demonstrate that the subjective mind is even more changing and modifiable than the objective. We can be very distracted or very aware of the present, and so on. Not all variations/differences are are differences in amounts, such as the difference between blue and green. The amounts are an a posteriori category. You are pointing out what are best and most easily described as differentiations in quality, rather than quantity, but all differences whatsoever can be quantified as indeed those have already been. We may see a corresponding difference in a brain scan, yet it is not the same difference. Right it is an ENTIRELY different perspective. (The brain scan, of course, shows only amounts.) It is your insistence on pigeonholing everything into neat little artificial categories that is causing the confusion. All differentiations and modifications can be described and conceptualized in terms of both quantity and quality because they are both together... and thus neither apart. Since we can understand and then say that it is not the same difference, it becomes a causal factor in addition to the difference detectable by the brain scan. It is an artificial distinction. That is the source of the “additional”. As long as we simply react to what we see, the brain scan might reflect all causal factors. The brain scan does not even come close to representing all causal factors. Such a thing is an impossibility. However, the moment we reflect on visual consciousness itself, on how we see, the brain scan will not reflect all causal factors. (As I think you already agree, just clarifying and deepening these points.) yes, I agree. There is no point of view that can fully represent immanent causation. Yes, from the perspective of quantifiable measurements, how do you think will one see non-amounts come into effect? I don’t believe in ‘amounts’ or ‘non-amounts’ as anything existing independently of the categorizing mind or intellect. All modifications can be equally quantified and qualified. How do non-amounts change what we would otherwise expect to happen, how will it practically make a difference? By, ‘non-amounts’ I will substitute ‘immanent causation’ so as to be able to make sense of and answer the question. So, “How does unobservable immanent causation change what we would otherwise expect to happen, how will it practically make a difference?” Immanent causation is what REALLY happens. We simply observe it from our various pov’s as transitive causation in terms of quantity and quality. When we understand that both objectivity and subjectivity are necessarily incomplete and do not and cannot capture all of immanent causation then we can simply understand the explanatory gap as a consequence of the fallibility of epistemology. Thus it is to be expected that subjectivity does not eliminatively reduce to objectivity and vice versa. Both povs are symbiotic and necessary. The practical difference is that we can then stop wasting time on limiting questions asked in the wrong way and proceed with more pertinent questions. If non-amounts are causal factors, how or where do you think will they change what happens from what would happen if only amounts were causal factors (which is the current view of physics)? In a word or two or more: indeterminacy, unpredictability, randomness, chaos, etc. Immanent causation is infinitely complex coming as it does from a continuum of action. It is fundamentally irreducible and cannot be captured as a finite set of “initial conditions”, neither spatially nor temporally; i.e. there is no fundamental moment nor particle of causation to build any finite model of initial conditions to base a prediction upon. This is the source of indeterminacy and randomness and also the self-similarity in all modifications. You wrote "There is no place that they don’t come into effect.", so how is the situation different than it would be if this were not the case, for example different to what happens in terms of boolean logic in a computer, where every logical (quantitative) state depends only on other logical (quantitative) states (as long as the computer works the way it is supposed to work). The difference is that reality is not linear, discrete, algorithmic, Boolean or logical. It is only our models that approximate such ideals and it is the absolutist materialistic belief in this approximation as the actual reality (or the inverse pendulum swing in idealism) that is at the root of many philosophical conundrums. Does this clarify the question? I'm not sure yet how far we agree on this question, and in how far we see that which we agree on here in the same context. We’ll see. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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But of course we could attach numbers to the degrees of differentiation, say, as actual degrees on a color wheel, for example. If we can see the differentiation, we can quantify as well as qualify it. The look is ENTIRELY dependent on the amounts and relations of the wavelengths that combine and enter our eyes, therefore it is indeed constantly changing and that is why we can differentiate between thousands (? at least) of different colors. The amounts are an a posteriori category. You are pointing out what are best and most easily described as differentiations in quality, rather than quantity, but all differences whatsoever can be quantified as indeed those have already been. It is your insistence on pigeonholing everything into neat little artificial categories that is causing the confusion. All differentiations and modifications can be described and conceptualized in terms of both quantity and quality because they are both together... and thus neither apart. I don’t believe in ‘amounts’ or ‘non-amounts’ as anything existing independently of the categorizing mind or intellect. All modifications can be equally quantified and qualified. It seems that the distinction between amounts and non-amounts is something we need to address not only in terms of words. So I think it is clearer if I actually use the word "quantitative" again, since I am in fact talking about an a-priori difference, not an "a posteriori" category. You mentioned the color-wheel as a quantification, and that the look depends "entirely" on amounts and relations. Here is why I think that misses my point, and it is a point with crucial consequences for understanding the nature of consciousness: When two persons look at the same color-wheel, you have the same quantification. You might extend that quantification to all neural brain processes. Still there is no reason to assume it impossible that with all those properties having the same result in quantification, the two persons could still see the colors on the color-wheel with a different look, consciously. Whether or not there are any differences in reality of this kind is not the question, only the fact that we cannot tell whether or not this is the case. So there is an additional differentiation (whether or not it is constant would be the next question, not the same question). Significantly, this is not so with known physical properties, for example the shape of an object. Except for questions of precision, the shape is completely defined by its quantification. The quantification does not leave any open questions about the shape. (Except, as I said, for precision and such questions as raised by string theory and its 10 or 11 dimensions). To put it more simply: if you know the length of an object to be 0.75 meter, than that's it, there is nothing else about the length that could be different. That is why "length" is an amount, and "conscious look of color" is not. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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It seems that the distinction between amounts and non-amounts is something we need to address not only in terms of words. So I think it is clearer if I actually use the word "quantitative" again, since I am in fact talking about an a-priori difference, not an "a posteriori" category. I realize this, but I think it would be a regression to go back to “quantitative”. Oh well, suit yourself. You mentioned the color-wheel as a quantification, and that the look depends "entirely" on amounts and relations. Here is why I think that misses my point, and it is a point with crucial consequences for understanding the nature of consciousness:
No. The quantification is arbitrary. It could be based on a colorwheel with 360 degrees for one person or any other dimensioning for someone else. You might extend that quantification to all neural brain processes. Still there is no reason to assume it impossible that with all those properties having the same result in quantification, the two persons could still see the colors on the color-wheel with a different look, consciously. That is beside the point. Subjectivity is non-verifiable. That is its nature. It is non-objective. Whether or not there are any differences in reality of this kind is not the question, only the fact that we cannot tell whether or not this is the case. So there is an additional differentiation (whether or not it is constant would be the next question, not the same question). Ok, more differentiation. Significantly, this is not so with known physical properties, for example the shape of an object. You keep pointing to intrinsic differences between subjectivity and objectivity. I keep acknowledging those differences. Subjectivity is non-objective and objectivity transcends the subjective through communicative abstraction. Except for questions of precision, the shape is completely defined by its quantification. Not so. The shape has a QUALITATIVE aspect as well. What does it FEEL like to look at a spikey vs. a soft and round shape? This feeling exists regardless of whether or not we quantify the shape. The quantification does not leave any open questions about the shape. Indeed it does, they are just unasked by yourself. (Except, as I said, for precision and such questions as raised by string theory and its 10 or 11 dimensions). To put it more simply: if you know the length of an object to be 0.75 meter, than that's it, there is nothing else about the length that could be different. Length is itself the quantitative abstraction and is not equivalent to shape nor the perception thereof. That is why "length" is an amount, and "conscious look of color" is not. Yes, length is conceivable as an amount, but it also can be conceived in qualitative terms. We do this all the time. This is called estimation. We get a feel for whether something is longer or shorter by purely subjective and qualitative means. I fail to see why this artificial pigeonholing differentiation is so crucial to you. Maybe I have just forgotten? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Blue, note that what is quantified in ALL cases is the EXPERIENCE underlying ALL sensation whether subjective or objective. You keep pointing to this experience as if it only applied to the subjective which you have arbitrarily and somewhat unconsciously subcategorized again into objective subjectivity such as the experience of shapes, and subjective subjectivity such as the experience of color. I am saying that the difference is non-absolute thus demonstrating that underlying all objectivity and quantification is subjectivity in the actual experience of sensation. This points to the symbiogenesis of subject and object.
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Blue, note that what is quantified in ALL cases is the EXPERIENCE underlying ALL sensation whether subjective or objective. You keep pointing to this experience as if it only applied to the subjective which you have arbitrarily and somewhat unconsciously subcategorized again into objective subjectivity such as the experience of shapes, and subjective subjectivity such as the experience of color. No, the difference between shapes and look of color is not a difference between subjective and objective. "You keep" re-mapping any distinctions I make onto the distinction subjective/objective. "You" also "keep" agreeing with most distinctions until we come to the point where it would require acknowledging that these distinctions have _practical_ consequences: that they not only are non-materialistic, not only in addition to materialistic statements about the world, but that they also actually contradict materialistic statements about matter itself. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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No, the difference between shapes and look of color is not a difference between subjective and objective. I didn’t say it was. I said that the perception, and therefore the quantification of both shapes and color (which is indeed accomplishable at both the subjective/individual level or the objective/collective level) is based in the same experience or qualia that you keep pointing to. You can’t quantify anything without experienceing it first. Therefore ALL human quantification (as opposed to quantization) is based on qualia because quantification is a symbolic process to measure and interrelate patterns in perceived reality. "You keep" re-mapping any distinctions I make onto the distinction subjective/objective. Oh really? I thought that was what you were doing with your artificial division within qualia itself. ;-) Does the perception of a shape give a qualitative experience as well as being quantifiable a posteriori? "You" also "keep" agreeing with most distinctions until we come to the point where it would require acknowledging that these distinctions have _practical_ consequences: that they not only are non-materialistic, not only in addition to materialistic statements about the world, but that they also actually contradict materialistic statements about matter itself. I have agreed with these points in the past and will continue to do so. What I disagree with is your insistence that ALL objectivity AND subjectivity is not based in qualia. You keep pointing to an artificial distinction between the perception of shapes and that of color as if the perception of EVERYTHING did not give a qualitative experience (qualia) that is only then a posteriori quantified. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I didn’t say it was. I said that the perception, and therefore the quantification of both shapes and color (which is indeed accomplishable at both the subjective/individual level or the objective/collective level) is based in the same experience or qualia that you keep pointing to. You can’t quantify anything without experienceing it first. Therefore ALL human quantification (as opposed to quantization) is based on qualia because quantification is a symbolic process to measure and interrelate patterns in perceived reality. I have agreed with these points in the past and will continue to do so. What I disagree with is your insistence that ALL objectivity AND subjectivity is not based in qualia. You keep pointing to an artificial distinction between the perception of shapes and that of color as if the perception of EVERYTHING did not give a qualitative experience (qualia) that is only then a posteriori quantified. It seems we might be coming closer to an understanding in general, yet perhaps here I'm missing your point. Even if everything were based on qualia in the same way, I don't see how this would make a difference to what has been said. I think it would only make these distinctions even more significant. However they are already significant enough, and in reality quantifiable properties are not in the same way based on qualia. The quantifiable properties are a result of so to say analyzing the differences in qualia (sizes), or of recognizing and categorizing qualia ("blue" or "green" as category), whereas the non-quantifiable properties are a direct, visible property of qualia by itself. (Or rather, qualia _are_ these directly experienced properties.) Speaking of distinctions within the conscious 3D image (rather than instinctive non-conscious reactions), we for example recognize the sun because there is a yellow area within a larger blue area (the sky). The size of the sun (for a human observer) is recognized by the extent of the yellow area in contrast to the blue area. So there is no qualia for "size", rather "size" is an abstraction based on differences in the color-qualia. That you might have a "feeling", as you said earlier, when observing the size of the sun, is a different conscious experience (also qualia), however not a visual conscious experience, and so a different topic. One can, and does, of course have feelings about everything including the main characters of a suspenseful story, even though they don't exist at all. Oh really? I thought that was what you were doing with your artificial division within qualia itself. ;-) Does the perception of a shape give a qualitative experience as well as being quantifiable a posteriori? I'm not sure what you are saying here, again I may be missing your point. The distinction quantitative/non-quantitative (or amount/non-amount) can be applied to the third-person view just as well as to the first-person view. However, it is only in the first-person view (conscious experience) that the non-quantitative can be directly observed. Non-quantitive properties are not observable when a scientist looks at another person or that person's brain, which is called the third-person view. Of course, a quantitative measurement could not possibly measure a non-quantitative property. But to answer my own question: How does the non-quantitative come into effect? At the point in time we talk about how we consciously experience, some processes must start in our brain which have not only quantitative causes, so to say, they would appear to happen "out of the blue". There may be quantitative requirements, but they would not be sufficient causes. So at that point, the non-quantitative would become a causal agent within the objective (third-person) realm, due to its effects on the quantitative, measurable physical properties. So it could be considered to be "objective" itself, perhaps just a question of definition. This does not exclude that there are non-quantitative properties in any "matter". However, this is not part of the contemporary scientific paradigm, except one might have the thought that this might have to do with "quantum uncertainty". Either way, it contradicts the assumption that quantitative physical events can always be explained just in relation to other quantitative physical events. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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It seems we might be coming closer to an understanding in general, yet perhaps here I'm missing your point. Even if everything were based on qualia in the same way, I don't see how this would make a difference to what has been said. I think it would only make these distinctions even more significant. That is why I found it odd that you would argue against the idea. ;-) However they are already significant enough, and in reality quantifiable properties are not in the same way based on qualia. The quantifiable properties are a result of so to say analyzing the differences in qualia (sizes), or of recognizing and categorizing qualia ("blue" or "green" as category), whereas the non-quantifiable properties are a direct, visible property of qualia by itself. ALL properties are quantifiable. This is simply saying that we can describe anything, however crudely, through quantitative means. What is the big deal with this statement? Speaking of distinctions within the conscious 3D image (rather than instinctive non-conscious reactions), we for example recognize the sun because there is a yellow area within a larger blue area (the sky). The size of the sun (for a human observer) is recognized by the extent of the yellow area in contrast to the blue area. So there is no qualia for "size", rather "size" is an abstraction based on differences in the color-qualia. Semantics. We experience shape and size just as we experience color, texture and pattern. These are qualia for ALL perceptual experiences. What is your purpose for denying such an obvious fact? That you might have a "feeling", as you said earlier, when observing the size of the sun, is a different conscious experience (also qualia), however not a visual conscious experience, and so a different topic. No it is not. It is the same thing just a different qualia. Shape, pattern and size indeed requires an experience in the mind. One can, and does, of course have feelings about everything including the main characters of a suspenseful story, even though they don't exist at all. far afield… However, it is only in the first-person view (conscious experience) that the non-quantitative can be directly observed. I don’t recognize your term ‘non-quantitative’. I thought I knew, but I think it is causing misconceptions here. EVERYTHING observable is quantifiable. What cannot be observed is immanent causation itself, but the closest we can come is as the experience of the causation itself and this is indeed qualia. But we can attach mathematical symbols to ANYTHING observable. This is a common and obvious fact and it is really quite trivial. Non-quantitive properties are not observable when a scientist looks at another person or that person's brain, which is called the third-person view. Why don’t you just say qualia instead of non-quantitative? As I noted previously all qualia can be represented (not replicated, mind you) by numbers, or macaroni or WHATEVER symbol set we wish to use. Big deal. Of course, a quantitative measurement could not possibly measure a non-quantitative property. Those non-quantitative properties are not qualia. They are the immanent causation of which qualia is the emergent experience. Qualia is quantifiable, but not replicable via mathematics. But to answer my own question: How does the non-quantitative come into effect? At the point in time we talk about how we consciously experience, some processes must start in our brain which have not only quantitative causes, so to say, they would appear to happen "out of the blue". There may be quantitative requirements, but they would not be sufficient causes. That was an answer? ;-) So at that point, the non-quantitative would become a causal agent within the objective (third-person) realm, due to its effects on the quantitative, measurable physical properties. So it could be considered to be "objective" itself, perhaps just a question of definition. Seems quite a bit too convoluted to me. This does not exclude that there are non-quantitative properties in any "matter". Quantification is a function of the conscious mind. It is not inherent in matter. However, this is not part of the contemporary scientific paradigm, except one might have the thought that this might have to do with "quantum uncertainty". Either way, it contradicts the assumption that quantitative physical events can always be explained just in relation to other quantitative physical events. Ok |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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That is why I found it odd that you would argue against the idea. ;-) Hmmm. ;-) ALL properties are quantifiable. This is simply saying that we can describe anything, however crudely, through quantitative means. What is the big deal with this statement? The big deal is it would render much of my homepage obsolete... ;-) ... and that it leads to an understanding of consciousness and its relation to measurable properties... Semantics. We experience shape and size just as we experience color, texture and pattern. These are qualia for ALL perceptual experiences. What is your purpose for denying such an obvious fact? Clarity. Only color (at a depth in subjective space) is a directly experienced _visual_ property. Shape, size, texture and pattern are derived. The latter are also conscious, just like the thought of Albert Einstein (who is already dead, as we know) might be a conscious thought. Of course, shape, size, texture and pattern can describe the 3D image we see, yet not what it looks like. Like a wire-frame model in computer-graphics which shows only the outline, or a children's picture book which let's the child fill in the colors. Paint green here. No it is not. It is the same thing just a different qualia. Shape, pattern and size indeed requires an experience in the mind. (See also above.) You are right, they are experienced in the mind, but not a direct visual experience like color. They can either be seen as a description of the 3D image (and the description is not the described), or for example a recognition in the mind, for example the recognition of an object. The recognition of an object in the mind does in fact have a qualia like any conscious experience, however that is not a visual qualia, rather I would perhaps call this qualia "meaning", a conceptual/intellectual experience, if you know what I mean. I don’t recognize your term ‘non-quantitative’. I thought I knew, but I think it is causing misconceptions here. EVERYTHING observable is quantifiable. What cannot be observed is immanent causation itself, but the closest we can come is as the experience of the causation itself and this is indeed qualia. But we can attach mathematical symbols to ANYTHING observable. This is a common and obvious fact and it is really quite trivial. You view that everything observable is quantifiable is mistaken. It is Dennett's view, who doesn't accept that there is something "ineffable" (indescribable) about qualia. You can attach a number to a color, RGB, CYMK or Pantone or whatever, yet this number has a verifiable correspondence only to the wavelength of light (an obviously quantifiable property). In contrast, when it comes to conscious experience of color, we have no idea whether you are attaching that number to the same conscious experience as I am. Hence we do not know whether we are talking about the same "thing". However, when I say I have 10 fingers I know that I mean exactly the same as when you say it. (Spare me with the comment that your fingers might have a different shape). This is not "really quite trivial", but true nevertheless. You have not succeeded in attaching a number to a conscious color, you have attached it to a frequency spectrum of light. Why don’t you just say qualia instead of non-quantitative? As I noted previously all qualia can be represented (not replicated, mind you) by numbers, or macaroni or WHATEVER symbol set we wish to use. Big deal. It depends on whether you are interested in understanding consciousness, or in the question of whether quantifiable properties of this universe are "causally closed". If you are only interested in counting your assets, then it doesn't matter. BTW, how come your mention of "macaroni" makes me remember the term "freedom fries"? That was supposed to be funny, I think, but it backfired, I would say. Those non-quantitative properties are not qualia. They are the immanent causation of which qualia is the emergent experience. Qualia is quantifiable, but not replicable via mathematics. We are still talking about different things. Besides why should immanent causation be non-quantifiable (when conceived under the attribute of extension, to use Spinoza's macaroni) ? Quantification is a function of the conscious mind. It is not inherent in matter. Maybe not macaroni, but you are saying the number of fusselinis on your plate is not a property of matter? That sounds more mysterious then anything I have steaked. This must be an extreme version of quantum burger. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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S: ALL properties are quantifiable. This is simply saying that we can describe anything, however crudely, through quantitative means. What is the big deal with this statement?
I hope for your sake that is not the main reason you cling to it. ... and that it leads to an understanding of consciousness and its relation to measurable properties... What leads to this? Are you saying that this is a problem? And if so, why? Clarity. Only color (at a depth in subjective space) is a directly experienced _visual_ property. That is total bullshit. I experience very many different types of qualia and each one is equally as direct. BOTH color and shape are determined initially in the retina and then represented later on down the line in the brain to give us qualia. Shape, size, texture and pattern are derived. Equally as much derived and ‘objective’ or ‘quantitative’ as color. Furthermore you have ZERO cognitive science to back up your claim whereas I could point to lots of data if I am ever so inclined to look it up again. Of course, shape, size, texture and pattern can describe the 3D image we see, yet not what it looks like. No we actually EXPERIENCE those things because we have processing centers in the brain specifically for representing them as qualia, just as we do for color. You are right, they are experienced in the mind, but not a direct visual experience like color. Sorry, equally direct. Ask ANY cognitive scientist. He’ll tell you that they all have their locatable processing centers. They can either be seen as a description of the 3D image… I am thinking that it is your usage of the term 3D that makes you think that the experience of shape is mathematical and thus derived. There is NO 3D image in the brain. The sensation of depth is a FEELING, not a numerical computation. This feeling is QUALIA and equally as direct AND indirect as the experience of color. All qualia is both indirect and direct, of necessity and it is splitting hairs to assign some absolute category to differentiate them. Does your theory depend on these split hairs? Why would you cling to such a theory? (and the description is not the described) Exactly, the 3D described sensation is NOT 3D at all. It is a feeling of depth which is correlated to experience as is the experience of color. They are calibrated into the mnemonic primitives of qualia and these fundamental memories (primitives) are activated with every sensation to produce the ineffable qualia. It is the fundamental aspect of the mnemonic primitives that makes them so ineffable because they are at the root of experience itself. It is like trying to bite your teeth. Give it a shot. Did you find that you bit precisely NOTHING? Wow, mysterious. You can't directly see your own eyes either but does this mean that they don't exist? The recognition of an object in the mind does in fact have a qualia like any conscious experience, however that is not a visual qualia, rather I would perhaps call this qualia "meaning", a conceptual/intellectual experience, if you know what I mean. I am not talking about RECOGNITION for hell’s sake. I am talking about experiencing the shape or texture of something before any recognition whatsoever. You view that everything observable is quantifiable is mistaken. I think you simply expect too much of quantification. I keep mentioning that the quantification is often necessarily crude (hint: macaroni) and you seem to think it means something deeply important to attach a numerical value to it. I think it is quite trivial and superficial indeed. It is Dennett's view, who doesn't accept that there is something "ineffable" (indescribable) about qualia. No, this simply demonstrates that you don’t understand me. You can attach a number to a color, RGB, CYMK or Pantone or whatever, yet this number has a verifiable correspondence only to the wavelength of light (an obviously quantifiable property). I can attach any arbitrary value whatsoever to my qualitative experience of color whether it is objectively verifiable or not. I keep pointing out that I am NOT talking about collective verification whatsoever, but simply the trivial assignment of number to an experienced qualia. Try to keep it straight, please. Objective verification is beside the point and after the fact of quantification itself. In contrast, when it comes to conscious experience of color, we have no idea whether you are attaching that number to the same conscious experience as I am. Who cares? I still can attach a number to it. See? Trivial indeed, but if I am consistent I can develop a completely non-objectively verifiable quantitative system of my own fundamentally ineffable qualia. ;-) Again, not such a big deal to anyone who has not built a theory based on an odd assumption stating otherwise. Hence we do not know whether we are talking about the same "thing". However, when I say I have 10 fingers I know that I mean exactly the same as when you say it. (Spare me with the comment that your fingers might have a different shape). Again you are pointing to the fundamental difference between subjectivity and objectivity as if it applied to the difference between quantifiability and non… It doesn’t and they are indeed NOT THE SAME THING. This is not "really quite trivial", but true nevertheless. You have not succeeded in attaching a number to a conscious color, you have attached it to a frequency spectrum of light. Nope. I attached it to my own inner ineffable experience as compared to some other inner ineffable experience. Qualia are internally differentiated amongst themselves and thus they are intrinsically quantifiable. BTW, how come your mention of "macaroni" makes me remember the term "freedom fries"? That was supposed to be funny, I think, but it backfired, I would say. I haven’t a clue why it makes you think of that. That is your own idiosyncratic association. Macaroni is not even a French word….ah yes, I remember, I mentioned building the Eiffel Tower out of macaroni as if that would prove that macaroni is intrinsic to its essence. This was to demonstrate that just because we can represent something in terms of something else (such as numbers) then it does not mean that this something else pertains to the essence of that represented and thus the quantifiable is not intrinsically quantitative. My point was simply to demonstrate the crudity of representation itself. Macaroni constructions were the first thing that came to my mind and I simply liked the image. You associated the French Eiffel Tower with Freedom Fries of your own accord and even YOU didn’t know why or how it happened. I think you just fried your notion of absolute freedom. We are still talking about different things. Besides why should immanent causation be non-quantifiable (when conceived under the attribute of extension, to use Spinoza's macaroni) ? Lol. How can you quantify that which you cannot see? Only modifications can be conceived under the attributes. That is why physics deals exclusively in terms of TRANSITIVE causation NOT the immanent. S: Quantification is a function of the conscious mind. It is not inherent in matter.
Congratulations, you have just found yet another amusing method of confusing yourself even further. Do you suppose that something else besides a conscious mind goes around symbolically assigning numbers to things or building representations out of macaroni for that matter? If, in your system (if it can be called such a thing) consciousness is a fundamental quality of the universe, then how could it be anything but a function of the conscious mind? Apparently you don’t really even understand your own system. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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What leads to this? Are you saying that this is a problem? And if so, why? There was an incomplete sentence...a negation missing...I meant to say that understanding that there are non-quantitative properties in conscious experience leads to an understanding of consciousness and its relation to measurable properties... That is total bullshit. I experience very many different types of qualia and each one is equally as direct. BOTH color and shape are determined initially in the retina and then represented later on down the line in the brain to give us qualia. Those are just more and more irrelevant details, but I can see why they confuse you. You think it is BS because you didn't read all of it carefully. I have already written that the qualia related to shape are conceptual/intellectual qualia. In so far as the visual 3D image is concerned (and who cares whether it is 2D or 2.5D or 3D ?), the shapes of the conscious visual image are not the qualia by which we experience shape. I think cognitive science is correct that there is neural processing regarding shapes _before_ this information becomes conscious (as you write later on), but that _is_ exactly what I call the _recognition_ of shape, and it has its own qualia, separate from the conscious color-image and the shapes of that color-image. The shapes we recognize and experience are, according to cognitive science, not the shapes of the conscious image. However, the conscious image also has shapes in it, and these shapes are quantitative properties of the conscious image. These shapes are the shapes I talk about when I say that conscious experience _also_ has quantitative properties. Which means we not only recognize the shapes of external objects, but we are also able to tell that our concious color-image has shapes relating to the physicl shapes the brain recognizes. However, the same applies to those qualia which are actually related to the recognition of shape: those qualia have non-quantitative properties as well. The quantitative information (shape) represented by the qualia is not the qualia itself. (Here I am not talking about the color-image anymore.) That is simply a distinction of information, and of how the information is represented. The information is quantitative, whereas its representation in qualia is non-quantitative. You have not described the qualia of recognizing a shape, and you will not be able to do so. All this is only making it more complicated, but perhaps we need to discuss these details so that you can see how I relate what you know from cognitive science to an understanding of qualia. Unfortunately, we complicated enough to reach the limits of my mastery of the english language in term of presenting my thoughts in an easily understandable manner. Which is why I usually refrain from going to this level of detail. I can attach any arbitrary value whatsoever to my qualitative experience of color whether it is objectively verifiable or not. I keep pointing out that I am NOT talking about collective verification whatsoever, but simply the trivial assignment of number to an experienced qualia. Try to keep it straight, please. Objective verification is beside the point and after the fact of quantification itself. You can, but it is not the same thing as attaching numbers to a shape. If you attach the number 5 to "blue", then the number 5 says nothing about what blue looks like. In contrast, saying that the shape of a square has 4 corners and 4 sides each of length x, that says _everything_ about _all_ properties of the shape. You have comletely described the shape, but you have not in the least described what "blue" looks like by giving it the number 5. That there is also a conscious experience of recognizing shapes is a different matter, but perhaps confusing the two is actually why you don't understand this whole distinction (between quantitative and non-quantitative properties) yet. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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There was an incomplete sentence...a negation missing...I meant to say that understanding that there are non-quantitative properties in conscious experience leads to an understanding of consciousness and its relation to measurable properties... And so? Aren’t we both saying that there are non-quantitative properties in consciousness? I think it is your semantic imprecision that is causing the confusion here. I already suggested that you abandon the term ‘quantitative’ because it continues to suggest intrinsic mathematical properties which we both agreed do not exist. S: That is total bullshit. I experience very many different types of qualia and each one is equally as direct. BOTH color and shape are determined initially in the retina and then represented later on down the line in the brain to give us qualia.
It is a trivial matter to prove it to oneself that qualia is quantifiable. The fact that we can distinguish between millions(?) of colors by purely qualitative methods, signifies that color is modification and therefore intrinsically quantifiable, not intrinsically quantitative. You think it is BS because you didn't read all of it carefully. Wrong. I think it is BS because I know otherwise and have experienced the quantification of my own senses, even that of color. It is a trivial matter. I have already written that the qualia related to shape are conceptual/intellectual qualia. Write it all you want, but that is your own arbitrary classification and it is not what I am talking about. We actually EXPERIENCE shape and texture and just as we have qualia mechanisms for color so we have them for shapes, lines, angles, textures, different kinds of motion etc. That is qualia and thus it demonstrates that qualia is the root of BOTH the subjective and objective. It is their interface. I am afraid that qualia is far more complex and differentiated than you seem to be aware of. In so far as the visual 3D image is concerned (and who cares whether it is 2D or 2.5D or 3D ?) The simple point that you failed to grasp is that the ‘perception’ of depth is also based on qualia. It is a feeling not a computation. Furthermore you seem to be deluded that somehow the experience of color is the only sense that is not derivative. The raw fact is that ALL qualia is derivative. It is always an emergent phenomenon and that is why you can’t point to it. I think cognitive science is correct that there is neural processing regarding shapes _before_ this information becomes conscious (as you write later on), but that _is_ exactly what I call the _recognition_ of shape, and it has its own qualia, separate from the conscious color-image and the shapes of that color-image. Of course it is separate and I did not say otherwise. The point is that qualia are intrinsically quantifiable simply because their function is to differentiate features of the external world. They ARE sensory differentiation and thus are quantifiable. The shapes we recognize and experience are, according to cognitive science, not the shapes of the conscious image. The experience is indeed the conscious image. Where and when did you study cognitive science? You have not described the qualia of recognizing a shape, and you will not be able to do so. Can’t you keep track of a conversation? I explicitly said that I am NOT talking about RECOGNITION of shapes. This is going nowhere because you keep slipping up all over the place. All this is only making it more complicated, but perhaps we need to discuss these details so that you can see how I relate what you know from cognitive science to an understanding of qualia. I am afraid my patience is wearing thin and boredom is setting in. You can, but it is not the same thing as attaching numbers to a shape. If you attach the number 5 to "blue", then the number 5 says nothing about what blue looks like. Exactly, but that is not the point. Quantification does not necessitate all forms of description nor even a visual one. To the user of this system the meaning is ALWAYS implicit and cannot be made explicit by any other means then appealing to a similar implicit experience. In contrast, saying that the shape of a square has 4 corners and 4 sides each of length x, that says _everything_ about _all_ properties of the shape. WOW, you really are naive. Do you actually believe that such a description is absolutely complete? I didn’t think the problem was that bad, but apparently so. You have comletely described the shape, but you have not in the least described what "blue" looks like by giving it the number 5. Again beside the point. Quantification ALWAYS rests on implicit associations. That there is also a conscious experience of recognizing shapes is a different matter, but perhaps confusing the two is actually why you don't understand this whole distinction (between quantitative and non-quantitative properties) yet. Lol, or perhaps not. It quite plainly appears to me that you are trying force your distinctions where they do not apply. And furthermore you are attaching an undue significance to the distinction. I pointed out just how trivial a matter it is to quantify ALL sensation and qualia. This simple trivial matter doesn’t register with you so it seems pointless to continue. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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And so? Aren’t we both saying that there are non-quantitative properties in consciousness? Yes, however we seem to have different ideas about which those are and consequently which conclusions are possible or not possible. If you say the non-quantitaive properties are those which are the underlying immanent causes, then I have in practical terms no idea what you are talking about. Whereas I am making it clear that I am talking about the look of a color, as an example. It is a trivial matter to prove it to oneself that qualia is quantifiable. The fact that we can distinguish between millions(?) of colors by purely qualitative methods, signifies that color is modification and therefore intrinsically quantifiable, not intrinsically quantitative. Why should it be trivial to equate differentiability with an intrinsic quantifiability? I completely disagree that everything that can be differentiated can also be quantified. Giving a color a number and calling that quantification and otherwise defending yourself with insults is plainly ridiculous. That's not science, for sure. B:
Of course that is what I believe, and that part is not naive but obvious. Oh, actually I forgot to say that the angle in the corners must be 90 degrees. Or did you also want to discuss molecular bumpiness and such things? Actually there are no two-dimensional shapes anyway, but what would that have to do with anything... It quite plainly appears to me that you are trying force your distinctions where they do not apply. "It quite plainly appears to me that you are trying" to bash anyone who dares to question not only materialistic assumptions about consciousness, but also materialistic assumptions about matter itself. At that point, dialogues with you quickly go south. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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If you say the non-quantitaive properties are those which are the underlying immanent causes, then I have in practical terms no idea what you are talking about.
ok, if you wish to deny the simple fact of quantifiability and differentiation among the sensations of color, then so be it. I am just glad that my theory doesn't hang by such a thin split hair. Why should it be trivial to equate differentiability with an intrinsic quantifiability? I completely disagree that everything that can be differentiated can also be quantified. Giving a color a number and calling that quantification and otherwise defending yourself with insults is plainly ridiculous. That's not science, for sure. I told you it was a trivial matter, now it appears that you are finally seeing it. Quantitative does not equate to differentiated and the senses of color are entirely differentiated. That is indeed their function, to differentiate among various sensation. Once differentiated they can be quantified, however loosely (trivially and "unscientifically") or rigorously (not quite so trivially and more "scientifically"). B: In contrast, saying that the shape of a square has 4 corners and 4 sides each of length x, that says _everything_ about _all_ properties of the shape. S: WOW, you really are naive. Do you actually believe that such a description is absolutely complete? I didn’t think the problem was that bad, but apparently so. B: Of course that is what I believe, and that part is not naive but obvious. Oh, actually I forgot to say that the angle in the corners must be 90 degrees. Or did you also want to discuss molecular bumpiness and such things? The sub details do after-all exist and thus your mathematical description is fundamentally incomplete. It is ALWAYS an abstraction. There is no such thing in reality as a perfect square or circle etc. The map is NEVER the territory unless it ceases to be used as such and you begin walking all over it. "It quite plainly appears to me that you are trying" to bash anyone who dares to question not only materialistic assumptions about consciousness, but also materialistic assumptions about matter itself. At that point, dialogues with you quickly go south. No I just get tired of continually correcting your sloppy and slippery split-hair semantics in hopes that you will see my obvious point (a point that radmail so effortlessly and presciently made in his brief appearance in this discussion). The argument really started south in the first place. That is why I was so hesitant to begin any prolonged discussion with you. Oh well, thanks again for the discussion. It was fun, but it has gone south, as you said. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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ok, if you wish to deny the simple fact of quantifiability and differentiation among the sensations of color, then so be it. I am just glad that my theory doesn't hang by such a thin split hair. It is not a simple denial, but a qualified consideration which I am willing to discuss in all detail, even if I myself often leave out details for the sake of avoiding confusion. (Such as the easily possible confusion of the "shape of experience" with the "experience of shape"). I think it only seems to be a "split hair" because in science we are used to walk around this fact for the purpose of establishing mathematical theories based on repeatable quantitative measurements. However, in actuality, it applies to all qualia, which are, as you have said, the basis of all our (conscious) experience. I told you it was a trivial matter, now it appears that you are finally seeing it. Quantitative does not equate to differentiated and the senses of color are entirely differentiated. That is indeed their function, to differentiate among various sensation. Once differentiated they can be quantified, however loosely (trivially and "unscientifically") or rigorously (not quite so trivially and more "scientifically"). I am not sure whether this is just verbal imprecision in your response, but I do think that if something can be quantified that implies it is also differentiated. It is the other way around: I think that something which can be differentiated can not necessarily also be quantified. Examining this more closely, I think we need to distinguish between "quantification" and "identification". Attaching a number to a color only identifies, selects that color. It does not describe the look of a (primary) color at all, it is more like giving it a name. Also, giving a number to for example a frequency is a repeatable measurement, whereas if you give it to a conscious experience, even when talking only about your own, is done without continuous reference point. You won't be able to tell whether the blue you see tomorrow is the same you gave a number to today. You can't say, ah, the blue I see today is #4, and the one I saw yesterday was #5, so it must be a different blue. Speaking of the conscious experience, you would have to be able to tell it is a different blue in the first place. Except you can compare "what" you see from the objectve side, but that is not the same. The sub details do after-all exist and thus your mathematical description is fundamentally incomplete. It is ALWAYS an abstraction. There is no such thing in reality as a perfect square or circle etc. The map is NEVER the territory unless it ceases to be used as such and you begin walking all over it. The sub details do after-all exist and thus your mathematical description is fundamentally incomplete. It is ALWAYS an abstraction. There is no such thing in reality as a perfect square or circle etc. The map is NEVER the territory unless it ceases to be used as such and you begin walking all over it. Of course the details always exist. But knowing that there are between 4 billion and 20 billion human beings living is much better than having no idea at all. And even having no idea at all is still different than an impossibility to quantify something in the first place. It is in fact important to understand that the description is never the described. However it does not mean that all descriptions stand on equal footing metaphysically, or that the impossibility to describe certain properties of reality would be an insignificant fact. Furthermore, the distinction between amounts and non-amounts is not really a distinction of describability, unless you take a position of taking quantum theory to the extreme, which if you want to consider you can say so. If you find that a physics experiment delivers very imprecise results, you will look for the causes of that imprecision, instead of just saying: "Oh well, all results are imprecise anyway." And if you find that some properties of reality cannot be subjected to quantitative measurement at all, than you would also better look for the causes, which is what I am doing. No I just get tired of continually correcting your sloppy and slippery split-hair semantics in hopes that you will see my obvious point (a point that radmail so effortlessly and presciently made in his brief appearance in this discussion). The argument really started south in the first place. That is why I was so hesitant to begin any prolonged discussion with you.
Since I felt this message of yours was more to the point, I tried to shortly address some of your concerns, even though my answers are probably not the ones you were looking for. Also I am not sure which point out of the several possible ones you are referring to when talking about your hopes. If you want to stop here, that is fine. We would probably come back to these questions later. BTW, I have already discussed these questions here on this board long before I saw your alias here for the first time, and many arguments come up again and again, in fact "the map is not the territory" was one of the first responses I got when I came here the first time. I am simply learning to address these arguments (such as what I call the "anyway" arguments), rather than expecting to convince anyone within a short time frame. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I am not sure whether this is just verbal imprecision in your response, but I do think that if something can be quantified that implies it is also differentiated. It is the other way around: I think that something which can be differentiated can not necessarily also be quantified. Examining this more closely, I think we need to distinguish between "quantification" and "identification". So tell me, blue, what is to stop someone (namely yourself) from assigning an actual dimension of numerical value to the internal spectrum of qualia, and why can’t you do it yourself, when I am sure pretty much anyone else can do it as can I practically effortlessly. Attaching a number to a color only identifies, selects that color. It does not describe the look of a (primary) color at all, it is more like giving it a name. Who says that quantification entails visual description? That is your idiosyncratic definition. I have pointed this out before, but you failed to take note and respond. It simply provides a more rigorous communication system for internal or external dialogue whether it is used to describe something visually or not. Also, giving a number to for example a frequency is a repeatable measurement, whereas if you give it to a conscious experience, even when talking only about your own, is done without continuous reference point. There is certainly a difference between the subjective methods and capabilities of quantification as compared to the objective, but that is beside the point. You won't be able to tell whether the blue you see tomorrow is the same you gave a number to today. You can't say, ah, the blue I see today is #4, and the one I saw yesterday was #5, so it must be a different blue. On the contrary, you can tell within certain limits of precision. Furthermore you could carry around a pantone booklet to compare it with and objectify your subjective quantification experience. But of course this crosses the interface and further blurs your distinction. Speaking of the conscious experience, you would have to be able to tell it is a different blue in the first place. It is a simple difference of degree of precision, not a difference of kind, as you are trying to force it to be. Quantification is quantification regardless of the limits of precision at the extremes or in absence of a standardized reference point. At the quantum level, there is a severe lack of precision and that is what engenders the uncertainty relations, but that does not stop us from quantifying things at that level. Of course the details always exist. But knowing that there are between 4 billion and 20 billion human beings living is much better than having no idea at all. The question was whether or not the mathematical description is ABSOLUTELY complete. You said it was and I pointed out its limits. No one ever said that those limits make the mathematical description useless or no better than no description at all. Where do you find these tangents? It is in fact important to understand that the description is never the described. However it does not mean that all descriptions stand on equal footing metaphysically… No one is saying that they do. The difference is one of degree of precision not of kind. Your argument hinges on forcing a difference of kind, however, so you have to split this hair wide open. …, or that the impossibility to describe certain properties of reality would be an insignificant fact. This demonstrates a confusion between types and properties of description. The quantification of the sensation does not necessarily describe what it looks like and I never said it does. It simply attaches a value to the differentiations to establish a communicative (internal or external) rigor. And if you find that some properties of reality cannot be subjected to quantitative measurement at all, than you would also better look for the causes, which is what I am doing. You fail to acknowledge your dogmatic absolutism here. There are NO visualizable properties of reality that cannot be quantified ****at all****. Anything we can see or experience can be quantified to some extent. Thus it is merely a difference of degree not of kind. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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So tell me, blue, what is to stop someone (namely yourself) from assigning an actual dimension of numerical value to the internal spectrum of qualia, and why can’t you do it yourself, when I am sure pretty much anyone else can do it as can I practically effortlessly. The random assignment of numbers to the physical causes of perception (a color wheel is a physical object) is completely meaningless and not a quantitative description. All such instruments such as color-wheels are based on the the physical working of the senses which combine perceived colors from 3 (or so) primary colors. So these instruments, directly or indirectlt, merely assign numbers to the amounts of for example red, green and blue in the combined color. The actual challenge would be to give a quantitative description of a single primary color, for example blue. Who says that quantification entails visual description? The random assignment of numbers to a fleeting impression is meaningless. Furthermore you could carry around a pantone booklet to compare it with and objectify your subjective quantification experience. But of course this crosses the interface and further blurs your distinction. Of course that "crosses the interface", meaning you are not talking about conscious experience but about the physical causes of sensory perception, which is what a pantone booklet is. If your conscious experience of a primary color changes, then your experience of the pantone booklet would change as well, so that only serves to assign a number to the physical cause, not to the conscious experience, the actual conscious "look" of the color. It is a simple difference of degree of precision, not a difference of kind, as you are trying to force it to be. Only the combination of a color from primary colors can be done in amounts. The assignment of numbers to primary colors is arbitrary and has nothing to do with the measurement of amounts on a scale from 0 to 100. The question was whether or not the mathematical description is ABSOLUTELY complete. A shape is in fact something that is defined absolutely and completely in quantitative terms. there is nothing non-quantitative about a shape. This has nothing to do with precision. Unlike the look of a primary color. You fail to acknowledge your dogmatic absolutism here. There are NO visualizable properties of reality that cannot be quantified ****at all****. This is ridiculous. What would be a quantification of "blue". I'll take the RGB number for blue in 8-bit precision: (0,0,255). This is not a quantification of the look of "blue" as a primary color at all, it merely says that this color consist of blue and nothing else. So how is that a quantification of the look of blue? It just says that blue is blue. That is in fact no quantification at all. If you can't see how that is different from physical measurements on a scale and the resulting quantitative descriptions like E=m*c*c, then I don't know what else I could say. You have reverted to a completely meaningless notion of "quantification" which only shows that you are now denying you own understanding of physics for the benefit of being able to insult me. And now I have better things to do. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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S: Who says that quantification entails visual description?
Random? So just because mathematics can be used at a far more general level than visual description you assume that it is applied at random? Where do you get this stuff from? Of course that "crosses the interface", meaning you are not talking about conscious experience but about the physical causes of sensory perception, which is what a pantone booklet is. No, we were talking about the quantification of visual color sensation. It is quite easily and trivially accomplished, as I pointed out. Note that I did not specify that the quantification does anything more than implicitly reference the look itself which means that it will not encode transfer the the visual description explicitly. This is the nature of mathematics, however. It is perfectly explicit and must be used within a common implicit semantic contextual environment. If your conscious experience of a primary color changes, then your experience of the pantone booklet would change as well, so that only serves to assign a number to the physical cause, not to the conscious experience, the actual conscious "look" of the color. As I said, mathematics is inherently limited in precision, but that doesn’t stop us from quantifying things. Whether or not we have some ABSOLUTE standard (which we NEVER do) we can still quantify and obviously we do. S: It is a simple difference of degree of precision, not a difference of kind, as you are trying to force it to be.
Bullshit. Each sensation of a primary color comes with its own intensity. Mix those intensities together and you have your variations on the color wheel. This is common color theory and it is quite obvious. You are clearly grasping at straws, here. The assignment of numbers to primary colors is arbitrary and has nothing to do with the measurement of amounts on a scale from 0 to 100. ALL QUANTIFICATION IS ARBITRARY. It is ALL based on an arbitrary assignment of parameter and scale. S: The question was whether or not the mathematical description is ABSOLUTELY complete.
Those kinds of shapes are mathematical ideals and they do not exist as something to be perceived. Remember, however, that we were talking about the PERCEPTION and QUALIA of shape, NOT THE MATHEMATICAL IDEA(L). there is nothing non-quantitative about a shape. This has nothing to do with precision. Does your own body have a shape? Is it purely mathematical? Your loose semantics is stinking your own ship. S: You fail to acknowledge your dogmatic absolutism here. There are NO visualizable properties of reality that cannot be quantified ****at all****.
The scale and method of quantification is entirely arbitrary at root and thus the actual value could be pretty much anything so long as it affords a numerical system of interrelating differences in color perception. I'll take the RGB number for blue in 8-bit precision: (0,0,255). This is not a quantification of the look of "blue" as a primary color at all How many times do I have to tell you that we are not explicitly describing the LOOK of blue through quantification. Get it through your skull, please. Just try to pay attention and keep track of what has been said for the sake of expediency. So how is that a quantification of the look of blue? It just says that blue is blue. That is in fact no quantification at all. Lol. If I assign a system of coordinates to my tile floor so that I can locate any point on it with relatively accurate precision, will that describe for me the texture, color and pattern of the individual tiles? Do you understand what quantification is? It can be used for a great many types of applications, very few of which include visual description. If you can't see how that is different from physical measurements on a scale and the resulting quantitative descriptions like E=m*c*c, then I don't know what else I could say. lol, yes just give up, I already have. If you don’t already see by now that quantification is at a far more general level than visual description then you never will. You have reverted to a completely meaningless notion of "quantification"… Lol. Quantification has ALWAYS BEEN INHERENTLY MEANINGLESS. I am simply pointing it out for you, but since your system is based on assigning an undue meaning to it then it hurts a bit. …which only shows that you are now denying you own understanding of physics… Eh? Pulled another one out of your hat? Quantification does not equate to understanding THAT is why physics is NOT based in understanding, but simply in quantitative prediction. … for the benefit of being able to insult me. I am just playing your game. And now I have better things to do. Ok, run along now. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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How many times do I have to tell you that we are not explicitly describing the LOOK of blue through quantification. Exactly my point. But we are describing explicitly at which time the ball will hit the floor when I let it drop. That is the difference. Amount and non-amount. Thanks for your confirmation. Quantification has ALWAYS BEEN INHERENTLY MEANINGLESS. Another pointless "anyway" argument. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Exactly my point. And how long have I been saying it? Quantification is inherently arbitrary, meaningless and trivial so your distinction fails. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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And how long have I been saying it? Quantification is inherently arbitrary, meaningless and trivial so your distinction fails. Oh, now it is you who has been saying that... ;-D This must be the top "anyway" argument you've come up with so far...and yes, it makes all distinctions fail (not only mine)... ;-D |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Oh, now it is you who has been saying that... Lol, did I ever once say that by quantification I meant an encoding of a description of the look in explicit terms? No, I simply said that the sensation could be quantified. This is a trivial matter and I mentioned so at the outset. As soon as I realized that you were thinking that I was talking about using mathematics as an explicit description of the implicit look, as if mathematics were capable of such a thing in any of its applications, then I made sure to inform you that quantification operates at a more general level. It took you at least five or so posts of constant repeating of this point for it to finally sink in. So, yes you are correct, mathematics cannot encode implicit meaning in its explicit language, but then no language can and there is no reason to assume that it ever could and should. Your distinction rests simply on the limits of language and NOT between types of qualia as you suppose. It fails because you have made a categorical error due to your misunderstanding of the limits of language. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Lol, did I ever once say that by quantification I meant an encoding of a description of the look in explicit terms? No, I simply said that the sensation could be quantified. This is a trivial matter and I mentioned so at the outset. As soon as I realized that you were thinking that I was talking about using mathematics as an explicit description of the implicit look, as if mathematics were capable of such a thing in any of its applications, then I made sure to inform you that quantification operates at a more general level. It took you at least five or so posts of constant repeating of this point for it to finally sink in.
Ok, you've convinced me that you are actually trying to tell me something: That mathematics/language cannot encode "implicit meaning" anyway. I'm not quite clear what you think I am supposing about "types of qualia", though, so I better understand that before responding. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I'm not quite clear what you think I am supposing about "types of qualia", though, so I better understand that before responding. Ok, so tell me in terms that I can relate to, what you mean by your distinction between types of qualia, and we'll go from there. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Which is my "distinction between types of qualia", can you refer to a quote from one of my messages? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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you said something about quantitative vs. non-quantitative, but since quantification is such a trivial and arbitrary thing, can you render the distinction in more meaningful terms in order to make it useful for your theory? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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you said something about quantitative vs. non-quantitative, but since quantification is such a trivial and arbitrary thing, can you render the distinction in more meaningful terms in order to make it useful for your theory? I think from my side the difficulty is to find out what would be more meaningful for you. Since you used the expression "types of qualia", perhaps I should first say that I wasn't referring to different types of qualia in the sense of there being two or more groups of qualia. Let me come back to the conscious color-image. This color-image consists of just one type of qualia (color in subjective space), yet it has multiple characteristics. The patterns and structures of the colors within this color-image, and what the color at a certain point looks like. Now it is possible to describe the patterns and structures with mathematics/language, but not what the color looks like. I am saying that the reason is that the patterns and structures are combinations of amounts (lengths and angles, etc.), whereas the look of a primary color is not an amount or combination of amounts. (It is much easier to use primary colors as an example, though not really necessary.) So I am not speaking of different qualia, just of the conscious color-image as "one" qualia, and when I speak of the structures in this color-image, I am referring to the structure-of-the-experience, not to the experience-of-a-structure. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Since you used the expression "types of qualia", perhaps I should first say that I wasn't referring to different types of qualia in the sense of there being two or more groups of qualia. Let me come back to the conscious color-image. This color-image consists of just one type of qualia (color in subjective space), yet it has multiple characteristics. The patterns and structures of the colors within this color-image, and what the color at a certain point looks like. So essentially you are categorizing ALL the different qualitative aspects that go into the **experience** of visual discrimination under the single term “color”. Do you have any particular reason for this categorization? Note that this categorization is highly idiosyncratic and most philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists recognize the other forms of qualia such as pattern, texture and shape as qualia in their own right. You are the only person that I know of that assumes color as the primary category of which all the others are derivative, (if that is indeed what you are saying). Now it is possible to describe the patterns and structures with mathematics/language, but not what the color looks like. Nor, really what the patterns and structures look like. The mathematics simply allows one to reconstruct the image (including shape, color and texture etc.) in another medium. It does not encode the “look” (i.e. the implicit knowledge) of any of it but it can encode an explicit description of all of it. I am saying that the reason is that the patterns and structures are combinations of amounts (lengths and angles, etc.), whereas the look of a primary color is not an amount or combination of amounts. (It is much easier to use primary colors as an example, though not really necessary.) I think your categories are imprecise. There are indeed intensities (amounts) associated with ALL primary experiences of color and these intensities can be encoded along with shape in mathematical language. So I am not speaking of different qualia, just of the conscious color-image as "one" qualia… An odd way of describing it, but ok I will go along with your arbitrary linguistic categorization scheme. … and when I speak of the structures in this color-image, I am referring to the structure-of-the-experience, not to the experience-of-a-structure. lol, so now you are admitting modification in the actual experience? Would you care to flesh out the distinction between “the structure-of-the-experience” and “the experience-of-a-structure” so I can better understand this distinction. Right now they seem to be the very same thing. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Nor, really what the patterns and structures look like. The mathematics simply allows one to reconstruct the image (including shape, color and texture etc.) in another medium. It does not encode the “look” (i.e. the implicit knowledge) of any of it but it can encode an explicit description of all of it. The patterns and structures are abstract properties of the color-image. Certain perceived structures or patterns may trigger additional sensations, but I am just talking about the qualia of color at this point. So when talking about the structure of the conscious image, I am talking for example about the zero-sized dividing line between two differently colored areas. This is an abstraction and does not look like anything. It is an abstract property of the color-image, not part of the image. I think your categories are imprecise. There are indeed intensities (amounts) associated with ALL primary experiences of color and these intensities can be encoded along with shape in mathematical language. One can meaningfully talk about the amount of blue (a primary color) but blue itself is not the amount _of_ something else, rather _is_ "something". lol, so now you are admitting modification in the actual experience? Would you care to flesh out the distinction between “the structure-of-the-experience” and “the experience-of-a-structure” so I can better understand this distinction. Right now they seem to be the very same thing. See above. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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The patterns and structures are abstract properties of the color-image. That's nice in theory, but in fact it is not true that the other aspects of the visual image are derivitive of the qualia of color. There are special regions in the brain for processing all such "abstract" qualia (including color), and their abstraction is at the same level as that of color. They each are processed in parallel in their equally important specialized regions down the line. A lack of knowledge of cognitive science details could easily lead to such a simplistic view, however. It could easily seem that since the retina is composed of color sensing cells that color must be primary, but remember that shape, pattern and texture are captured at this same rudimentary level. At this point the inputs all go in parallel to different processing regions for each of the different qualia. Certain perceived structures or patterns may trigger additional sensations, but I am just talking about the qualia of color at this point. Ok, so you are ignoring the other qualia that exist in parallel and not as derivations of color qualia. So when talking about the structure of the conscious image, I am talking for example about the zero-sized dividing line between two differently colored areas. That’s ok but it ignores the specialized areas in the brain that actually produce the qualia that represent those regions as the conscious experience that you take for granted. This is an abstraction and does not look like anything. It is an abstract property of the color-image, not part of the image. Right, because you ignore it and do not know it is there. I, however, can actualy see such shapes and feel them as experience. One can meaningfully talk about the amount of blue (a primary color) but blue itself is not the amount _of_ something else, rather _is_ "something". Of course, an amount is an abstraction. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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That's nice in theory, but in fact it is not true that the other aspects of the visual image are derivitive of the qualia of color. it is in fact true because the other aspect you are talking about are not the ones I have been talking about, they are not aspects of the conscious color-image, see below: There are special regions in the brain for processing all such "abstract" qualia (including color), and their abstraction is at the same level as that of color. They each are processed in parallel in their equally important specialized regions down the line. A lack of knowledge of cognitive science details could easily lead to such a simplistic view, however. It could easily seem that since the retina is composed of color sensing cells that color must be primary, but remember that shape, pattern and texture are captured at this same rudimentary level. At this point the inputs all go in parallel to different processing regions for each of the different qualia. Qualia are not abstract, but the structure of qualia is an abstract property of qualia. In so far as the brain has "specialized regions" for processing the structure of the perceived information (which I have no reason to doubt, however I would not expect the retina itself to have such capabilities), then that may lead to qualia as well, and these qualia will again have abstract properties such as "structure" of their own. Ok, so you are ignoring the other qualia that exist in parallel and not as derivations of color qualia. No, but they have their own structure. B:
Of course, an amount is an abstraction. Yes, you can "feel" them as experience. I'm not ignoring that, I'm simply talking about something different. I'm talking about that each qualia has a structure of itself as an abstract property. Which means the conscious color-image has both characteristics that are abstract amounts, and characteristics (the look of blue) which are not amounts and also not abstract. As human beings, we can reflect on both structures: the perceived structures, and also, if we want to, reflect on the resulting structure of the conscious image (as well as on the non-amount-ive "look"). When we reflect on it, that is then again a real process, not abstract. Perhaps some animals experience ("feel") structure as well as color, but are perhaps not able to reflect on the fact that their color-image has an abstract structure itself. The experience of structure is not abstract, but the property of the image is an abstract property. Now, why did we go into this detail? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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it is in fact true because the other aspect you are talking about are not the ones I have been talking about Just because you weren’t talking about it does not make your statement true. … they are not aspects of the conscious color-image
Qualia are not abstract, but the structure of qualia is an abstract property of qualia. lol, ok. Qualia are entirely real, BUT they represent something which they are not. They represent aspects in the external world and in that sense they are abstract. S: Ok, so you are ignoring the other qualia that exist in parallel and not as derivations of color qualia.
Yes, so? All qualia has its own structure. Yes, you can "feel" them as experience. I'm not ignoring that, I'm simply talking about something different. Right, like I said you are ignoring the other aspects of qualia which are NOT derivative of color qualia, but act in parallel. I'm talking about that each qualia has a structure of itself as an abstract property. Oh, so now you are saying that each qualia has a structure of itself as an abstract quality? How is structure an abstraction rather than a reality? In what sense do you mean ‘abstract’? Which means the conscious color-image has both characteristics that are abstract amounts, and characteristics (the look of blue) which are not amounts and also not abstract. lol, clumsy categorizations, but ok. Perhaps some animals experience ("feel") structure as well as color, but are perhaps not able to reflect on the fact that their color-image has an abstract structure itself. Humans are such animals that FEEL the patterns and structures in their qualia. Now, why did we go into this detail? To get to the bottom of your arbitrary distinction. I don’t think it is really getting anywhere, however, because the language is too clumsy so I don’t mind if we just stop right here. If you can clarify things then I will respond, but otherwise I feel that we are still going around in circles. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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To get to the bottom of your arbitrary distinction. I don’t think it is really getting anywhere, however, because the language is too clumsy so I don’t mind if we just stop right here. If you can clarify things then I will respond, but otherwise I feel that we are still going around in circles. Speaking of the distinction between amount and non-amount, it is of course not getting anywhere because there is nowhere else to go regarding this question. Blue is not the amount of something else, it is "something". Yet blue is something different than green. And the difference between blue and green is not an amount because neither one of them is an amount. This is not the same as anywhere else because in physics we have only amounts and so physicists can have the hope of unifying everything and all forces to a single thing and/or a single force. Of course these physical amounts must be the amount of something or some things, but this thing or things does not have any known effect on us other than in terms of amounts. Whereas colors have an effect on us other than amounts: the difference between blue and green, and the fact that we can talk about this difference, which makes the fact that we talk about this difference a kind of process that is unheard of physics, hence something unheard of in physics must be going on in our brains. Ok? Agreed? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Ok? Agreed? Overall, yes. I really do think we are on basically the same page, but we have different preferences for the way in which we map things. Thank you, blue, for the conversation. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Overall, yes. I really do think we are on basically the same page, but we have different preferences for the way in which we map things. Thank you, blue, for the conversation. Great and yes, I am aware of both. The way in which I map things is not perfect and I hope I will learn in this regard. I'd like to encourage you to (further) develop your "own" way of mapping things. Thanks. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I'd like to encourage you to (further) develop your "own" way of mapping things. I have indeed been doing so and largely with your help to bounce ideas off. If you would like to see a recent paper of mine putting forth my interpretation of Spinoza's attributes in the context of Buckminster Fuller's "Nucleation of Observability" then I will be happy to send you a link to download it. Right now I am in the proofing stages so I am seeking Spinoza scholars to critique it for me and offer valuable feedback, but you have always offered valuable fedback in the past so I would enjoy feedback from you as well. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I will be happy to send you a link to download it. Sure, send away. Either here or via my homepage "Send a Message" ... |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Please also send the link to me or post it here
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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And how long have I been saying it? Quantification is inherently arbitrary, meaningless and trivial so your distinction fails.
So if now you are now finally admitting that quantification is arbitrary, meaningless and trivial then there are no distinctions to be made between inherently quantitative and non-quantitative qualia. Anything, including all qualia, can be quantitified, but that is not saying much at all really. It just means that we can speak about it systematically in another language regardless of its limitations. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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but that they also actually contradict materialistic statements about matter itself. The only materialistic statements that 'they', (i.e. immanent causation) contradicts are those which attempt to discretize and finitize matter as well as those which claim that ALL experience can be reduced, not just explained from an outside vantage point, but actually reduced, to an objective discrete, finite viewpoint as if a viewpoint (and only one) could and should be fundamental. I see the viewpoints of subjectivity and objectivity as symbiotic and part of the very same fundamental polarity implicit in the process of nucleation and modification itself. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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So do you deny really the subjectivity and non-numerical quality of perception? You wrote this in the same thread as, but following my explanation that "quantitative" does not mean "numeric". So I have to clarify this even more: A voltage is not numeric, it is analog, but still an amount, still quantitative. A number is a symbol, it is boolean, decimal, octal, or hexadecimal, and so on. An electrical voltage is of course not symbolic, but it has an amount. It is 5 Volts, or 12 Volts, or 110 or 220 Volts. It can be measured as a quantity, so it is quantitative. All by itself, even without measurement, it is quantitative even before it is measured. (Pending objections from quantum theory ;-)) |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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So I repeat my statement: "Everything we know about physical reality is quantitative." Are you following this conversation? Did you read the post where I granted you this claim, so long as we both understood what this really means? Did you accept those terms or reject them? Let us be clear that the term "quantitative" means simply that it *can* be quantified to an extent. So now what does this prove wrt your argument? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Are you following this conversation? Did you read the post where I granted you this claim, so long as we both understood what this really means? Did you accept those terms or reject them? Let us be clear that the term "quantitative" means simply that it *can* be quantified to an extent.
Actially I didn't read that one yet. (Since you post several messages in succession and I replied to the first one first and you reponded quickly so followed up on that response. etc. ;-)) Let me study your "terms" and other in-between messages when I have more time (perhaps this evening). |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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LOL.. I can resist jumping in here!
It seems that subtillioN succeeds at least in establishing his communication style... The difference is this: In physical world, if we know that two objects have the same size and all other quantitative (expressible in numbers, roughly speaking) measurements are the same as well, then there is nothing about those two objects that we could still imagine to be different. However in conscious experience, when two persons are looking at the same colored object, even if we know that the color-identifications in RGB values are the same. and both call the color blue, we can still consider it possible that they see "blue" in a different way, subjectively, and we can consider that possible even if all their neural processes are exactly the same, from a materialistic point of view. So in physical reality, numbers can describe everything we know, but in conscious reality, numbers cannot describe everything we see, they describe only the informational content, but not the specifics of conscious representation: the "look" of a color. And I have made this argument over and over, and if you guys still don't "get it", that's not my fault. And if you guys keep using insulting language, that only shows the quality of _your_ argument. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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The difference is this: In physical world, if we know that two objects have the same size and all other quantitative (expressible in numbers, roughly speaking) measurements are the same as well, then there is nothing about those two objects that we could still imagine to be different. Not so at all. The only case in which this identicality is true is the case of the abstract ideal in mathematics. In the real world no two objects can be ABSOLUTELY identical. Two perfect mathematical spheres are identical PRECISELY because they don't really exist except for the number representing their radius. However in conscious experience, when two persons are looking at the same colored object, even if we know that the color-identifications in RGB values are the same. and both call the color blue, we can still consider it possible that they see "blue" in a different way, subjectively, and we can consider that possible even if all their neural processes are exactly the same, from a materialistic point of view. Of course and no-one is denying this. This is the explanatory gap which is entirely real, but results from the nature of the polarity. So in physical reality, numbers can describe everything we know, but in conscious reality, numbers cannot describe everything we see, they describe only the informational content, but not the specifics of conscious representation: the "look" of a color. Again this was already agreed to. In the internal world only the subject has access to the referent. This is the opposite of the external world of objectivity where the referents are represented in tangible objects such as yard-sticks. And I have made this argument over and over, and if you guys still don't "get it", that's not my fault. I am afraid that you don't get the relevance of your own argument. No one is disputing your sole item of evidence in the explanatory gap. Yet you keep bringing it up as if it proves your point. That is about the totality of your argument. proving that blue is not objectively quantifiable. Well, duh. Subjectivity is not objectivity. So what's new? And if you guys keep using insulting language, that only shows the quality of _your_ argument. It actually shows the exasperation for someone who can't keep the argument straight. You keep arguing moot points that are already agreed to and which do not prove what you think they do. It gets annoying. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Not so at all. The only case in which this identicality is true is the case of the abstract ideal in mathematics. In the real world no two objects can be ABSOLUTELY identical. Two perfect mathematical spheres are identical PRECISELY because they don't really exist except for the number representing their radius. So what is that we know about these two objects, that shows them to be different, but is not quantitative? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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form, structure, qualitative appearance at deeper levels |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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form, structure, qualitative appearance at deeper levels What is non-quantitative about form and structure? What is "qualitative appearance at deeper levels" in terms of something we know about two objects? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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What is non-quantitative about form and structure? What is quantitative about the word "squiggly"? Off the top of your head can you give me a formula that represents it? Yet no doubt you understand what it means. This is qualitative meaning. What is "qualitative appearance at deeper levels" in terms of something we know about two objects? The way they LOOK regardless of whether we assign numbers to their parts. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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What is non-quantitative about form and structure? Their essence is entirely non-quantitative. They are real objects not simulated ones in a numerical computer. They exist whether or not someone measures their real non-quantitative forms. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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My earlier question: What is non-quantitative about form and structure?
Their essence is entirely non-quantitative. They are real objects not simulated ones in a numerical computer. They exist whether or not someone measures their real non-quantitative forms. What do we know about their essence? And what is it specifically that would be non-quantitative? (Again, "quantitative" includes "analog".) My statement was that everything we _know_ about physical reality is quantitative. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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What do we know about their essence? Number is man-made. Did man make the substance out of which everything is made? And what is it specifically that would be non-quantitative? REAL FORM (Again, "quantitative" includes "analog".) Wrong. Only in your mind. My statement was that everything we _know_ about physical reality is quantitative. That is absolutely untrue. Most of what I know about nature is NON-quantitative, i.e. qualitative. Do you deny that vision is qualitative? What about the color blue? Do you suppose that that color is the only qualitative aspect of vision? Are the other properties of vision both qualitative and quantitative or are they simply qualitative yet quantifiable? Can you see the difference yet? One refers to an ability and the other an essence. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I wrote:
That is absolutely untrue. Most of what I know about nature is NON-quantitative, i.e. qualitative. Do you deny that vision is qualitative? What about the color blue? Do you suppose that that color is the only qualitative aspect of vision? Are the other properties of vision both qualitative and quantitative or are they simply qualitative yet quantifiable? Can you see the difference yet? One refers to an ability and the other an essence. Now you start mixing physical reality and conscious experience again. Do I have to explain that the term "physical reality" refers to what we know so-called "objectively" about the "outer world"? You seem to be a materialist at core. The rest is poetry. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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"My statement was that everything we _know_ about physical reality is quantitative."
What are you talking about? You are the one who said that everything we can KNOW about physical reality is quantitative. That is a result of the mixture that was already there. Do I have to explain that the term "physical reality" refers to what we know so-called "objectively" about the "outer world"? Objectivity is not fundamentally quantitative. It is qualitative. When you look at things do you simply count them? Is the only thing that you can see the amounts of things? That is absurd. We see all sorts of qualitative properties in the objective world, not only the amounts of things. You seem to be a materialist at core. The rest is poetry. LOL you see them everywhere! |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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The simple difference here is that you are calling that which is quantifiable by the term quantitative. My point is that this nomenclature is misleading because not everything about objective reality is quantifiable and even if it were this still only refers to a conscious a posteriori process rather than the actual nature of the objects.
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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ok, blue. I will grant you that objective reality is quantifiable and even the use of the word "quantitative" to signify that capability, but only if you will grant me that underlying all quantification of observability is qualitative perception, i.e. the perception of colors, textures forms shapes etc, using no numbers whatsoever. Thus at root objectivity is pure awareness of external modifications. So long as those modifications which exist on all levels, internally and externally, can be observed and captured and kept track of then they can be quantified and we can assign arbitrary numeric symbols to them, but not otherwise.
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Thus at root objectivity is pure awareness of external modifications. I suppose that this sentence will come much too close to the interface of subject and object to be comfortable for you to accept. Your argument seems to rest on an absolute distinction between the two, but my argument demosntrates that they are an integral part of one another, i.e. they are symbiotic and even symbiogenetic. And furthermore I identify the actual interface itself in what I call the "mnemonic primitives" (forthcoming work) which are essential for BOTH subjectivity and objectivity. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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Again this was already agreed to. In the internal world only the subject has access to the referent. This is the opposite of the external world of objectivity where the referents are represented in tangible objects such as yard-sticks. Does radmail know this as well? His message is the one I responded to. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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I think he does, but you would have to ask him. Either way I am sure he could understand it immediately. He simply said that the subjective can be quantified SUBJECTIVELY, but he did not say that it could be OBJECTIVELY quantified. This is common practice in the medical industry where patients are asked to rate their subjective feelings of pain. "I'm at pain level 10, so shoot me up doc." Who can verify that this is EXACTLY and quantitatively so...including the patient himself? |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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>I think he does, but you would have to ask him. Either way I am sure he could understand it immediately. He simply said that the subjective can be quantified SUBJECTIVELY, but he did not say that it could be OBJECTIVELY quantified. This is common practice in the medical industry where patients are asked to rate their subjective feelings of pain. "I'm at pain level 10, so shoot me up doc." Who can verify that this is EXACTLY and quantitatively so...including the patient himself
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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excellente! Thanks radmail, the neurological details are much needed and welcome in such a discussion. |
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Re: Zen, and the symbiogenesis of subject and object |
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yes i think it adds an important piece to answer the diabolical question- what is consciousness? |
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